Veterans and Heroes: The Militarised Male Elite in Timor-Leste

Sarah Niner

To cite this article: Sarah Niner (2020): Veterans and Heroes: The Militarised Male Elite in Timor-Leste, The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology, DOI: 10.1080/14442213.2019.1711152

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14442213.2019.1711152

Published online: 29 Jan 2020.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 2

View related articles

View Crossmark data
Veterans and Heroes: The Militarised Male Elite in Timor-Leste

Sarah Niner ✉ *

The contemporary roles and relations of men in the nation of Timor-Leste (East Timor) are explored in this article, focusing on the construction of a hegemonic militarised masculinity in the post-conflict period. This construct is a cornerstone of contemporary society established during the twenty-four-year resistance to Indonesian occupation (1975–99) and the establishment of the new nation in 2002. Unsurprisingly, this society affords superior relations of power and privilege to the veterans and heroes who fought and suffered as part of the nationalist armed struggle for independence. This privileged, essentially male elite now reproduce relations of power that dominate less powerful men, women, and their respective concerns in the new state. While the most obvious negative impact of this social structure is the conflict between the male elites that led to violent conflict in 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2015, the development implications include growing inequality in the new society. Living with rigid gender roles and expectations causes health and psychological problems for many Timorese across the gender spectrum. Local programs exist to combat these challenges but the women’s movement and its allies require much more assistance and solidarity to effectively challenge the status quo.

Keywords: Masculinity; Gender Relations; Timor-Leste; Political Leadership; Militarisation

2019 marked the twentieth anniversary of the beginning of the new nation of Timor-Leste. It is an important time to reflect on contemporary gender relations established since the twenty-four-year resistance to Indonesian occupation (1975–99) and the declaration of the new nation in 2002. This article explores how contemporary gender relations and inequalities are to be accounted for. To do this I trace the

* Sara Niner is Course Director, Masters of International Development Practice, Monash University. Her research interests include: the culture and politics of Timor-Leste, gender relations across the region and critical development studies. Correspondence to: Sara Niner, School of Social Sciences, Monash University, E470 Menzies Building, Clayton 3800, Australia. Email: sara.niner@monash.edu

© 2020 The Australian National University
historical development of conceptions of masculinity, including the emergence of a
hegemonic, militarised masculinity in the post-conflict society. The central influences
explored are Timorese experiences of Portuguese colonialism and Indonesian occupa-
tion, which have, in turn, intersected with the underlying patriarchal structure
that existed in pre-colonial Timorese society.

My investigation focuses on the impact of the experiences of men associated with
war and militarisation in East Timor, tracing the construction of a militarised hegemo-
nic masculinity and exploring the implications for contemporary Timorese society.
The most significant implication of this dominant masculinity is the perpetuation of
violence and trauma\(^2\) in the post-conflict society and the deleterious effects on national
and human development. The peak of this violence was the ‘crisis’ of 2006 which,
along with other lesser episodes of recurring civil strife, caused fear and suffering
amongst the population. What is significant in these violent episodes is the normalisa-
tion of the dominance and privileging of violent men and the near-total absence of
other voices—that of more peaceful men or women. Yet not only civil or communal
violence is pervasive but private or domestic violence also. A government minister
explained East Timor’s ‘culture of violence’ to be the result of the Indonesian occu-
pation (UNICEF 2006). Physical violence is tolerated as ‘normal’ in local communities,
particularly the perpetration by those in positions of authority for ‘educative’ purposes
\((baku hanorin)^3\) including gendered or domestic violence—the crudest form of men’s
dominance over women (Niner 2011).

The discussion and findings in this article are the result of many years of historical
archival research, graduate and post-graduate fieldwork and ongoing research projects
2017b; 2018; Niner, Cornwell, and Benevides 2015; Niner and Loney 2019; Niner
Cummins and Tam 2019). The insights reflect discussions by the author with key
informants working in the field of men and violence in Timor-Leste and during aca-
 Niner, Wigglesworth, Santos, Tilman and Arunachalam 2015). Analysis of these
data about gender relations and masculinity in Timor-Leste draws on contemporary
theories regarding masculinities and gender inequality.

Conceptual Framework: Masculinity, Hegemony and Militarisation

The article marries several key concepts discussed below to explain the evolution of
gender relations in East Timor. In most anthropological writings on masculinity,
inequality—between women and men, but also between different groups of men—is
a common theme (Gutmann 1997). Gendered social structures and hierarchies are
created by the ‘systematic employment of gender dualisms’ in the ordering and organ-
isng of social activities such as the division of labour and the allocation of resources
and political positions of power (Risman 2004). This creates a gendered hierarchy of
power which, like other regimes of power, constitutes the domination by elites without
the necessity of force and violence, although the threat often remains (Donaldson
Hierarchy is built into social and cultural practices and institutions, including the socialisation of consent. Particular gendered power hierarchies are culturally articulated through a discourse of differences between men and women, often represented as natural biological attributes and enshrined through customary practices.

Strict gender relations can have detrimental effects on human wellbeing and the field of ‘men and masculinities’ studies has allowed for new investigations into the violence and trauma in men’s lives (Cornwall, Edstrom, and Greig 2011, 4). Internationally there is a strong link between various gender-related norms and notions of masculinity and gendered violence, as well as poor health outcomes for men. Raewyn Connell’s (1995) insight that violence related to masculinity is not just individualistic, but collectively defined in cultures, families, peer groups and public institutions, is important for its implications for analysis, change and transformation.

As Antonio Gramsci (1971) theorised in the 1920s, cultural hegemony is not achieved simply through active coercion, but through the socialisation of consent of the subaltern; in this case the subordinated gender categories of complicit, compliant and marginalised men and women in general. Hegemonic masculinity is the idealised and dominant form in a hierarchy of masculinities. It is typically heterosexual and closely connected to the institution of marriage (Connell 1995, 186). Hegemonic masculinities are not maintained through active male conspiracies, but through more complex, indirect and subtle processes which present their dominance as the way of the world, and their powerful position ‘as entirely natural, normal and straightforward’ (Edley and Wetherall 1996, 108). However, while masculinity may be hegemonic, it is not homogeneous, and differentiation is closely bound up with class and other hierarchies based on social categories of education, wealth, ethnicity, sexuality and disability (Connell 2002). Individual agency cuts across these structural constraints.

Militarisation in post-war societies re-entrenches the privileging of masculinity as Cynthia Enloe (2004, 217–218) explains, outlining the core beliefs of militarisation:

(a) that armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions; (b) that human nature is prone to conflict; (c) that having enemies is a natural condition; (d) that hierarchical relations produce effective actions; (e) that a state without a military is naive, scarcely modern, and barely legitimate; (f) that in times of crisis those who are feminine need armed protection; and (g) that in times of crisis any man who refused to engage in armed violent action is jeopardizing his masculinity. (Enloe 2004, 219)

Many of these assumptions are observed in post-conflict environments and the data and findings presented below will show that Timor-Leste is no exception.

Militarised masculinity is a ‘fusion of certain practices and images of males with the use of weapons, the exercise of violence, and the performance of an aggressive and frequently misogynist masculinity’ (Theidon 2016). This article traces the development of a militarised masculinity in Timor-Leste derived from an ‘autochthonous warrior culture’ (Myrttinen 2005, 240) forged through colonial martial rule and intensified during post-colonial armed conflict with the Indonesian military. Understandably the resulting ‘warrior brotherhood’ may be more loyal to one another than to any ‘feminine or individualistic’ tendencies (Kirby and d’Estree 2008). In post-conflict
environments violence and militarism remain attractive to men, particularly when other traditional options for status are hard to access (Chant and Guttman 2002)—as has been the case for many men in East Timor throughout the historical periods surveyed below. In these fluid post-conflict environments, violence is often produced by ‘alpha-males’ jockeying for political power and control of resources.

**Discussion**

*Contemporary Society*

Timor-Leste has experienced a substantial increase in GDP as a result of its share of profits of the exploitation of petroleum deposits in the Timor Sea. While these sudden riches have marginally decreased poverty levels, Timor-Leste remains one of the least economically developed countries in the Asia-Pacific region. How the government is saving and spending the new wealth has become a matter of great public debate (Scheiner 2014; Scambary 2013; Barma 2014; Dale, Lepuschuetz, and Umaphathi 2014). Applying a gender lens to this dispersal of resources in Timorese society elucidates the post-conflict gendered power relations created. According to the theories of Gramsci and Connell, this is accomplished through the socialisation of consent within cultures and institutions: cultures privilege and award positions of power to particular people or groups of people who then allocate and distribute material resources, maintaining and reinforcing the positions of those in power.

The new oil wealth in Timor-Leste is distributed through various government social welfare and investment schemes that are highly gendered (Niner 2017b). A key example is provided by the substantial government expenditure on pensions and payments to male veterans who are also favoured for important government positions, and in the awarding of government contracts for national infrastructure.

Such economic inequality is supported by data that show much lower incomes for women and high levels of domestic violence. The latter occurs within the context of a generalised tolerance for violence in contemporary society that is associated with the effects of conflict and trauma. The Commission for Truth, Reception and Reconciliation (CAVR) final report, Chega!, links current high levels of domestic violence and sexual abuse directly to the period of armed conflict:

…”domestic violence was a common occurrence in the current lives of many victims. For example, some male survivors of detention and torture told the Commission that they had fallen into a pattern of violent behavior. (CAVR 2005)

Nearly 70 per cent of children in school have experienced a teacher beating them with a stick, while over half have also experienced being beaten with a stick and shouted at by their parents (UNICEF 2006). Various surveys and studies have concluded that a majority also accepts a husband’s right to physically punish his wife if she contravenes certain gender roles and expectations (Niner et al. 2013), and domestic violence rates are high as the statistics below demonstrate.
The most comprehensive data on violence against women in Timor-Leste is found in the 2010 National Demographic and Health Survey (NDS 2010) in which 38 per cent of women surveyed reported experiencing physical violence from the age of fifteen, of which 80 per cent involved a current or former husband or partner. Attitudes of men and their motivations for perpetrating domestic violence are also explained. For example, 80 per cent of men surveyed agreed with at least one justification for a man beating his wife (such as ‘if a wife neglected the children’, 71 per cent, or ‘arguing with a husband’, 44 per cent). It is estimated that domestic violence accounts for 40 per cent of all reported crime in Timor-Leste, yet formal justice systems often fail women attempting to pursue justice for such crimes (JSMP 2004). This situation has improved with the introduction of the Law Against Domestic Violence in 2010 and government policies to explain or ‘socialise’ this law with the general population.

The new generation who have grown up since the withdrawal of Indonesia — those under eighteen now represent 55 per cent of the current population (NDS 2010, 12)— remain affected by the events of the occupation. A 2013 study with 500 young men (aged 17–24) concerning their attitudes toward equal gender relations described the dominant form of their masculinity as tough, aggressive, virile and heterosexual (Niner et al. 2013). The data show that the male respondents’ aggressiveness increased and support for gender equity diminished with age. While most of the young men in the survey agreed with broad gender equality statements, they showed a lack of commitment to more equitable gender relations closer to home and within their own personal relationships with the women in their lives. In the face of rapid social change they expressed a preference for the maintenance of traditional values that confer power and status to masculinity and age.

The study also revealed the blaming of women victims of male violence, along with high levels of acceptance of public sexual harassment and forced sex. Disturbingly, nearly one third (31 per cent) of young men surveyed did not think forced sex could be described as violence and nearly half (42 per cent) thought that a woman could not refuse to have sex with her husband. In a later study (Asia Foundation 2016), 20 to 30 per cent of men surveyed admitted to rape, and this may be linked to even higher levels of sexual abuse experienced by these men, discussed below.

Due to the Indonesian occupation, the Catholic Church in Timor-Leste had remained largely unaffected by liberal changes introduced by the second Vatican Council (1962–65) (Harris Rimmer 2005, 164, 173). A female Timorese activist in Esther Richards’s study explains that even today Catholic priests will not accept ‘modern’ ideas about gender equality or address sexual abuse and violence:

... they are more inclined to men’s perspectives and although they participate in training events they are always slightly more inclined to the patriarchal mentality. Sometimes when women activists find out about sexual abuse and women speak out there is normally some conflict with the Church—this is because priests don’t always accept that [...] Also because (when it comes to) women’s rights in the home and in public, priests say that women aren’t ready, they need to learn more
and they can’t copy things from abroad, these ideas are ‘modern’. They defend the traditional culture. (Richards 2017)

Disturbing sexual violence is also prevalent. One-quarter of men in a 2015 study said they had perpetrated partner and/or non-partner rape at least once in their life motivated by sexual entitlement, fun, entertainment or boredom (TAF 2016, 22). This may be linked to even higher levels of sexual abuse of the men themselves. A shocking 42 per cent of the 839 men surveyed reported being sexually abused before the age eighteen—nearly double the rate reported by a corresponding group of women (TAF 2016, 23). While research data do not yet exist on perpetrators of male victims, it seems unlikely that these young boys were sexually abused by girls or women but, rather, by more powerful boys or men from within their own families, communities, clubs, churches and schools—highlighting Connell’s statement that violence related to masculinity is not only individualistic, but collectively defined in cultures, families, peer groups and public institutions.

While the 2015 study did not examine the backgrounds of the perpetrators, it might be reasoned that the perpetrators were once victims themselves and are perpetuating cycles of abuse. Wardrop (2009, 123) writes about ‘violence as a reassertion of masculinity’ in post-apartheid South Africa. She explains that this kind of ‘threatened masculinity’ derives from repeated trauma: ‘collective and individual acts of violence, expressions of dominance impelled by past and present wounds, by fear, by the urgent demands of vulnerable, wounded, senses of self’.

Three key factors are associated with the use of this kind of sexual violence: ‘the culture of masculinity (and, by extension, patriarchy)’ but, also, ‘the economic motivations of the actors, and the political climate that facilitates each due to weak state institutions’ (Meger 2012, 70–71). In Timor-Leste today, a tough and brutalised masculinity linked to the long military occupation and its legacy of ongoing post-conflict violence is apparent in the aggressive, militarised male leadership which prevails across national political institutions. This leadership has also created a patronage network and weak state institutions that have led to growing economic underdevelopment and inequality.

Customary Timorese Society

Acceptance of customary leadership and social hierarchy is strong and enduring in East Timor. This includes the local hereditary kings or Liurai, and their families—here both women and men hold power and privilege. Customary gender roles and relations are modelled in indigenous cosmology and in the myths and legends of ancestors and warriors. The tasi-feto, the female sea, to the north of the island embodies attributes of calmness and gentleness, but to the south, the unrestrained and wild male sea, the tasi-mane, is feared and treacherous (Traube 1995, 46). This and other beliefs provide insight into the gendered behaviour attributed to men and women in customary Timor. Gender relations in indigenous societies such as Timor-Leste,
however, are different to the strict gender roles delineated in modern or Western capitalist patriarchies and are often more pragmatic and fluid, enhanced by acceptance of third genders (Trindade 2017; Niner 2018). Context and flexibility are hallmarks of Timorese customary ways of being and this applies to gender relations also. These traditional or Timorese indigenous gender norms vary between ethno-linguistic groups, with social organisation ranging from patrilocal to matrilocal. The ideal for gender relations is described below:

In the traditional realm, before European arrival, there are oral-references to an egalitarian society (‘tempu rai diak’ [the tranquil time], our parents call it in Tetun) where men and women equally participated in ritual, social, cultural, political and economic activities freely, in a balance manner. (Trindade 2017)

However, the dominance of men in formal social exchange and political processes and in public or political decision-making processes is well established, while women, particularly senior women, hold less obvious power in private family domains and in spiritual practices. The feminine and fertility are powerful forces in indigenous belief systems (Fox 1980; Hicks 1984; Cristalis and Scott 2005; Trindade 2009) and anthropological accounts confirm the prominence given to women in ritual practices and the centrality of fertility as a powerful and sought after asset. Contemporary relations evidence a dilution of the high value ascribed to the feminine and fertility—likely the result of colonialism and conflict.

While customary masculinities no doubt varied across respective ethnolinguistic groups, insights do exist in early ethnographic research such as David Hicks’s writing about Viqueque in the 1960s:

In stipulating the qualities that define masculinity, people to whom I spoke stressed courage and force, most flamboyantly celebrated in narratives describing headhunting expeditions […] a practice Portuguese authorities brought to an end […] (Hicks 2004, 102–108)

Hicks describes bachelors engaging in kick-fighting games, but only married men being permitted to take part in the more serious cock-fights which remain popular today. The warrior as fighting rooster is a cultural analogy common throughout Timor. Hicks proposes that cockfighting had replaced the custom of headhunting for Timorese warriors and was particularly important in its aspect of blood-letting, as symbolically it opens “lines of communication” between sacred and secular, and this is the most prominent way in which fertility and life are infused from the former to the later’ (Hicks 2004, 102). The ‘… violent shedding of blood activates the socially procreative potential of males’ (Hicks 2004, 108), transmitting the powerful forces of fertility and life, from the sacred realm to mortal men in the secular world (otherwise only biologically available to women). Many of these indigenous practices were adopted by modern warriors during the Indonesian occupation.

In customary patriarchal Timorese society described by Hicks (2004), bachelors are considered ‘socially impotent’ and married men ‘socially competent’. Only when men marry do they enter ‘socially influential and economically responsible roles’
This social system marginalises unmarried men unable to afford the prohibitive costs of marriage rituals, and privileges rich and powerful men. Here we can see the limiting of options for men during hard times, such as during conflict when resources are scarce. The cultural hegemony of heterosexual marriage and then reproduction as the basis for social competency provides married men with social superiority over other men—those either not inclined to be married or too young, too poor or too disabled to do so—as well as over women and children in their kinship group. While these practices reflect, in part, Connell’s hegemonic masculinity, the matter of monogamy provides an important exception. Monogamy, and perhaps heterosexuality too, had not been a strict requirement for achieving this cultural hegemony in indigenous societies, particularly for elite men, but these moral prescriptions have become influential through the teachings of the Catholic Church and Portuguese colonialism.

**The Portuguese: Martial Law, Militarisation and Catholicism**

By the eighteenth century lack of economic, military and political power saw the Portuguese colonies reduced to footholds in Macau, Malacca and the half-island colony of East Timor, where they maintained tenuous control of territory through alliances with local ‘kings’. These alliances generated intimacies and intermarriage. This intermixing of colonist and colonised, labelled *lustropicalismo*, was portrayed as a superior, less racist kind of colonialism (Vale de Almeida 2008, 1). Over hundreds of years the model of European patriarchy was introduced and imbricated into local systems. The imprinting of a foreign gender order has created complex structures of gender relations all over the world (Connell 2002, 254).

The most significant cohort of the colonial regime was the Portuguese military. Governors were always high-ranking military officers. They depended upon the longer-serving, lower ranks, repeatedly referred to as ‘venal’ and ‘brutal’, who engaged in ‘inter-dynastic feuding’ and ‘sub-altern intrigue’ to manage relations with Timorese elites (Davidson 1994, 13). The level of intimacy between the Timorese and Portuguese ensured this model of militarised masculinity was influential.

Weak colonial control during the seventeenth century coincided with an era of Timorese Queens who made decisions at the highest levels of society and were politically and diplomatically dominant (Hagerdal and Kammen 2017). Women leaders secured power and influence in the shifting colonial world where native and colonial elites continually negotiated the terms of their power. However, as the colonial state became stronger, ruling became ‘solely a male affair’. In 1903 colonial authorities secured their power economically and forbade *Liurai* to collect traditional tribute from communities. Instead, Timorese were compelled to pay ‘taxes’ directly to government agents (Gunn 1999, 172–175). This ‘head’ tax was collected from every male head of family, formalising the European model of the patriarchal family. Although Timorese rebelled against these changes, East Timor was pacified for the first time and the constitution of a colonial patriarchal order was complete.
The colonial army instituted formal national service and at the lower levels of colonial administration Timorese and *mestiço* men were ‘employed, and carefully controlled, in the service of the colonial power’ (cf. Brownell and Besnier 2013). Timorese men were conscripted to serve in the colonial army, including Xanana Gusmão who has described the inherent racism in the institution (Niner 2009, 19–21). A Latino-style militarised machismo apparent in Portuguese colonial armies has been described as aggressively heterosexual (cf. Connell 2002, 254), developed through an active and obligatory regime of homosociality and performances of virility and bravery (Vale de Almeida 1997).

For much of the twentieth century, Portuguese Timor was ruled directly by the fascist dictatorship of Antonio Salazar which censored the politics of anti-colonialism, feminist liberation and the sexual revolution. By the twentieth century, a colonial oligarchy of key families had been established, many of whom remain powerful in Timor today. Out of this elite, the first generation of nationalist leaders, including Jose Ramos Horta, Mari Alkatiri, and Xanana Gusmão, were shaped by colonial policies of cultural domination and racial and gender discrimination.

The moral and spiritual underpinnings of the colonial gender regime was, however, provided by the archly conservative Catholic Church—itself a patriarchal institution ordered by hierarchy and sacred obedience which strengthened and ossified the patriarchal structures of East Timorese society. Males were brought up to be the head of household and directly responsible for the control, care and protection of their families (Thatcher 1993, 74–75; Pinto and Jardine 1997, 84). In the strict Catholic school system in which the Timorese elite were educated, harsh physical punishment was normal and has remained so not just within the education system but also in Timorese society. While boys studied Latin and Portuguese history, girls were trained in the domestic arts to run strict, clean and pious homes. The education of boys was prioritised and they were subject to less strict codes of behaviour. Boys spent more time in public activities with their elders, while women and girls were consigned to becoming homemakers.

The collapse of the colonial regime in 1974 was followed by a three-week civil war between progressive anti-colonial forces and the conservative oligarchy. This war, secretly manipulated by Indonesian military agents, was the precursor to the larger war and invasion. Xanana Gusmão, the most powerful of the contemporary male elite, has compared this civil war to a cockfight: awarding responsibility to the macho-aggressive attitudes of the various Timorese political leaders of the 1970s (Gusmão 1994, 31). The victors of the civil war, FRETILIN, reconstituted their faction of Timorese soldiers serving in the Portuguese Army as FALINTIL (Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste / Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) providing the basis of a ‘modern’ militarised masculinity (Niner 2009). It is this cohort that not only resisted the massive and brutal attack of the US and Australian-backed Indonesian military for twenty-four years, but then went on to become the core of the new national army after Indonesian withdrew in 1999.
Indonesian Occupation: The Intensification of Militarisation

The twenty-four-year regime of terror profoundly affected and traumatised the whole of Timorese society. It also transfigured FALINTIL from an anti-colonial artefact into an armed guerrilla insurgency, igniting the formation of the clandestine resistance. Many prominent figures in today’s government and armed forces are veterans of this struggle, revered and rewarded for their service and sacrifice in creating the new nation.

There are reasons for this. Tragically, by the late 1970s, approximately 100,000 Timorese people had been killed as a result of the invasion and occupation, along with most of the original FRETILIN Central Committee leadership. The women’s arm of this committee, OPMT (Organização Popular Mulher Timorense / Popular Organisation of Timorese Women), advocated for the liberation of women. While OPMT remained a key part of resistance structures, its ability to advocate for women was balanced with the needs of the nationalist struggle. The argument that nationalist priorities must take precedence over women’s rights was not easily overcome and some women activists found themselves excluded. The resistance structure that developed within Timor was, by necessity, nationalist, militaristic, authoritarian and clandestine—rather than revolutionary—as it had been conceived by the early FRETILIN leadership opposing colonial control (see Niner 2009). What remained of the resistance from the early 1980s onward was revived and led both politically and militarily by Xanana Gusmão, held to no program of women’s liberation and, in fact, had little capacity to think beyond basic survival. Conditions were harsh and often terrifying. The guerillas relied on family and traditional clan networks to survive and revive the resistance. No woman ever held a senior position within this wholly male power hierarchy (Niner 2004, 103–106, 111–119).

Henri Myrttinen (2005, 240) argues that the FALINTIL guerillas developed their own ‘autochthonous warrior culture’ based on indigenous customs. Gusmão has described the effectiveness of the magical talismans worn by guerrillas (as protection from Indonesian bullets) reduced through the action of a soldier engaging in sex with a woman (Niner 2004). In a synchronicity of logic, Gusmão also explained that he often refused to let women into FALINTIL camps, enforcing a strict homosociality amongst the resistance army. He criticised his fellow guerrillas for remaining with their families or allowing them to stay in the guerrilla camps (Gusmão 1994, 58, 59, 63), viewing this as weak and undisciplined. Instead he advocated the abandonment of wives and children—an action he had already taken twice by ‘turning his heart to stone’ (Niner 2009). An effective soldier, in his army, was a man loyal only to the masculine military group and unencumbered by family and the feminine. The Timorese warriors of previous centuries were similarly segregated from their wives and community, just as the fighting cock is segregated from the flock before a fight. As noted there are strong associations between the symbology of the cock or fighting rooster, the indigenous warrior and the modern guerrilla soldier (Figure 1).
Not only the FALINTIL guerrillas were affected by an intensified militarisation. Virtually all East Timorese men were comprehensively and systematically militarised and exposed to the violent model of masculinity inherent in the Indonesian military (cf. Wilson 2002, 212). Timorese conscripts were organised into a variety of formal and informal military groupings. In the early 1980s, in line with the national Indonesian internal security system, civilian defence units called *ratih* were estimated to number 31,000 along with 6700 *hansips* (Robinson 2003, 20; Niner 2009). Timorese men and boys were press-ganged into killing their fellow Timorese, occupying the ‘cutting edge of many counter-insurgency operations’ (Turner 1992, 158).

Paramilitaries formed the basis of militias who carried out the destructive plans of the Indonesian military in 1999, leaving behind a ‘volatile, living legacy of a deeply militarised society’ (Scambary 2009). A further penetration of civilian society was accomplished by Indonesian social engineering to integrate young men into state-organised sporting activities and youth groups (Ryter 1998). This included military-style marching groups and martial arts groups that still remain popular today. A clandestine civilian resistance network grew in opposition to this Indonesian strategy. The 1990s became the decade of the political coming of age of the generation who grew up under Indonesian occupation. These young activists, referred to as the *gerasaun foun*, established the civilian wing of the resistance. The social structures that had previously enabled men to acquire status were reduced during the occupation and in the post-conflict era.

*Figure 1* Xanana on His Return to Timor with Falintil Commander Taur Matan Ruak (on left) and Commander Lere (on Right) in Their First Reunion after the Ballot, Los Palos, October 1999. Photo Courtesy of Kirsty Sword Gusmão.
The Post-Conflict Legacy

Connell (2002, 256) has described how the reassertion of men’s patriarchal authority after conflict acts to shape the establishment of the armed forces. Enloe (2004, 217–219) proposes that war and militarisation rest on the core beliefs that humans are prone to conflict and having enemies, and that women and children require protection from this, and, further, a society that has become used to war and conflict will privilege those men who have engaged in it above those who have not. As in most post-conflict places in the world, demobilisation in Timor failed to deal with the deep imprinting of violent masculinities in former combatants and the effects of militarisation on the society overall. Those who fought in the independence struggle—brutalised by experiences of armed conflict, deprivation, imprisonment, torture, and also the loss and torture of family and fellow soldiers—have assumed positions of power that enable a massive influence on society. Moreover, militarisation in Timor did not stop at the end of the Indonesian occupation in 1999, but continued with the arrival of around 10,000 peacekeeping forces and the pervasive influence of the ‘masculine nature of the UN administration’ (see Vijaya Joshi 2005) (Figure 2).

Figure 2 Xanana Gusmão and CNRT Election Poster, Dili, n.d. Photo by Ed Rees.
The establishment of substantial army and police forces under the auspices of the UN was heavily criticised by experts (Rees 2004; Hood 2006). A central criticism was that the politicisation of both forces was the result of inept processes of selection and training of candidates. The police force, PNTL, recruited many disgruntled veterans and came to represent a rival agency to the army, F-FDTL, leading to conflict in the political leadership and violent riots in 2004. This institutionalised rivalry has been crudely described as one between the army, dominated by ex-guerrillas loyal to President Xanana, and the police force, controlled by Rogerio Lobato, an original, influential member of FRETILIN and loyal to the first government. Minister Lobato supplied hundreds of semi-automatic weapons to the police with more arriving later in the year. Civil unrest grew in June 2004 when four civilians died in incidents of mob violence involving martial arts groups. Growing discord and ideological conflict between President Gusmao and Prime Minister Alkatiri and his FRETILIN government caused friction and instability.

These conflicts came to a head in the national crisis of 2006 that shattered the process of national reconstruction. The crisis offers a prime example of the outcome of the development of a militarised leadership. Led by feuding members of the militarised male elite, Timorese society fragmented along old and new political and cultural fracture lines. Over several weeks of fighting between various factions of army and police, thirty-seven were killed and mobs filled the vacuum with chaotic violence, looting and burning. Up to 150,000 people fled to IDP camps.8

In partial explanation, academic and wife of Timorese political leader La Sama, Jacqueline Siapno (2006), wrote at the time that, ‘Militarisation was so successful in East

Figure 3 National Coat of Arms featuring an AK-47 Assault Rifle and Bow and Arrows.
Timor that even after independence, violence and war is still an attractive option for most men’. This process of militarisation of society was symbolised the following year, in 2007, when a new national coat of arms was introduced that included an AK-47 assault rifle alongside the traditional bow and arrow (Figure 3).

The brutality of the occupation and the violence of 2006 spawned an even more divisive male leader, Alfredo Reinado, this time from the generacao foun—the younger men who had largely allied themselves with older male elite in the struggle for independence.9 Leading a gang of deserters from F-FDTL in the western part of Timor, Reinado began calling on the government to do more to help the poor and became a hero for many of the disenfranchised. He elaborated a ‘Rambo’ style of dress, appearing heavily armed with mirrored sunglasses and, reportedly, sporting a ‘Triple X’ tattoo on the back of his neck, emulating the Hollywood action movie persona of Vin Diesel (Abdullah and Myrttinen 2009, 17). His public notoriety spread and young urban men began to replicate his hypermasculine military style and graffiti his name on walls (Figure 4).

This street-fashion was a new iteration of the militarised masculinity of the older male elite and a dangerous role model for young men in Timor-Leste, valorising male dominance, aggression and violence along with a rampant virility and heterosexuality (Myrttinen 2003, 38). Reinado’s image borrowed not only from the FALINTIL resistance heroes with their indigenous and Portuguese era heritage, but also the military strong man image of the Indonesian generals and their militias with which Reinado had grown up alongside. After a failed capture attempt, Reinado posted a video on YouTube taunting Gusmão. In February 2008, Reinado allegedly attacked the house of President Jose Ramos Horta. Amidst substantial gunfire between security

Figure 4 Alfredo Reinado.
forces and Reinado and his men, Horta was severely injured and Reinado slain. No person has yet been made accountable for his death, although a variety of conspiracy theories exist.

Although Reinado’s death retraumatised the population, displays of militarisation have continued, such as the ceremony for the ten-year anniversary of the police in March 2010, with its celebration of weaponry and the ongoing substantial purchases of military arms and hardware. The violence also continued with the insurrection of ex-guerrilla fighter Mauk Moruk (Paulino Gama) and his banned Maubere Revolutionary Council (KRM) in 2013–15. Like Reinado, Moruk began to repeatedly challenge the government to address poverty and unemployment and sought power, ostensibly to address these issues. Local human rights organisations documented dozens of cases of beatings by security officials of suspected KRM members. An Amnesty International report (2016, 363) related that: ‘Accountability mechanisms remained weak. Dozens of individuals were arbitrarily arrested and tortured or otherwise ill treated by security forces as part of joint security operations in Baucau district between March and August [2015]’. After allegedly attacking police at the eastern tip of the island, Moruk and several others were killed by security forces sanctioned by the national political leadership. Once again aggressive conflict between the highly militarised male elite ended in further ex-judicial slayings and national anxiety (Figure 5).

The dangers inherent in these ongoing clashes are even now being admitted by the male elite themselves. At the end of his presidency in 2017, ex-FALINTIL and F-FDTL leader, Taur Matan Ruak, spoke about the ongoing conflict between himself and Gusmão (born out of the 2006 conflict) and also the current Commander of F-

![Figure 5 Mauk Moruk with Followers.](image)
A characteristic of military people is being too up-front, and lacking diplomacy. It’s a flaw of mine that causes embarrassment. Now I’m having to learn to do things differently, but before you learn others have to take you how you are.¹⁰

The consequences are often much more serious than embarrassment—as demonstrated by the events of 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2015. Superior relations of power and privilege favour these veterans and heroes of the nationalist armed struggle for independence. Local histories, supported by the wider political analysis of East Timor’s conflict-riven past, privilege men and the actions and experiences of men, most often the elite male leadership, who are assumed to represent the nation (Amal 2017).¹¹ Other social categories of men are rewarded for conforming or being allied or complicit with this new hegemonic order, or censured and marginalised for contesting this dominant paradigm (Meger 2014, 3).

In civil society today, including the generation born from the late 1990s with little direct involvement in the war years, the effects of militarisation are felt in various ways. A 2005 World Bank report estimated approximately 20,000 registered martial arts members and as many as 90,000 unregistered members across Timor-Leste (Ostergaard 2005, 22). Amongst this plethora of groups are the remnants of resistance militias from the occupation and some criminal gangs with links to Indonesia. Some of the older members of currents martial arts groups, themselves former members of the clandestine resistance movement who provided neighbourhood security from Indonesian army and militias, continue to demand the status they once enjoyed as protectors (Scambary 2013). Unlike the FALINTIL fighters, who have received medals and pensions, these men have not been similarly recognised and compensated, and seek status in other ways.

Many of the young men who join martial arts groups and gangs in Timor today are rural migrants. Leaving traditional rural societies, they have few means to reproduce the traditional rites of manhood (Scambary 2013). These youth struggle to meet family obligations and expectations, such as maintaining the sacred houses, finding work and getting married—all of which must be undertaken before they can be regarded as ‘socially competent’ adult men in customary society (Hicks 2004). With few opportunities for education or wage employment, young men have limited means for demonstrating their worth, status and masculinity. In this ‘crisis’ of masculinity, one way of establishing status and respect is through the performance of masculinity afforded by group and gang membership.

Conclusion

This article has traced the construction and dominance of a hegemonic militarised masculinity in Timor reproduced in contemporary society by an elite leadership of
men who control the significant state institutions of government, police and army. These veterans of the war with Indonesia are revered in the post-war society formed over the last nineteen years. A hierarchy based on past service to the resistance has been established, and leaders of the armed and clandestine resistance occupy privileged leadership positions in contemporary society and are recipients of significant social welfare and investment schemes. This privileged male elite reproduces relations of power that dominate less powerful and non-conforming men, women, and their respective concerns in the new state. The most serious negative implication has been ongoing outbreaks of violent civil conflict, the most recent in 2015. These dynamics are not uncommon to post-conflict societies that are prone to persistent militarisation, but this gendered social structure is not only a result of past conflict and Indonesian occupation. The underlying patriarchal structures of indigenous societies and colonial influence are called upon and imbricated in contemporary expressions of masculinity.

Although this elite male leadership is ageing, their influence on younger men in the subsequent generations is profound. Many of the generacao foun have been allied and co-opted into national conflicts and in some, a new or repurposed, more violent masculinity is displayed by figures such as Alfredo Reinado and leaders of various martial arts clubs. An even younger generation of men displays a tough and aggressive masculinity with attitudes that are harmful to themselves and their families.

In Timor-Leste, as in many post-war places in the world, addressing violence requires transformative cultural and institutional change and sustained challenges to patriarchy and militarisation. While future work should focus on community norm change with men, women, boys and girls to shift versions of masculinity that promote violence; power hierarchies and oppression in society must also be addressed (Jewkes, Flood, and Lang 2015).

The implications for contemporary Timorese society if these issues are not addressed are a tough and aggressive politically competitive environment that excludes many citizens. As well as the barriers and discrimination that women face, men are also restricted in their lives by rigid gender roles and expectations. Living with social expectations—both the measure of success and aggressive even violent interactions with other men, and women and children—and being burdened with the sole responsibility for family and decision-making cause health and psychological problems for many men. In global terms, men’s performance of masculinity increases their risk of dying in many ways: they are six times more likely to die in combat and twice as likely to die from suicide (WHO 2014). The lack of individual freedom and deprivation of human potential and capability caused by such strict gender regimes is perhaps unmeasurable, but has clearly negative effects on national peace, democracy and national and human development.

Solutions offered by researchers and practitioners in this field to these problems focus on masculinities, involving men in work to reflect and transform their thinking on gender relations, improve their health and combat violence. Despite these challenges, culturally appropriate programs—developed by the local women’s movement
and their allies in the small men’s movement fighting gender inequality—already exist in Timor. Furthermore, the youthful population presents an opportunity to contest the long-standing acceptance of violence and engage youth as allies in prevention. Counter-hegemonic expressions of masculinity are clearly visible in Timorese society and several men’s activist groups are operating to counter the negative impacts of aggressive masculinity. While these men, alongside efforts by the tenacious women’s movement, have the potential to begin to ameliorate the negative impacts of this militarised male elite, these groups are not yet sufficiently influential to effectively challenge the status quo. These tenacious citizens fighting the mainstream values of their own society are in need of greater solidarity from both within their own society and beyond.

Notes

[1] Timor, Portuguese Timor, East Timor, Timor Loro’sae or Timor-Leste? There is debate about the name of the territory of East Timor. During the period of Portuguese colonisation it was usually referred to as ‘Portuguese Timor’ in English language contexts and, simply, ‘Timor’ in Portuguese. After the Indonesian invasion it was more often referred to as ‘East Timor’ in English language contexts, or as RDTL (the Republica Democratica Timor-Leste / the Democratic Republic of East Timor) by the independence movement in resistance and Portuguese contexts. It was widely referred to in Tetun as ‘Timor Loro’sae’ during the later resistance period. While this term fell by the wayside when the country was again declared RDTL in 2002, 'Timor-Leste' was also used, and 'East Timor' used to refer to the country in English. Some Timorese object to this, arguing that everyone should use the official name chosen after such a long struggle. English language editors do not agree, complying with stylistic conventions that the English translation should be used when writing in English. I have tried to use the appropriate term in each context.

[2] A study carried out in 2000 documented that nearly all Timorese had experienced at least one traumatic event during the Indonesian occupation. Three-quarters had experienced combat and more than half had come close to death: 12 per cent had lost children to political violence; 57 per cent had been tortured; 22 per cent had witnessed the murder of relatives or friends. One-third was classified as having post-traumatic stress—someone in every family—and 20 per cent of people believed they would never recover (Modvig et al. 2000, 1763). The type of masculinities created and prevailing in a post-conflict environment such as Timor is the subject of discussion in this article.

[3] This phrase and all other non-English terms in this article are in Tetun, the national language of Timor-Leste.

[4] The national rate of MPI (multi-dimensional poverty index) is 68 per cent, as reported in the UNDP Human Development Report, but there is a great deal of variation in the poverty rate by district, the lowest being in the capital of Dili (Cornwell, Inder, and Datt 2016). The latter research paper provides comprehensive recent information on poverty in Timor-Leste.

[5] In the 2013 Masculinity study (Niner, Cornwell, and Benevides 2015, 70–71) general principles of gender equity (women’s equal rights to study, work and respect) were agreed to by over 89 per cent of survey respondents, allowing us to project broad societal support. The acceptance of attitudes of gender inequality was concentrated in situations relating to
men maintaining power and control within marital relationships. Although overwhelming agreement was expressed for young women’s equal rights to education and work, this was not reflected in changes within the household that would enable women to study or work outside the home more easily.

[6] These shocking statistics are from the Asia Foundation (2016) report Understanding Violence against Women and Children in Timor-Leste: Findings from the Nabilan Baseline Study – Summary Report. It continues: ‘Overall, three-quarters of women (72 per cent) and men in both sites (77–78 per cent) experienced at least one form of physical and/or sexual abuse before age 18. Nearly half of all women (49 per cent) and over one-third of men in both sites (36 per cent) had witnessed their mother experience physical violence from her male intimate partner’.

[7] The Commission for Truth, Reception and Reconciliation (CAVR) final report, Chega!, presented to President Xanana and the parliament on 31 October 2005 estimated the total number of conflict-related deaths during the period 1975–99 between 102,800 and 183,000.


[11] While much analysis about Timor-Leste has been gender-blind, there are studies focused on gender and others demonstrating an awareness of gender relations in their investigation of particular men, groups of men or masculinity that I draw upon heavily in this article. These studies include de Araujo (2004, 2005, 2012); The Asia Foundation (2016); Harrison (2016); Lotfali (2006); Myrttinen (2003, 2005, 2012); Scambary (2006, 2009, 2013); and Streicher (2008).

ORCID

Sarah Niner http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2175-965X

References


