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Chapter 9

A Lot of Talk But Not a Lot of Action: The Difficulty of Implementing SSR in Timor-Leste

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Introduction

In mid-2006 large parts of Timorese security institutions collapsed and the fledgling nation lurched towards civil war. The country's police (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste – PNTL) and the military (Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste – F-FDTL) were, at best, incapable of controlling and, at worst, complicit in fomenting crime and lawlessness, requiring the government to request an Australian-led peacekeeping force and international policing presence to come in to restore immediate public order.

The tragic events of April to June 2006 – 37 died in the violence and over 100,000 were driven from their homes – laid bare frailties and dysfunctions within the security sector. The 'crisis' – as the events of 2006 are known – revealed that there was little substance in many of these institutions beyond uniforms and equipment. Timor-Leste, it was suggested, needed comprehensive, far-reaching security sector reform.

In response to these bloody three months of riots, shootings and the partial disintegration of state security institutions, the United Nations Security Council authorised a new multidimensional and integrated mission with a wide-ranging mandate, including executive policing and support to a government-led 'security sector review'.² Bilateral donors began new programmes or substantially augmented existing ones. Under Operation Astute, the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force provided military peacekeeping.³

This chapter examines the fitful progress at turning this agreed policy concept of security sector reform (SSR) into programmatic reality. The chapter shows that, although the term 'security sector reform' is frequently

used in statements and papers, the concept remains poorly understood and seemingly unsusceptible to programmatic implementation.

The difficulty of turning stated policy intent into everyday practice is for three principal reasons, which will be introduced here and developed further in the second part of the chapter. Firstly, the concept remains esoteric, ethereal and hard to explain clearly, even more so given the multiple languages used in Timor-Leste. In effect, this has meant that SSR is much more a rhetorical trope than a specific programme of action. This may explain why the only actual programmatic activity to occur under the banner of SSR – a ‘security sector review’ – has not yet meaningfully begun.

Secondly – and not unusual for a relatively new concept – SSR has struggled to find a bureaucratic place within existing institutional structures. It is the simple nature of organisations that a concept has to ‘sit’ somewhere. There is no institutional home for the ‘security sector’. The Timorese government runs separate ministries and institutions in charge of the military, police and justice sectors. Major bilateral partners mirror this approach with separate programmes that focus on specific institutions carried out by staff and personnel experienced in a particular area or sector. This tendency for different parts of an ‘integrated’ or ‘whole of government’ approach to fix practically upon a specific part of the sector is most marked in the UN peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste, the only actor actually to use the phrase ‘security sector reform’ in its programming.

Thirdly, and perhaps most grievously, SSR as it is described and espoused is going against one of the fundamental tenets of the very concept – that of essentiality politics. Despite the pre-eminence of politics in policy statements and handbooks, SSR is still approached and explained as a dry, mechanical exercise. In large part, this is because many of those tasked with working on the ‘security sector’ have slim understandings of the politics, history and languages of the half-island they work in.

Structure

The chapter is organised into four sections. Before going on to lay out the structure of the chapter, it is important to note its scope. The author has not delved into specific sectoral reform programmes even though – confusingly – these are sometimes referred to as ‘security sector reform’. These have been the subject of extensive research and thought published already.⁴ Rather, the chapter’s focus is on tracing efforts to realise the concept of SSR and the evident practical difficulties that come with doing so.

The chapter begins with brief historical background, which traces the development of the security institutions since 1999, noting the relatively limited usage of the term ‘security sector reform’ in Timor-Leste. The term was only marginally used and, when it was, more often by research institutes and advocacy-based organisations than actual security practitioners. The phrase only gained currency in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis in which significant sections of the Timorese police and military fractured. Assessments of the ‘crisis’ focused upon dysfunction in the ‘security sector’, critiquing an overly technical approach, but many of the programming approaches post-2006 were little different in their core model, namely bringing to Timor-Leste individuals with little prior experience in the country and critiquing an overly technical approach.

The second section, which examines programming since 2006, shows how difficult this has been to achieve in practice. The section discusses the limited traction of the only activity actually termed ‘SSR’, the UN-mandated security sector review. Progress on the review has been extremely sluggish, attributable to a combination of the three central difficulties identified at the beginning of the chapter: meaningfully conceptualising SSR, finding bureaucratic space and finding individuals with skill-sets appropriate for the task. Problems of implementation and integrating concepts began even during the formulation of the UN mandate for an integrated mission, and have continued since. On the part of bilaterals, new or enhanced programmes have emerged, but have come out of existing bureaucratic structures geared to focus on elements of the sector individually and not in a comprehensive way. The sense emerges that ‘SSR’ is an aspiration, an ‘over the rainbow’ activity, to be undertaken at some point in the future. The section discusses the limited practical usage of the term, and continued emphasis on specific institutions and technical programming on the part of bilateral donors.

The third section surveys the Timorese security sector three years after the crisis, as the UN mission begins to hand over primary responsibility for policing back to the PNTL. A lot has been done on paper, and now it will be a matter of instantiating and socialising new laws and policies still further. What’s on paper is on paper, and often not inculcated into the minds and habits of individuals. Major structural issues remain.

The concluding section – entitled ‘Between Gospel and Reality’ – discusses a contradiction in the SSR. Despite the relatively large group of researchers and policy officers working on refining, questioning and discussing SSR issues, very few working on SSR programmes are aware of the SSR gospel. Beyond sloganeering about coordination, few agencies or countries coordinate deeply or indeed use SSR concepts as a strategic

framework around which to coordinate their work. The OECD DAC Handbook remains more a coffee-table book than a blueprint.⁵ This leads on to some conclusions about the need for a pragmatic, open reappraisal of how to implement the concept.

Methodology

The chapter's methodology is worth describing. The author wrote this chapter while working for an Australian Federal Police-funded development programme, working as an adviser in the Office of the Secretary of State for Security, from 2008 to the present. Between August and October 2007 he worked as a consultant to the Security Sector Support Unit, the UNMIT (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) unit charged with implementing the 'security sector' portion of the mandate. The author wrote the first concept note for the Security Sector Support Unit and led a series of 'in-house' seminars on SSR for the mission and the unit.⁶ During this period he interacted with people – mostly international staff – who talked about 'security sector reform' on an almost daily basis and frequently were disgruntled and frustrated at what they felt was the apparently minimal traction of their endeavours.

This chapter has grown organically out of these two years. The author kept notes, but had not intended to write about SSR in Timor-Leste until discussions with the editors. The methods he used included participant observation, interviews, open-ended interaction with key sources and a long-term presence on the ground. Therefore, he feels that he managed to get as close as was possible to the smallest of micro-details of actual events and was also able to supplement his research with documentary sources and interactions that it would not have been possible for other researchers to access.⁷

In writing the chapter, the author tried to strike a balance between writing about the issue from an institutional perspective and accepting that, in Timor-Leste, the issue is couched in personal terms. There is a relatively small national and international policy community working on SSR issues, and 'problems' or 'issues' rapidly take on personal characteristics of '(s)he did this and that'.

Most of the analyses of SSR processes in Timor written between 2006 and the date of final submission of this chapter tend to tack firmly to the 'institutional' or 'process' path, making no mention of the individual personalities and their skills or otherwise. The author believes that

acknowledging people, personalities and personal issues is important – a policy is only as good as the disposition and skills of the individuals charged with implementing it, and the success of a policy can be subverted or torpedoed by individuals – but is often ignored or dodged when authors write about processes, instead framing the issues in purely institutional terms. However, he has tried wherever possible in the chapter not to identify individuals.

The author also accepts that – by sheer virtue of being so closely involved in these processes that he is describing – it is inevitable that he suffers from research and analytical biases. He has made a huge effort to become proficient in Tetun, which no doubt goes some way to explaining his bewilderment that other long-term advisers do not make an effort to learn how to communicate with their colleagues, and have to don ‘simultaneous translation’ headphones during formal meetings. Likewise, he pored over many of the books and articles written on Timorese history, seeking to understand the human, ideational and ideological context in which the security sector was founded, which may account for his tilt towards prioritising the importance of context.

Another problem presents itself, which could be called the ‘moving target’ problem of writing about contemporaneous events. When the author began work in January 2008, relations between the PNTL and F-FDTL remained poor. In February of that year attacks on the president and prime minister, which resulted in serious injury to the former, had one positive side-effect in that the events compelled the two forces to work together in a ‘joint command’ to track down remaining rebels. Other significant context-altering events have included the appointment of a new PNTL commissioner in 2009 and, in May 2009, the conclusion of a draft protocol governing the incremental transfer of police powers from UNPOL (UN Police) to the PNTL. As a result, analysis can quickly be rendered redundant by events. This chapter was first drafted in April 2009 and completed in August 2009. Even within this time, there have been changes in the author’s analysis and perceptions. There is accordingly a risk – given the time lag before publication – that what is given importance in the narrative is superseded by events.

Background

The Timorese vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999 led to the UN Security Council mandating the UN Transitional Administration in East

Timor (UNTAET) with sweeping powers, empowered to prepare the half-island for the independence that came in 2002. Although UNTAET was responsible for a relatively small territory compared to other UN peacekeeping missions, its mandate was colossal: in effect, to build a state from scratch. The would-be nation had few formal accoutrements of sovereignty on which to build a state: no ministries, no institutions, no police and just a handful of courts. For reasons of occupation and dislocation, indigenous resources to animate these institutions were limited.

A number of uniformed institutions were created quickly to fill the gap. The institutions that would later be collectively termed the ‘security sector’ were created through a series of responses to commitments and circumstances. UNPOL had inherited a mandated responsibility for training up an indigenous police service. The institution in question, the *Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste*, was established in 2000 and nurtured subsequently by a series of UN peacekeeping missions. The PNTL was an amalgam of extremely young recruits and Timorese who had previously served in the Indonesian police. The question of how to deal with discontented veterans led, via a study from King’s College, London, to a UN decision to create a Timorese defence force, for which bilateral donors would quickly assume the training burden.⁸ This force was to become known as *Falintil-Forças Defesas de Timor-Leste*, and was headed by the final field commander of the Timorese resistance movement, Taur Matan Ruak. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assumed principal carriage for developing the judiciary and assisting in the development of laws. Customs became housed under the Ministry of Finance.

What marked all endeavours was that the establishment of each institution took place without much of a policy framework to unite them. Writing about the police, former adviser Ludovic Hood described ‘shortcomings in training and recruitment, the UN’s failure to focus on building the PNTL’s institutional capacity [and] inadequate planning and deficient mission design; unimaginative and weak leadership’.⁹ Arrangements around the F-FDTL were similarly ad hoc.¹⁰ Throughout this period of seemingly ad hoc trial and error, the phrase ‘SSR’ had a limited reach and confused those who did know it.¹¹

The only activity or programme that actually bore the phrase SSR was a programme of the National Democratic Institute, a US-based NGO (non-governmental organisation) focusing on democratisation issues.¹² The programme was initially conceived as civil-military in focus, aspiring to expand citizen knowledge about the role of the military in a democratic society, but, from its inception, expanded its remit to the wider ‘security

sector'. The programme was intended to expand citizen knowledge about the role of the police and other security actors, help civil society and political parties establish channels of communication in order to express preferences and affect policy, encourage research and help civil society and the media develop a watchdog capacity allowing them to monitor decisions and policies adopted by the executive and the legislature as regards the security sector.¹³

The 2006 Crisis and a Renewed Focus on SSR

In 2005 the UN's presence in Timor-Leste was winding down, with a sense of a job well done. Peacekeepers had withdrawn and a trimmed-down UNOTIL (United Nations Office in Timor-Leste) was scheduled to end in May 2006. The UN presented its efforts as having successfully laid strong foundations for state-building in the world's newest country. The *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations* – an authoritative, independent source on peacekeeping – also reflected similar confidence, observing that 'Timor-Leste is rightly seen as a UN success story.'¹⁴ Indeed, the World Bank president, Paul Wolfowitz, lauded the country's 'functioning economy and vibrant democracy' just one week before its collapse into widespread violence.¹⁵

The 'crisis' in Timor-Leste has complex origins.¹⁶ Its proximate cause was the dismissal of one-third of the Timorese defence force, the F-FDTL, itself led by (former) resistance leaders. A series of follow-on events awakened incipient tensions between soldiers from Timor's eastern and western regions. The PNTL also fractured along similar east-west lines and various factions began fighting with elements of the defence force. Some PNTL even broke from their own organisation to fight for the F-FDTL against elements of the PTNL. Among the brutal incidents that occurred were the killing of nine unarmed police officers who surrendered to UN officials by F-FDTL soldiers, and six people burnt to death in their homes.¹⁷

The breakdown in order led to related high levels of gang violence.¹⁸ Thirty-seven people were killed and many houses were destroyed. More than 150,000 Timorese – 15 per cent of the entire population – sought refuge as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in makeshift camps for nearly two years.¹⁹

Events showed the PNTL and F-FDTL were more providers of insecurity than stability. Large sections of the police in Dili unravelled altogether into separate and competing factions.

The violence that erupted in 2006 tragically demonstrated that the national and international efforts over six-and-a-half years had not succeeded in developing and nurturing effective security institutions. A submission from Rede Monitorizasaun Diretos Humanos – a coalition of ten Timorese NGOs – to the Independent Commission of Inquiry summarised the problems thus: lack of a veterans' policy, ineffective law enforcement and a culture of impunity, and insufficient clarity on roles.²⁰

Many of the institutions created by the UN and bequeathed to the new state were simply not fit for their intended purpose. As Oliver Richmond and Jason Franks observed, 'the fact that actors from within the government and security apparatus were prepared to take such violent actions to augment their own claim to power, vent their frustrations, or protect themselves illustrates the weakness of the political system and the dysfunctionality of the state'.²¹ Nor was this a case of being 'wise after the event'. Prior to the crisis many voices were raised concerning the state of the security sector. It is also remarkable how many analyses of the Timorese security sector prior to 2006 had flagged up profound weaknesses within the security institutions. Some pieces proved tragically prescient. A World Bank-led Joint Assessment Mission in 2002 raised concerns about the robustness of the PNTL,²² King's College, London's research project on peace operations, released in 2003, was equally critical.²³ Take also the first paragraph of a piece by Edward Rees, which looked at security sector reform and peacekeeping. When asked what posed the greatest threat to Timor-Leste's security in 2004, a senior officer in the high command of the country's defence force, the F-FDTL, and a 24-year veteran of the guerrilla resistance to Indonesian occupation stated simply, 'The police.'²⁴

Analyses of the crisis pointed to deep and entrenched problems within the security institutions. Their hasty organisation, presided over by an ever-changing set of international advisers who stayed for varying periods of time, had resulted in anaemic, dysfunctional and deeply politicised institutions. The security sector was plagued by a legacy of antagonism and suspicion between various sectors of society divided along regional lines, insufficient senior management and an absence of sufficient civilian professionals. The plentiful critiques of the approach were either not read or quickly shelved.

Security sector reform was a predominant feature in the Secretary-General's report on events in Timor-Leste released on 8 August 2006. The report was based on the findings of an assessment team led by Ian Martin, the SRS (special representative of the Secretary-General) who presided over the Timorese vote for independence in 1999. That report used unusually

blunt and undiplomatic language to describe the situation, a fairly explicit repudiation of the type of assistance that had been the norm before. The words of the report are worth quoting at length:

Institutional failures in PNTL and F-FDTL are at the core of the recent crisis in Timor-Leste... The early problems of F-FDTL have been further exacerbated by the failure to develop a legal framework governing its activities, mechanisms for civilian oversight and an overarching national security policy... extremely weak institutional development in the Ministry of Defence. Legislation and internal procedures... are almost entirely lacking... inadequate civilian oversight of the force... International advisers have reportedly worked at cross-purposes. The institutional framework of PNTL remains weak. The Ministry of the Interior... regularly interfered in policing activities at all levels, including in police operations and personnel decisions... intervened arbitrarily in disciplinary, recruitment and promotion proceedings... top heavy organization that lacks critical capacities at the middle and lower management levels.²⁵

The Secretary-General's report proposed a sweeping review of the security sector, which should 'assess the threats facing Timor-Leste, both internal and external, and the options for development of the sector. It should also address the real difficulties that have confronted the sector to date, including the tensions between F-FDTL and PNTL, and ways in which the relationship between the two can be changed from a competitive to a cooperative one.' The report also noted that a request had been made by the Timorese government for specialist civilian advisers.

The germ of the idea that became the 'security sector review' came from a few members of Ian Martin's assessment team. Some had experience in Kosovo and/or in contributing to policy debates, and hatched the idea of replicating a comprehensive security sector review, modelled along that which had just been concluded in Kosovo.²⁶ The idea – discussed in a series of internal team meetings – was to have a reflective review of core functions, roles and responsibilities of the security sector, asking difficult but necessary questions about the role of the defence force in a country with limited external threat, sorting through the roles and responsibilities of the president, prime minister and parliament, and delineating roles. The aim was not to let the crisis go to waste without frank, open and searching examinations of core issues that had not been addressed in the sprint to get institutions up and running. The idea was that the review would be concluded in 12 months from its initiation.

The idea of a security sector review was discussed with the then minister of defence, José Ramos-Horta (the previous incumbent, Roque Rodrigues, had departed under pressure of allegations that he had illegally distributed weapons), though, as a participant in the meeting recalled, ‘whether those discussions amounted to consultation and ended in a meeting of minds is moot’.²⁷ In other words, few Timorese were ever really consulted on whether they wanted the review or understood what one would entail.

The idea of a security sector review was presented as a recommendation of the Secretary-General’s report of 8 August 2006, and subsequently incorporated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1704 paragraph 4(e) as a review. The mandate combined the review with the government request for specialist advisers, to read thus:

...to assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste in conducting a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector, including the Falintil-Forças Armadas de Defesa Timor-Leste, the Ministry of Defence, the PNTL and the Ministry of Interior with a view to supporting the Government, through the provision of advisers and in cooperation and coordination with other partners, in strengthening institutional capacity-building, as appropriate.²⁸

A contradiction soon presented itself. The mandate incorporated the idea of a review, but also included much more detail about one institution in the security sector: the PNTL. The mandate went into detail as to what the substantial number of UN police would do: reassume executive authority for policing while at the same screening PNTL officers and developing a plan for the reform, rebuilding and reconstruction of the PNTL. From the outset, the weight of attention in the mandate on the police did not really square with the idea of a holistic review and a subsequent security sector process. Justice issues would be dealt with in a separate review – an example of a holistic concept not being holistic enough.

Oddly, even though it was dysfunction within the F-FDTL that lit the touchpaper for the crisis, the new mission would not have any real role in defence force development except for two adviser positions. One might wonder what explained the almost exclusive emphasis on the PNTL over the F-FDTL in the UNMIT mandate. To be sure, the focus seems somewhat tilted and it is difficult to find an entirely rational explanation. Two potential explanations are rooted in the bureaucracies and ontologies of the UN peacekeeping effort rather than an objective appraisal of need. The United Nations has an on-call policing component in UNPOL, which it is able to

deploy; this explains the emphasis on the police. Conversely, the United Nations does not have ‘on-call’ experience in military reform, which explains the relative inattention given to this. At the time the UN had no mandate to do military development. The UNDP, for example, was explicitly prohibited and the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations) did not have a single person on staff to undertake military development. Moreover, at the time there were no guidelines developed to steer UN engagement in security sector reform.

Another issue in the development of the UNMIT mandate was a fundamental difference of opinion between members of the assessment team. They were divided on whether UNMIT should be a ‘boutique’ policing operation, with a relatively small number of dedicated expert staff, or a larger mission with officers drawn from the larger UN national-based recruitment pool. The police division, which advocated the second approach, won out.

The strong disconnect was apparent in the absence of integration in the 2006 assessment report to the Security Council and the mandate as to how the various concepts would fit together. The police reform process was accorded several paragraphs in the mandate, but these paragraphs were entirely separate from the notion of a security sector review. This divergence continued when the transition team was at work in September. The policing section of the report of the transition team included provision for a reform, restructuring and rebuilding (RRR) plan but made no reference to other security institutions, much less to the need for a comprehensive review encompassing the PNTL, F-FDTL and the ministries.

The concept of a ‘security sector review’ was quickly becoming a bureaucratic orphan. Clearly, the police reform process would be marshalled by UNPOL in New York, but there was no institutional home for the ‘security sector’.²⁹ Many of the advisers who participated in Ian Martin’s assessment mission returned to posts that did not directly involve Timor-Leste. One stayed in Dili to participate in the International Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate the events of 2006. The overarching concept lost some momentum, despite the International Crisis Group making supporting the ‘security sector review’ its foremost recommendation in its authoritative October 2006 report on the crisis. Interest on the part of policy advocates was not matched with interest inside a bureaucracy. The SSR review was also the foremost stated task in the 2006 UNMIT mandate implementation plan.³⁰

The concept found eventual bureaucratic shape when mission planners created the Security Sector Support Unit, but positions went unfilled until

August 2007. Initially these tasks were unspecified but bureaucratized into the special adviser position. The origins of these positions was the list drawn up by an (international) adviser to the Timorese government in June 2006 which specified a number of technical advisers it wanted the UN to provide. During the subsequent development of the mandate (assessment mission, Secretary-General's report, transition team report, mandate implementation plan) the role of the advisers morphed into something explicitly linked to the comprehensive review and SSR, though the ambiguities about the exact nature of that link are evident if the texts of the Secretary-General's report and subsequent resolution are compared.³¹

And after that, nothing very much happened for about a year. The initial batch of adviser posts were advertised in January 2007 and advisers began to arrive in August, a relatively normal speed of hire for new intake to a peacekeeping mission. Fortunately for the international adviser who drew up the list of skill-sets contained in the Timorese letter, the interview panel deemed him to have enough of the requisite skills for a post as adviser to the F-FDTL.

By this point, UNMIT had become clearly identifiable as a policing-first mission. An overwhelming number of UNMIT staff were uniformed police, a supplemental policing arrangement setting out respective authorities of the UNPOL and PNTL had been put in place, screening of PNTL officers had been started, a patchy mentoring programme had been initiated and UNPOL had delivered a series of proposals to the government for the reform, rebuilding and restructuring of the police – proposals which the government almost completely ignored. The previous first-order priority was badly lagging behind.

There are some explanations for this apparent lack of attention. An early decision was taken to focus in the first year of the mandate on ensuring successful 2007 presidential and parliamentary polls. On the one hand, this made good sense. A review required a legitimate government to take it on. On the other hand, the argument could be made that the decision meant UNMIT ignored the core political issue identified by the assessment team dispatched by the Secretary-General in the wake of events of May 2006, namely that the deeply politicised, fragmented security institutions lacking in legitimacy were at the core of the new state's problems.

There had also been significant changes to Timor-Leste's political landscape by the time that the SSR unit began to be staffed. José Ramos-Horta – installed as interim prime minister after the crisis – was elected president in May 2007, defeating the candidate of Timor-Leste's governing party, Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN), in a

second-round run-off. FRETILIN's electoral setback continued in the June parliamentary poll, as it slipped from 55 seats (of 88) to 21 in the now 65-member parliament. Although it remained the largest party in terms of seats, FRETILIN was unable to persuade enough other parties to join it in a coalition, leading to a deadlock in the formation of a government. In August 2007 the new president asked an alliance of parties led by the former president, Kay Rala 'Xanana' Gusmão, to form the new government. The new administration has put forward a platform involving, among other things, tackling poverty, strengthening security and returning the remaining 100,000 persons who were internally displaced during the 2006 violence to their homes. As well as the prime minister's portfolio, Gusmão took on the post of minister of defence and security, delegating everyday control to two young technocrats who had just previously been working as think-tank researchers, Julio Tomas Pinto and Francisco da Costa Guterres. Pinto and Guterres would become secretaries of state for defence and security, taking up residence in the old Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior buildings.

Crucially, neither Gusmão, Pinto nor Guterres had been involved in any of the discussions 15 months previously about the 'comprehensive review of the security sector'. Nor was any man consulted as to what they would like the 'special adviser' posts to do. Like most new governments and most new ministers, they came in with their own plans and agendas and did not appear too motivated to follow policy that had been created a year before by a different government. It is rational and normal in a democracy that succeeding governments do not follow the policies of those they replace.³²

Operationalising SSR: Security Sector Support Unit

Timor-Leste represents the first time that the UN has attempted explicitly to operationalise the concept of SSR within a named unit, by having the Security Sector Support Unit (SSSU) within the UNMIT structure to carry out the mandate task of assisting in the comprehensive review of the security sector.

Like many first attempts, it has not been easy. The creation and subsequent development of the SSSU exemplifies the three issues identified at the beginning of the chapter, namely conceptual confusion, bureaucratic space and the skill-sets of many of the individuals hired to execute the task.

There was fundamental confusion within the mission as to what is or is not SSR. Although the decision to create a separate pillar dedicated to

‘security sector and rule of law’ affirmed its centrality to the UNMIT mandate, confusion still reigned as to what ‘security sector reform’ was or was not. Was it simply a term to apply to police and military reform? Was it a framework for thinking conceptually or programmatically? What was UNMIT’s role actually in this regard? To some degree this confusion is understandable – a vigorous debate continues as to what SSR is/is not within academic/policy literature – but simply saying ‘UNMIT is working on the security sector’ does not clarify much. Calling the pillar ‘security sector support and rule of law’ as if these are somewhat different concepts only added to the confusion.

Moreover, it is difficult to mount a convincing argument that one believes in the principles of ‘security sector reform’ when the police reform process, the most public personification of UNMIT’s commitment to SSR, involved repeating many of the same processes of the past. This police rebuilding process was something of a ‘do-over’ opportunity for UNPOL, a chance to prove that they have addressed the deficiencies that arose in the creation of the PNTL during the transitional administration period. The ‘blue berets’ faced much of the same external and self-made difficulties in creating an effective and legitimate police institution as their predecessors. Moreover, the manner in which reform was approached carries uncomfortable echoes of the old style that proved so ineffective: large numbers of national contingents with officers of varying styles, approaches and interests in the job who stay for insufficient times to win trust. The UN police do not provide their officers – who are often in a country with which they are not linguistically or culturally familiar – with training about how to transfer knowledge. Despite the prominence given to the goal of capacity-building, how one actually goes about transferring learning and experience remains thinly understood. Incoming officers receive little guidance to assist, leaving them to default back to learning – good and bad – gleaned from their home countries. Added to this is the tendency for UN peacekeepers to work in English, when this is not the predominant language of the Timorese police. The multiple iterations of the RRR plan were never translated into any other language, and as result the PNTL staff were never able to read it, let alone sign up and agree to it.³³

For better or for worse, UNMIT became indelibly associated with reform in one part of the sector and not the sector as a totality. In part, this was hardly surprising. The police – at 1,650 by far the most numerous part of the mission – are made all the more visible by the police uniform. But it was also because the majority of initiatives and the prime determinant of when the mission will downsize and whether or not it will be judged as a

success are UNMIT's efforts with the police. Most of the major set pieces since UNMIT have involved the police and not the 'security sector' as a whole. These included the signing of the supplemental arrangement, the reform, restructuring and rebuilding plan presented and, in May 2009, the first incremental transfer of policing responsibility from UNPOL to the PNTL.

Secondly, there was bureaucratic confusion as to the role of the SSSU. This confusion was reflected in job descriptions for the SSSU posts advertised in January 2007, with some posts readvertised in May. The job descriptions envisaged unit members as 'advisers' to/with/on (it is not clear) police, military and the ministries of defence and interior (since renamed 'national security'). But advising on what, exactly? There were already surfeits of UN advisers on policing (every member of UNPOL, in fact) and bilateral advisers in the government ministries. Moreover, with the UN hiring process beginning during one government's tenure and ending when another was instituted, there was very cursory consultation with the new secretaries of state as to whether they needed advisers and what their roles should be or to lay the foundations for their arrival.³⁴

The late-hired unit was not structurally aided to make an expeditious start. Prior to its arrival there had been no preparation of background documentation on elements of security sector reform, coordination of extant research/analysis (e.g. political affairs, Joint Mission Analysis Center) or a strategy about sensitising key stakeholders to the 'review concept'. But, beyond three 'stand-alone' seminars on the security sector between May and August 2007, not much happened. And in only the final one of these seminars was a 'security sector review' mentioned. The new head of the SSSU was given no task specifications on arrival.

It was also difficult to find a space. Operatively, UNMIT separates the 'police' from the security sector. At one point there were 1,650 UNPOL in the country working on the 'reform, restructuring and rebuilding' of the police while another part of the mission – the UNDP – worked on justice affairs. There are fewer than 20 members of the mission's Security Sector Support Unit, which, as its name would suggest, is tasked with working on the entire sector. Despite the fact that many guidelines on SSR explore issues of security, policing and justice together, this is not rendered into managerial practice, making coherence and complementarities all the more difficult to achieve.

The absence of bureaucratic preparation was also revealed when it came to the issue of a budget for the review. There was no facility within the

peacekeeping budget to 'hold' money. As a result, the unit entered into an agreement with the UNDP to ask for a funding facility.

Finding the right people was also an issue. Staffing this unit would be relatively simple, one might think. The 'make-up' of team members required to fulfil what would clearly be one of the most politically sensitive elements of the mandate could quickly be sketched. Its head would possess demonstrated diplomatic skills and the savvy to navigate this inherently political issue as well as conceptual clarity on the term 'security sector reform'. Ideally, this would be allied with experience of managing large programmes, preferably with a significant research component. His/her team would be individuals with an acute knowledge of policy debates and skill-sets in research, negotiation and facilitating public consultations. Linguistic skills and demonstrated deep historical knowledge would obviously be vital characteristics. Nor need the unit be populated extensively with individuals with backgrounds in the uniformed services. Surely the frequently identified lesson that security sector reform is a deeply political process would be reflected in the hiring process? It would seem not. Defective thinking through of what the mandated task would require was reflected in the posting of job descriptions that did not match individuals sought with actual tasks, compounded by the paucity of planning. Only a few members of the SSSU had any prior experience in Timor-Leste. In 2009 only one member of the SSSU spoke Tetun. Somewhat absurdly, some of the 'special advisers' do not even sit in the same building as their putative national counterparts.

An Illusory Security Sector Review

Although a 'review' is often mentioned in UN documents, in reality no such comprehensive review has taken place as of the time of writing, three years after it was mandated.

The SSSU was extremely effective in securing donor assistance for the review, all the more so given that for the first six months of staffing, there was only the barest of concept notes produced outlining what the money would be used for. SSR was a vague, vogue phrase and donors wanted to be a part of it. Norway chipped in \$600,000, Australia and Ireland \$200,000 each, with additional augmentation from UNDP internal funds. An additional \$2.2 million was secured from the European Commission's Instrument for Stability for 'capacity development' (therefore reform) in December 2008.

But now that the funding was secured, a new problem presented itself. What would the money actually be spent on? National actors seemed resolutely disinterested in actually conducting the review that the money had been committed to. Rather oddly, donors had committed money to a review that national actors seemed so obviously uninterested in. It took until June 2008 for a project document to be signed and nearly three months more for the project board created under the project even to meet.³⁵ The final project document exists only in English.³⁶

Nearly a year afterwards, no functional review of any part of the security sector has taken place. Money has been allocated to fund some extremely useful seminars on reform, border management and a national security policy. Of the \$4 million committed, 85 per cent was spent or committed, a large amount to pay for salaries and related costs. Other funds have been allocated to a miscellany of activities, but little that actually appears as a review activity. Most funds are allocated – through the EC funding – to national and international ‘in-line’ advisers on SSR. One national adviser admitted to knowing very little about the concept or what their role is to be. Project board meeting minutes record very few conversations about actually conducting a review.³⁷ The review is lost ‘in the micromanagement of advisory board meetings, sub-committees, and piecemeal projects’.³⁸ The review process was bureaucratically recast to focus less on its origins:

The Security Sector Review in Timor-Leste Project has now expanded significantly from its initial inception growing from a one year one million dollar review project to a multi year four million dollar capacity building and review project.³⁹

A unit with a brief for everything but in charge of nothing, the SSSU has struggled for relevance within the UN mission since it has been staffed, and has remained relatively peripheral within the mission itself and the wider donor community. There has been little active marketing of the unit by UNMIT, meaning that it also had limited audience outside, with some senior diplomats confessing to not knowing that the unit existed. There is similar hazy knowledge among the national actors within the security sector that the unit is set up to assist. The unit and its role were never meaningfully explained. At a development partners’ meeting in May 2009, a member of the SSSU asked a Timorese minister with responsibility for part of the security sector what assistance the SSSU could provide him. ‘I don’t know,’

the individual replied, 'you should seek guidance from UNMIT and not from me.'⁴⁰

Bilateral Stovepipes

The United Nations is probably the largest numeric presence in Timor, but there are also large bilateral donors in the sector. Australia has 600 peacekeeping troops and substantial bilateral programmes that work, individually, on police, military and justice sectors. New Zealand contributes 150 troops and police, and Portugal over a hundred to UNPOL. Each country also has significant programmes.⁴¹

These programmes remain sectoral in focus and are not united by an overarching concept of security sector reform. These are the very silos that donor officials often complain about on conference daises. For example, the Australian Federal Police are responsible for Australian's bilateral police programme, the Australian Defence Force for a bilateral military programme and AusAid for the justice sector. These are programmes fixed from budgets allocated in Canberra on an institutional and not a sectoral basis. Although coordinated at the strategic level – regular information-sharing meetings are held between section heads – there is not much programmatic coordination between programme staff.

Bilateral programmes are overwhelmingly technical in their focus. The logic runs thus: the [insert particular institution] is lacking in policy and processes which means that we will be building up the capacity of individuals in order to help them run affairs for themselves.

Some issues present themselves with this approach. Firstly, its technical and stovepiped nature would seem to run counter to the painful lessons learned from the manner by which programmes were organised prior to 2006. The basic problem of communication afflicts bilateral programmes as grievously as it does the efforts of the UN. English is the primary mother-tongue of the capacity-builders, Tetun is the language of those intended to be capacity built, presenting basic challenges of actually being able to impart the vague and indeterminate goal of 'capacity'.

Third, and most difficult to resolve, is that while the problems afflicting security institutions manifest most obviously in technical deficiency, subterranean issues of politics have deep roots in the respective institutions. These are rooted in regionalism, trust and histories of who did what to whom, and tangled up in jealousies and personal relationships. This is difficult to understand and resolve, most especially if assisters have so few

contemporaneous shared reference points. Conversations through a translator are stilted. Moreover, acquiring the background knowledge necessary for understanding all institutions is difficult. It is very correct for SSR advocates to focus on politics, but much more difficult to know how this can be done given the strictures of and the (understandable) reluctance to commit to staying the years required to acquire the knowledge, develop the language skills and win the respect required to be effective.

An Australian capacity-builder who had just finished an 11-month stint was blunt: 'If Australia was serious, they wouldn't hire people like me, English-speaking civil servants for short stints who cannot interact with my counterparts. They'd hire people on long-term contracts and compel them to learn the language.'⁴² He is right, but are there sufficient numbers of the type of 'good capacity-builders' that he is talking about who either exist or want to serve?

Reforms Since 2006 and Challenges Ahead

There has been action on important administrative and legislative issues in the security sector. This has included definitions of the legal frameworks for the F-FDTL and PNTL, career, salary and promotion regimes for each institution, and developing an integrated system of national security, defining mechanisms and modalities of cooperation and coordination between the respective institutions. New criminal procedure codes have been drafted and promulgated, replacing the old Indonesian-era code that had previously been used. A national security policy that sets out the threats and challenges to the new nation has been drafted, identifying the principal challenges as coming from within the country and not from external threats.

It is an impressive list of policy legislation, drafted mostly by a series of Portuguese lawyers and Portuguese-speaking Timorese lawyers, and often drafted in relative isolation, ostensibly because of protocol issues concerning document sanctity and secrecy.⁴³ Therefore, at least on paper, some of the policy and legislative deficiencies identified in 2006 have been ameliorated or are in the process of being legislatively resolved.

This was the easy part. The difficulty will come in implementation and socialisation. Of particular concern will be issues of impunity in the security sector. Equitable application of the law is a major issue in Timor-Leste. Very few of those identified by the Commission of Inquiry are in jail. Some have been pardoned, but the vast majority are yet to be called, never mind prosecuted, by a Timorese court. Many of the members of the security

institutions implicated in the events of 2006 – including the F-FDTL accused of shooting the eight unarmed PNTL, convicted and sentenced to a collective 48 years in prison – remain in uniform. This apparent reluctance to prosecute has prompted some observers to question the degree of apparent impunity within the uniformed institutions.

If anything, the international presence will start to reduce. In May 2009 UNPOL handed over primary responsibility for policing in Lautem district in the country's east. Although the process is without a set timetable – and may take a few years to complete – the handover marks the beginning of a slow end to the UN's 'do-over' efforts to remake the PNTL in a better image second time around. It has been a difficult process, indicating it is perhaps more difficult to remake institutions that are already formed than restart from scratch. There are convincing arguments tabled on both sides as to why the process has not been smooth; frustration by Timorese at the mentoring and assistance received, and on the part of UNPOL at disinterest among the PNTL actually to receive assistance. It is still too early to determine the long-range success of this effort and the efficacy of the UNPOL model of trying to blend individuals from myriad policing agencies and cultures into a common approach.

The PNTL received significantly more attention post-crisis than the F-FDTL, which, although it also cracked in 2006, was not 'taken over' like the PNTL. The F-FDTL has probably grown in confidence since 2006, especially after its involvement in the joint command with the PNTL.

Perhaps the ultimate challenge will come when the Timorese security sector is challenged again. The sector reacted poorly to the 2006 crisis, but was probably strengthened by being tested in early 2008, when the forces worked together in a joint command to track down rebels who shot and gravely wounded the president. Many existential issues have also to be resolved, such as what the role of the army is to be in a small nation with little apparent outside threat, and an appropriate size for the PNTL. Moreover, in a country in which geography, resources and contextual realities will conspire to restrict the reach of the police, the issue of the role of non-state justice has yet to be addressed.

Perhaps the most difficult issues afflicting the Timorese security sector are the very smallness of the territory and the fact that many of the citizens – most especially the small élite – have gnarled interconnections with each other. Timorese politics is personalised. Another difficulty in instantiating the frequently advertised necessities of SSR is the smallness of the state itself, and of the political élite in particular. Moreover, in a small country with strong regional and family ties, it is difficult to create

information barriers within institutions to separate and isolate persons who make accountability and oversight decisions from persons who are the subject of those decisions. For example, the former defence minister used to share a house with the armed forces chief. The current secretary of state for defence is the nephew of the armed forces chief. The state is not anonymous.

Conclusion – Between Gospel and Reality?

It has proven extremely difficult to render the concept of security sector reform. An idea fitfully followed through and implemented perhaps too late to be useful, security sector reform has struggled for a proper place in the UNMIT mission. Other bilateral donors – despite policy statements to the effect – do not meaningfully implement the concept at all. It is, by now, almost boilerplate to observe that donor programmes are enacted in ‘silos’, but this is exactly what programmes in the security sector are in Timor-Leste, reflecting also the manner in which the Timorese government approaches the issue.

What explains this discrepancy between policy and practice? Possible explanations are threefold.

Firstly, the concept is perhaps too big to be coherently implemented, most especially in a fast-moving environment with various actors and programmes. A holistic approach also means that focus is blurry or takes place at such a high strategic or policy level that it is hard to translate down to the tactical level. It may not make practical sense. Many actors involved in or around the security sector – both national and international – still remain thoroughly confused as to what the concept is or is not. Instead of acting as a framework or organising principle, exhortations about ‘SSR’ complicate agendas that are already difficult to synchronise. In effect, this has meant that SSR is much more a rhetorical trope than a specific programme of action. This may explain why the only actual programmatic activity to occur under the banner of SSR – a ‘security sector review’ – has not yet meaningfully begun.

The second issue is institutional. Although a range of institutions have invested a massive amount of time and money in understanding the drivers, inhibitors and definitions of SSR, they are a long way behind in thinking through the kind of institutions that are needed in order to tackle the issue successfully. In the UN peacekeeping context, this means thinking through where SSR sits *vis-à-vis* the police division; in a UN family context it means thinking through which agency, fund or programme is best suited to hosting

a longer-term development endeavour; in the context of Australia or bilateral donors it may mean developing a special coordinating mechanism sitting over the range of programmes within the sector.

The third issue revolves around people. Simply put, at least a large number of those who are working on the security sector do not have the degree of inbuilt knowledge that faithfully implementing the concept would require. To be sure, learning languages and becoming familiar with complicated histories, personalities and processes take time and are not easy. Many of those who signed up to work on reform processes in the security sector probably did not anticipate the need for such learning or becoming aware of history. But one should not be coy about the need for such knowledge in order to ground programmatic effectiveness. The current norm of predominantly English-speaking advisers in a non-English-speaking country has yielded minimal results. The experience of reform processes from 1999 to 2006 is testament to that inconvenient truth. Perhaps relevant institutions need to think about ways by which one can ‘nudge’ or encourage staff to augment their ‘soft’ skills. The development of ‘stand-by’ expert rosters by agencies such as the UN DPKO (including its SSR section) and bilateral agencies to identify those with the right skill-sets for the job is welcome. Long-term contracting and incentives for performance seem obvious lures.

Clearly, the time is ripe and the need is acute for an open and candid examination of the implementability of the concept of SSR. The solution, perhaps, may be to trim the concept so that it is more easily accessible. This will require real introspection on the parts of the policy community that formulated the concept of SSR and the donor community that implements it as to how a more ‘user-friendly’ and, frankly, more pragmatic and practical definition of the concept can be reached. The result may be a more limited, modest and circumspect policy approach that may be more in tune with the post-conflict environment.

Notes

¹ The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Australian Federal Police (AFP), for whom the author has been working while researching and writing the chapter. The author would like to thank James Cockayne, Jim Della-Giacoma, Anthony Goldstone, Edward Rees, Eric Scheye, Bu Wilson, the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on previous iterations of the chapter.

² UNSC Res. 1704, 25 August 2006.

- ³ Australian Government Department of Defence, 'Operation Astute', available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/global/opastute/index.htm>.
- ⁴ Yoshino Funaki, *The UN and Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste: A Widening Credibility Gap* (New York: Centre on International Cooperation, 2009); International Centre for Transitional Justice, *Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste* (New York: ICTJ, 2009).
- ⁵ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR). Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD, 2007).
- ⁶ The draft paper was entitled 'SSSU – Challenges, Role, Fit', and was presented by the head of the SSSU to DSRSG Eric Tan in August 2007. The internal seminar was conducted in October 2007.
- ⁷ In contrast, most researchers who have written on the security sector since 2006 have based their observations on periods of a few weeks to a month in country.
- ⁸ Centre for Defence Studies, *Independent Study on Security Force Options for East Timor* (London: King's College, 2000).
- ⁹ Ludovic Hood, 'Missed Opportunities', in *Managing Insecurity: Field Experiences of Security Sector Reform*, eds Gordon Peake, Eric Scheye and Alice Hills (London: Taylor & Francis, 2007): 150–151.
- ¹⁰ Edward Rees, *Under Pressure: FALINTIL – Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste* (Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004).
- ¹¹ One adviser at the time recalled being asked what SSR was by a colleague from the UNDP; not wishing to appear foolish, he e-mailed the UNDP desk in New York for a clarification, only to be told that he should seek guidance from the very same colleague who had asked him what SSR was. Interview, Dili, April 2009.
- ¹² See www.ndi.org/tl.html.
- ¹³ As part of the programme, in 2002–2003 the NDI hired a young Timorese master's student, Julio Tomas Pinto, to write up a survey on public perceptions of security. In 2007 Pinto would be named secretary of state for defence. In 2002 Pinto wrote 'A Peaceful Future', setting out the results of focus groups regarding security.
- ¹⁴ Centre for International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2005* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006): 66.
- ¹⁵ Paul Wolfowitz, 'Timor-Leste a Leader among Post-war Countries; Challenge Now to Keep Peace, Use Petroleum Funds Well', remarks made at government-hosted function, Dili, 9 April 2006, available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/KHII-6NQ4L7?OpenDocument>.
- ¹⁶ James Scambary, 'Anatomy of a Conflict: The 2006–2007 Communal Violence in East Timor', *Conflict, Security & Development* 9, no. 2 (2009): 265–288.
- ¹⁷ United Nations, *Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste* (Geneva: United Nations, 2 October 2006).
- ¹⁸ James Scambary, Hippolito Da Gama and Joao Barreta, 'A Survey of Gangs and Youth Groups in Dili, Timor-Leste', report commissioned by Australia's Agency for International Development, AusAID, Dili, 15 September 2006; James Scambary, 'Groups, Gangs and Armed Violence in Timor-Leste', Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment Issues Brief 2, available at <http://www.timor-leste-violence.org/>.
- ¹⁹ International Crisis Group, *Timor-Leste's Displacement Crisis* (Brussels/Dili: International Crisis Group, 2008).

- ²⁰ Rede Monitorizasaun Diretus Humanus Submission to the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste on the Security and Political Crisis in Timor-Leste, 15 September 2006. Copy on file with author.
- ²¹ Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, 'Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New Clothes?', *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 2 (2008): 193.
- ²² World Bank Joint Assessment Mission, *Options for Reform of PNTL* (Dili: World Bank, 2002).
- ²³ King's College, London, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change* (London: King's College, 2003).
- ²⁴ Edward Rees, *Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: Improvisation and Confusion From the Field* (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006).
- ²⁵ United Nations, 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Timor-Leste', 7 August 2006, paras. 57–60.
- ²⁶ With the benefit of hindsight, the Kosovo Review may not have been the best case upon which to model a security sector review. Although the review was concluded in January 2006, it was plagued by problems over organisations, funding, competing agendas and organisational difficulties. There was also criticism of its lack of review of ongoing programmes. The final impact of the review was also probably less than its architects would have hoped. The final report was released quietly and little action has arisen from it. Anthony Cleland Welch, 'A Security Sector Review in Kosovo – An Holistic Approach to SSR', in *Security Sector Reform in South East Europe – From a Necessary Remedy to a Global Concept*, eds Anja Ebnoether, Ernst Felberbauer and Mladen Staničić (Vienna and Geneva: Austrian National Defence Academy/DCAF, 2007): 43–57; Eric Scheye, 'UNMIK and the Significance of Effective Programme Management', in *Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo*, eds Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer (Geneva: LIT/DCAF, 2008).
- ²⁷ E-mail communication with member of assessment team, May 2009.
- ²⁸ UNSC Res. 1704 4(e), 25 August 2006.
- ²⁹ A bureaucratic 'home' for security sector reform was not created until 2008 with the creation of a small security sector reform team at UN headquarters.
- ³⁰ See International Crisis Group, *Managing Timor-Leste's Crisis* (International Crisis Group, 2006). This was despite a 2006 mandate implementation plan that set out six tasks.
- 1) Maintaining close contact with the government in developing the terms of reference of and then implementing the comprehensive review of the sector.
 - 2) Monitoring and analysing developments within the F-FDTL and the PNTL, including the attitudes of the F-FDTL high command to key state actors and to other elements in the security sector, including the petitioners and their military supporters, and to the PNTL.
 - 3) Monitoring the government's political and policy responses to the ongoing crisis in the F-FDTL and consulting with the government on its intentions in these areas.
 - 4) Liaising with bilateral partners on the possible role of the UN in assisting the process of reform within the security sector; providing advisory capacity to the F-FDTL and the Ministry of the Interior (MoI).
 - 5) Coordinating the various adviser and training programmes.
 - 6) Supervising the advisers in the MoD and the MoI.

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- ³¹ No individuals involved in the process could recall any subsequent discussions as to what these advisers would specifically do. The job descriptions for the posts were eventually written by a member of the DPKO in New York who had been tasked with organising the Secretary-General's report on security sector reform.
- ³² Some members of the government are privately dismissive of the aptitude and quality of much of the SSR advice they receive; one senior figure has articulated concerns in public. In an article published in Tetun, Indonesian and English in August 2009, Secretary of State for Defence Julio Tomas Pinto was highly critical of SSR efforts. See 'Facing Challenges, Achieving Progress in Timor-Leste', available at <http://temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com/2009/08/ssr-in-timor-leste.html>.
- ³³ For more on the police reform process in Timor-Leste since 2006 see Gordon Peake, 'Police Reform in Timor-Leste: A Difficult Do-Over', in *Policing Developing Democracies*, eds Mercedes Hinton and Tim Newburn (London: Routledge, 2008); Bu Wilson, 'Smoke and Mirrors: Institutionalising Fragility in the Policia Nacional Timor-Leste', in *Democratic Governance in Timor-Leste: Reconciling the Local and National*, ed. David Mearns (Darwin: Charles Darwin University Press, 2008): 98–115; Andrew Goldsmith and Sinclair Dinnen, 'Transnational Police Building: Critical Lessons from Timor Leste and Solomon Islands', *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 6 (2007): 1091–1109.
- ³⁴ The International Crisis Group quoted former Minister of Defence Roque Rodrigues: 'I was a bit surprised with the arrogance of UNMIT, saying this person go to ministry of defence as adviser, this person go to ministry of interior... Foreigners do not understand the cognitive style of the Timorese. We Timorese have to work out our learning style.' International Crisis Group, note 30 above.
- ³⁵ There are five members of the project board, three from Timor-Leste and two from UNMIT. The three Timorese members are Francisco da Costa Guterres, secretary of state for security, Roque Rodrigues, adviser to the president, and David Ximines, ranking member of the opposition party FRETILIN on Parliamentary Committee B.
- ³⁶ See <http://unmit.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=179>.
- ³⁷ Copy of project board minutes on file with author.
- ³⁸ Jim Della-Giacoma, 'The UN's Lame Security Sector Review for Timor-Leste', *Lowy Interpreter*, February 2009.
- ³⁹ This is the phrasing used to situate the project when vacancies are posted. See, for example, the job advert posted on Relief Web for a international project assistant, UNDP Security Sector Review Project, Timor-Leste, Ref: RW_7T62BQ-28, available at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/res.nsf/db900SID/OCHA-7T62L̄K>.
- ⁴⁰ Comments at development partners' meeting, Working Group 5, 14 May 2009.
- ⁴¹ New Zealand's focus is on developing 'community policing' approach within the PNTL through its UNPOL contingent. It also provides five military advisers to F-FDTL. Portugal also gives assistance to F-FDTL.
- ⁴² Discussions with capacity-building adviser, Dili, 17 March 2009.
- ⁴³ *Organic Law of the Ministry of Defence and Security* – Decree-Law 31/2008, 13 August 2008; *Organic Law of the PNTL* – Decree-Law 9/2009, 18 February 2009, with Rectification 1/2009, 8 April 2009; *Salary Regime for the PNTL* – Decree-Law 10/2009, 18 February 2009, with Rectification 2/2009, 8 April 2009; *Promotion Regime of the PNTL* – Decree-Law 16/2009, 18 March 2009; *Commission of Promotions for PNTL* – Resolution of the Government 1/2009, 18 February 2009; *Appointment of the*

Commander-General and Second Commander-General of PNTL – Resolution of the Government 3/2009, 26 March 2009; *Evaluation Commission of PNTL* – Resolution of the Government 5/2009, 1 April 2009; *Commission for the Negotiation of the New Supplemental Arrangement* – Resolution of the Government 4/2009, 1 April 2009.