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Indonesian's Defense Posture in Timor-Leste Border Areas

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I. Introduction

After Timor-Leste became free from the Indonesian occupation in 1999, there has been a significant change in Indonesian military numbers in West Timor in the province Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) . All units of the Indonesian military in Timor Timur (now Timor-Leste) were withdrawn to West Timor. One of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) battalions which was permanently based in the province of Timor Timur, Infantry Battalion (Yonif) 745, was disbanded and the other one, Yonif 744, was moved to West Timor. The Korem 161 Headquarters was integrated into the territorial commands in West Timor. Security posts have been established along the border for deploying combat teams, these teams are tasked to defend Indonesian territory from external security threats. The territorial command in three districts has conducted territorial development operations. This 1st edition of Mahelein nian Hanoin discusses the increase in the number of Indonesian military forces in West Timor and the deployments of TNI along the border of Indonesia and the newly independent sovereign state, the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste.

II. The TNI Command in West Timor

TNI has divided the entire Indonesian territory into areas of defense which are called territorial commands or regional commands, starting from the Regional Military Commands (Kodam) whose territory covers one to three provinces, down to Military Resort Commands (Korem), whose territory covers several districts to one province, District Military Commands (Kodim) whose territory covers one to two districts, the Sub-District Military Commands [Komando Rayon Militer] (Koramil) whose territory covers one sub-district. The role of the territorial command is to conduct training for the troops (training and maintenance), military operations (which are divided into 'war operations' and 'operations other than war'¹), and territorial development (gather information, train and organize civilians to assist in military operations, preparing the logistics and prepare the area for the defense).²

In the structure of the TNI territorial command, West Timor is part of Korem 161/Wira Sakti which is based in Kupang. The territory of Korem 161 covers the entire Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) province, which is divided into 12 Kodims. West Timor is divided into four District Military Commands (Kodim), namely Kodim 1604 which is based in Kupang with the territory covering the District of Kupang and the City of Kupang, Kodim 1605 with headquarters in Atambua whose territory covers the entire district of Belu, Kodim 1618 is headquartered in Kefamenanu whose territory covers the entire district of Timor Tengah Utara, and Kodim 1621 is headquartered in So'e whose territory covers the entire district of Timor Tengah Selatan.

¹ Military operations other than war include relief operations in the event of natural disasters, assistance to police and border guard. (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, *Defending the Nation Entering the 21st Century – Defense White Paper 2003*, pg. 10-11).

² H.D. Wahana (Information Officer Kodam IV/Diponegoro), "Territorial development in TNI Law," *Suara Merdeka*, 19 August 2009; Lieutenant Colonel Judi Paragina, "Re-Vitalization And Re-Actualization of Territorial Development of the TNI AA Rejional Command In Order to Support the Interests of the Defense Dimension in the Future," Kodam Jayakarta website, <http://www.kodam-jaya.mil.id/arsip-artikel-kontribusi/960-re-vitalisasi-dan-re-aktualisasi-pembinaan-teritorial-komando-kewilayahan-tni-aa-guna-mendukung-kepentingan-pertahanan-matra-darat-pada-masa-mendatang?start=1>

Kodim within Korem 161/Wira Sakti

Kodim	Wilayah	Headquarter
Kodim 1601	The district of Sumba Timur	Waingapu
Kodim 1602	The district of Ende	Ende
Kodim 1603	The district of Sikka	Sikka
Kodim 1604	The district of Kupang and the City of Kupang	Kupang
Kodim 1605	The district of Belu	Atambua
Kodim 1612	The district of Manggarai	Manggarai
Kodim 1613	The district of Sumba Barat	Waikabubak
Kodim 1618	Kabupaten Timor Tengah Utara	Kefamenanu
Kodim 1621	The district of Timor Tengah Selatan	So'e
Kodim 1622	Alor	Kalabahi
Kodim 1624	The district of Flores Timur	Larantuka
Kodim 1625	The district of Ngada	Ngada

Korem 161/WS is part of the IX/Udayana Regional Military Command (Kodam) which is based in Denpasar, Bali. The Kodam IX territory covers three provinces, namely Bali, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Nusa Tenggara Timur. The military territorial command for each of these provinces are Korem 161 for NTT Province, the Korem 162/Wira Bhakti for NTB Province is headquartered in Kota Mataram, Lombok, and Korem 163/Wira Satya for Bali Province is headquartered in Denpasar.

Korem within Kodam IX/Udayana

Korem	Region	Headquarter
Korem 161	Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur	Kupang
Korem 162	Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat	Mataram
Korem 163	Provinsi Bali	Denpasar

In addition to supervising the territorial command, Kodam IX also oversee the combat troops, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and engineers. In total there are four battalions of the infantry troops, namely Yonif 742/Satya Wira Yudha (headquartered in Gebang, Mataram, Nusa Tenggara Barat), Yonif 743/Pradnya Samapta Bhakti (headquartered in Naibonat, the District of Kupang), Yonif 744/Satya Yudha Bhakti (headquartered in Tobir, The district of Belu) and Yonif 900/Raider (is headquartered in the city of Singaraja, Bali).³ Indonesian Infantry Battalions are usually 600-1000 strong. Most of the battalions are of 800, which is divided into four companies, namely one headquarter companies, two assault companies, and one reserve company.

The cavalry of Kodam IX/Udayana is of one company, namely the assault cavalry company (Kikavser) which is headquartered in Denpasar. While the engineers consist of one detachment, namely Combat Engineering Detachment (Denzipur) 9, which is headquartered in Gianyar, Bali.

³ Prior to the 1999 Referendum, the infantry of Kodam IX is of five battalions, the fifth battalion is Yonif 745 was disbanded on 21 September 1999 after being withdrawn to West Timor. Previously this battalion was based in the Province of Timor Timur (together with Yonif 744).

The Combat Strength of Kodam IX/Udayana

Units	Headquarter	Notes
Yonif 742	Mataram (Lombok)	
Yonif 743	Naibonat (The district of Kupang)	Two companies were outside the Timor island, namely in Waingapu (Sumba), and Ende (Flores)
Yonif 744	Tobir (The district of Belu)	Previously headquartered in Timor Timur
Yonif 900/Raider	Singaraja (Bali)	Previously named Yonif 741/Satya Bhakti Wirottama, the change of name occurred after its capacity was upgraded to special warfare, anti-guerilla (counter insurgency) and anti-terrorist in 2003.
Combat Engeneering Detachmente 9	Gianyar (Bali)	
Kikavser Kodam IX	Denpasar (Bali)	

If we look at the placement of the combat troops, it appears that the combat troops of the Kodam IX are concentrated in Korem 161. Two of Kodam IX's four Infantry Battalions are based within the territory of Korem 161, namely Yonif 743 and Yonif 744. Half of Yonif 743's strength is located in West Timor, namely company A and company B, while company C is placed in Ende (Flores) and company D in Waingapu (Sumba). Semua company Yonif 744 located in West Timor. This placement shows the importance of Nusa Tenggara Timur, and West Timor in particular, for Kodam IX. In the past, when Timor-Leste was still a *de facto* province of Indonesia, many TNI combat troops were deployed in the province of Timor Timur because at that time the TNI is in the state of armed conflict with the Forças Armadas da Libertação de Timor-Leste (FALINTIL), who were fighting for East Timor's independence. Two Infantry Battalions (Yonif 744 and Yonif 745) were formed especially for this purpose and placed in the province. Besides them there are a number of battalions from outside of Kodam IX which were deployed in the province. Their number varied depending on the military operations being carried out. After Timor-Leste's independence, the territory of Korem 161, in particular the mainland of West Timor, is still considered important because it is on the border with other countries, namely Timor-Leste (land and sea borders) and Australia (sea borders).

Along with the territorial units, the total strength of Korem 161 is 5,337. Korem 161 Headquarter with the following details:⁴


⁴ According to the information from the Commander of Korem 161/WS, quoted by Ganewati Wuryandari (editor), the Security in the Border of *Indonesia-Timor-Leste*, pg. 168. 2010

The Korem 161 Headquarters

Unit	Strength
Korem 161 Headquarter	358 personnel
BALAKREM (Badan Pelaksana Korem) 161	402 personnel
12 Kodim	2.938 personnel
Yonf 743 & Yonif 744	1.639 personnel
Jumlah	5,337 personnel

The strength of Korem 161 can be even greater than this number, namely when the battalions deployed in the region are from outside. This is because Korem 161 also oversees the border guard units which consists of one battalion brought in regularly from outside (described below).

TNI combat troops in Nusa Tenggara Timur



Despite this considerable military strength, the TNI leaders still think to increase the number. In December 2009, the TNI chief announced the establishment of the Infantry Brigade (Brigif) 21 Komodo, with headquarters in Camplong (the district of Kupang). Although there is no significant increase in personnel with the establishment of Brigif 21, because its constituent battalions are the existing battalions, namely Yonif 743 and Yonif 744, it does increase the operational capabilities of the TNI in West Timor. In the formation of the first commander of this brigade, the Commander of Kodam IX says that this establishment will “streamline the command and control unit”. According to him, with the establishment of the Brigif 21, the execution of assignments of Yonif 743 and Yonif 744 will be smoother and the training of the troops will be “more programmed and centralized.”⁵ In addition to the establishment of the Brigif, the TNI Headquarter plans to

⁵ “A Son of NTT Leads the Brigif 21 Komodo,” *Pos Kupang*, 20 February 2010.

increase the number of the personnel of Yonif 744, namely from the four companies with 800 personnel to five companies with 1,039 personnel.⁶

Another plan to be implemented in the near future is the establishment of the Korem in Flores and the establishment of several battalions in Flores and West Timor. The establishment of Korem in Flores had been planned in 2000, namely as the transfer of the Korem 164/Wira Dharma from Timor Timur. However this plan has not yet being implemented because it was opposed by various groups in the area.⁷ Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the Catholic Church were concerned that the establishment of the Korem would result in excessive violence by military personnel against the civilian population.⁸ The battalions which are to be established are one Infantry Battalion in Flores (headquartered in Ende, with its companies to be deployed in eastern, central, and western Flores), one field artillery battalion in Timor Tengah Utara, one cavalry battalion in Belu, and one air defense artillery battalion in Timor Tengah Selatan. A combat engineer detachment will also be established in Timor Tengah Selatan.⁹

The troops to be formed will be concentrated in West Timor. It deals with the reasons for the addition of military forces in the region, as stated by Col. Arief Rachman, Commander of Korem 161 in 2007, "in order to optimize the security of state sovereignty".¹⁰ In other words, the additional strength will assist in securing the Indonesian territory from external threats. It seems likely that in association with this plan, that the status of Korem 161 will also be upgraded in the near future. This Korem will be lead by a commander of the rank of brigadier general, one level above the rank of the actual commander (colonel). According to the present Korem 161 Commander, Colonel Ketut Siangan, the reason for this upgrade is because his territory is directly adjacent to the two countries, namely Australia and Timor-Leste.¹¹

The Combat Strength in the territory of Korem 161 (plan)

Unit	Strength	Base
Infantry	3 battalion	Flores (1), West Timor (2)
Cavalry	1 battalion	West Timor (The district of Belu)
Field Artillery	1 battalion	West Timor (The district of Timor Tengah Utara)

⁶ Information of Pangdam IX/Udayana Major General Herry Tjahjana, quoted by *Antara*, 9 May 2005 (the English version is published in ETAN website, <http://www.etan.org/et2005/may/15/10tni.htm>)

⁷ "TNI Has Planned the Establishment of Korem in Flores," *Antara*, <http://alutsista.blogspot.com/2007/08/rusia-pertimbangkan-bangun-pangkalan.html> - links

⁸ Interview with KM (NGO activist), December 2010 and BH (source in the Catholic Church), Kupang, December 2010.

⁹ This plan was stated in the explanation of the Commander of Korem 161/WS Colonel (Infantry) Arief Rachman to the joint commission meeting of DPRD NTT, Kupang, August 2007, quoted in "NTT Needs Five Battalions of TNI AD", *Antara*, published in the website of the Ministry of Defense RI,

http://www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&new_topic=1. In this plan, Company C Yonif 742 which is now located in Ende will be moved to Kalabahi (Alor island) which borders with Timor-Leste and the headquarter of Company C will be used as the headquarter of of the infantry battalion to be formed.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ "The Status of Korem Wirasakti is Upgraded," *Pos Kupang*, 7 January 2011. This news also mentioned that the status of Korem 161 is upgraded together with another 12 Korem, namely: Korem 032/WRB Padang, Korem 033/WP Tanjung Pinang, Korem 031/WB Pekanbaru, Korem 072/PMK Yogyakarta, Korem 081/DJ Madiun, Korem 083/BJ Malang, Korem 121/ABW Sintang, Korem 091/ASN Samarinda, Korem 131/STG Manado, Korem 152/BDL Ternate, Korem 173/PVB Biak, and Korem 174/ATW Merauke. The majority of these Korem were in borders with other countries.

Air Defense Artillery	1 battalion	West Timor (Timor Tengah Selatan)
Combat Engineer	1 detachment	West Timor (Timor Tengah Selatan)

For the same reasons increases in personnel and equipment will also be carried out by the TNI Navy and TNI Air Force. Since 2005 Tentara Indonesia Angkatan Laut TNI AL has planned to establish a base in Wetar island which located in the north of Timor-Leste and in time will soon get a new warship. This base is part of Lantamal VIII Maluku. According to the explanation of the Commander of Lantamal VIII at that time, this is part of the programs for outer islands and Wetar is considered as a vulnerable island because it is in the border with Timor-Leste.¹² As part of the defense strengthening, TNI AL in 2002 has also built a lighthouse in Loronwisi, Cape Oirata, Kisar Island¹³ (opposite Lospalos). Although not many, TNI AU has also improved its ability in this area for the same reason, namely to increase the security of the border areas. After the independence of Timor-Leste, it has placed four F-5E supersonic aircraft in TNI AU Base in El Tari, Kupang and has set up radar in the village of Buraen (Sub-district Amarasi, the District of Kupang), Saumlaki (Maluku Utara), Merauke, Timika and Biak (Papua). TNI AU plans to add another radar unit in eastern Indonesia, including in the island of Sumba. The additions in the NTT region, according to the Air Force Chief, Marshal Imam Sufaat, are because this region is directly adjacent to Timor-Leste and Australia “so it needs to have maximum security.”¹⁴

III. Border guard

As a territorial command whose regional responsibilities include national borders, Korem 161 is tasked by the TNI Headquarter to conduct border security operations. In accordance with the TNI Act Article 7 Paragraph 2, Indonesian border security is the responsibility of the TNI. Indonesia and Timor-Leste border security operations are controlled by Korem 161, which in this case acts as the Implementing Command of the Border Security Operations RI-RDTL (Kolakops Pamantas RI-RDTL),¹⁵ and the commander of Korem 161/WS acted as the Commander of the Kolakops Pamantas RI-RDTL. The troops who carried out this operation are called the Republic of Indonesia-Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Border Security Task Unit (Satgas Pamantas RI-RDTL) with the strength of one battalion.

In the beginning, the troops for Satgas Pamantas RI-RDTL were drawn from the battalions outside the Kodam IX. Such outside units included the elite troops of Kostrad (TNI Army Reserves and Strategic Command), such as Yonif 514/Raider from the Infantry Brigade 9 Kostrad based in Situbondo, Jawa Timur, the Airborne Infantry Battalion 432 which is based in Maros, Sulawesi Selatan (served as Pamantas in October 1999-June 2000) or

¹² “Indonesia to establish new naval base near East Timor,” *Antara*, 11 May 2005, published in the website of ETAN, <http://www.etan.org/et2005/may/15/12itiest.htm>

¹³ “RI Navy continues to safeguard Kisar, Wetar Islands,” *Antara*, 10 May 2005, published in the website of ETAN, <http://www.etan.org>.

¹⁴ “TNI AU Add One Radar in Sumba,” *Antara*, 6 July 2010, <http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/1278389612/tni-au-tambah-satu-radar-di-sumba>

¹⁵ Colonel (Arh) I Dewa Ketut Siangan (the Commander of Korem 161/WS), “The Role of TNI in Creating a Peaceful Border between the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL,” paperwork for Security Sector Reform workshop, organized by Independent Journalist Alliance (AJI), in Atambua, 20 August 2010. See also “Satgas Pamantas is transferred to Yonif 743/PSY,” *Kursor*, 5 January 2011.

Infantry Battalion Kodam such as Yonif 621/Manuntung¹⁶ which is a battalion of Kodam VI/Mulawarman based in Kandangan, Hulu Sungai Utara, Kalimantan Selatan (on duty in 2002). After 2005 the deployment of Satgas Pamtas RI-RDTL is rotated from the Infantry Battalions of Kodam IX which is based in Nusa Tenggara Barat and Nusa Tenggara Timur, namely Yonif 742 (headquartered in Mataram, Lombok), Yonif 743 (headquartered in Naibonat, the District of Kupang), and Yonif 744 (headquartered in Tobir, the District of Belu, near the border). Satgas Pamtas is led by a commander with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. Currently the battalion which served as the Satgas Pamtas is Yonif 743,¹⁷ which replaced Yonif 742 since January 2011.¹⁸ Each battalion takes turns serving for a year with the Satgas Pamtas RI-RDTL.

It is interesting that the battalions which served as Satgas Pamtas were not the battalions which were deployed in the province of Timor-Timur to eradicate the Forsa Armadas Libertaun Nasional Timor-Leste (FALINTIL) armed resistance. This seems to have been done by the TNI Headquarter in order to ensure that the serving TNI Korem 161 Headquarters did not have any relationship with the former militia groups, these groups which in the past had helped the TNI in combating the insurgency of Timor-Leste (and were called by TNI the Garakan Pengacau Keamanan (Security Insurgency Gangs) abbreviated to "GPK"). The existence of such a relationship could make the members of the TNI less willing to take actions against former militia members who cause security problems in West Timor and disrupt the good relations between Indonesia and Timor-Leste.¹⁹

The land border between Timor-Leste and Indonesia is of 316 kilometers in length and divided into two parts.²⁰ The longer eastern part of the border is where the Districts of Bobonaro and Covalima meet with the border of the District of Belu (whose capital is Atambua). The shorter western part of the border is where the District of Oecusse (Timor-Leste) is in the border with the District of Timor Tengah Utara (whose capital is Kefamenanu) and the District of Kupang (whose capital is Kupang). In order to maintain the security, the Satgas Pamtas Forces were deployed along the border. In the eastern border, the troops were placed in 25 border posts, namely: (1) Motaain 1, (2) Motaain 2, (3) Silawan, (4) Haliwen, (5) Salore, (6) Mahen, (7) Asumanu, (8) Maubusa, (9) Nunura, (10) Turiscain, (11) Dilomil, (12) Kewar, (13), Lakmars, (14) Fohuk, (15) Foholulik, (16) Fatubesi Atas, (17) Dafala, (18) Lookeu, (19) Laktutus, (20) Nanano, (21) Ailala, (22) Fatuha, (23) Auren, (24) Haslot, and (25) Motamasin. In the western border there are 13 posts, 10 posts within the territory of the District of Timor Tengah Utara (Olbinose, Manusasi, Ninulat, Haumeniana, Baen, Inbate, Nino, Napan Bawah, Wini, and Kefa

¹⁶ "Many East Timorese Infiltrating NTT Through the Border Market," the website of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&new_topic=1, accessed on 3 January 2011.

¹⁷ "Indonesia-Timor-Leste Border Security Battalions are rotated," *Antara*, 6 January 2011 (<http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/1294289370/battalion-penjaga-perbatasan-indonesia-timor-leste-dirotasi>).

¹⁸ "Yonif 742/SWY Not To Hurt the People," *NTT Online*, 14 January 2010. "The Border with Timor Leste Should be Strictly Guarded," *Metronews.com*, 9 April 2010.

¹⁹ One of the incident that shows that the TNI is no longer tolerated the activities of the former militias who disturbed the security is by strict action against some former milita members who want to launch protest against the arrest of a number of former militias who infiltrated into Timor-Leste in 2004. They were arrested by the officers from Satgas Pamtas when approaching the border in Mota Ain. (Interview with LR, a humanitarian worker in West Timor, Atambua, January 2011).

²⁰ *Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°50*, 4 May 2006, p.7.

posts) and three posts are within the territory of the district of Kupang (Opoli Pantai, Oepoli, and Oepoli Sungai).²¹

If compared with the border guard between Indonesia and Malaysia, the border guard with Timor-Leste is much more stringent. The border between Kalimantan Timur and Sabah, Malaysia which has 1782 kilometers in length is guarded by one battalion²² which are deployed in 27 posts.²³ While the border between Kalimantan Barat and Serawak, Malaysia which has 966 kilometers in length is also guarded by one battalion with 615 personnel which are deployed in 32 posts.²⁴

The map produced by Korem 161 regarding the deployment of troops in the border in 2010 shows that the Satgas Pamantas RDTL-RI troops consists of five "Combat Companies" (abbreviated Kipur). Kipur 1 is headquartered in Motamasin, Kipur 2 is headquartered in Kewar, Kipur 3 in Mota Ain, which all are deployed in the eastern border, while Kipur 4 is headquartered in Napan Bawah and Kipur 5 in Oepoli which are located in the western border. Those combat companies are divided into sections of [in Portuguese: *secções*] troops, which each sections are assigned to guard one border post.

From the map produced by Korem 161, it seems clear that the TNI is guarding the land border between Indonesia and Timor-Leste very strictly (see the map below), as if Indonesia faces a serious threat from across its border. The division of Satgas Pamantas RI-RDTL troops into "combat companies" along the border strengthens the impression that TNI is preparing to fight an enemy with the potential to destabilise Indonesia.

²¹ Colonel (Arh) I Dewa Ketut Siangan, *ibid.*, pg. 10. Besides that, Korem 161/WS also dployed troops in the post that is located in "outer/forefront islands", namely Pulau Batek (which is called Fatuk Sinai by the Timorese), Dana Island. The deployment of troops is not done by the Satgas Pamantas RI-RDTL but by the Task Force Unit for the Outer/Forefront Islands.

²² "The TNI Commander Observed the Border of Indonesia-Malaysia," *Antara*, 26 February 2011,

²³ "The Incentives for the TNI in the Border is 75 Percent of Salary," *Antara*, published in the website of the Ministry of Defence of the RI, <http://www.kemhan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=9364>

²⁴ "TNI Evaluates the Security Posts in the Border of RI-Malaysia," *Antara*, 27 February 2011, <http://www.antaraneews.com/berita/247736/panglima-tni-tinjau-perbatasan-indonesia-malaysia> published in <http://id.news.yahoo.com/antr/20110226/tpl-tni-evaluasi-pos-safekeeping-perbatas-cc08abe.html>

The Map of Korem 161 regarding the Deployment of Satgas Pamtas RI-RDTL Troops



Source: The Commander of Korem 161 Colonel (Artileri) I Dewa Ktut Siangan, “The Explanation of the Danrem 161/Wirasakti on Pubic Discussion about the Role of TNI in the Border,” PowerPoint Presentation in Public Discussion on Security Sector Reform, organized by The Independent Journalist Alliance (AJI) Kupang Branch, in Atambua, 20 August 2010. The map is on page 25.

Border security by the TNI is reinforced by the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia (POLRI). In the District of Belu alone, POLRI has set up and operates six security posts. According to the Regional Police of Nusa Tenggara Timur, the police personnel who are deployed to secure the border consists of one company from the POLRI paramilitary unit called Brimob (Mobile Brigade). The main task of these troops is to help the border guarding by the TNI (Satgas Pamtas RDTL-RI).²⁵

In performing the border guarding duties, besides deploying the troops in the security posts, TNI also conducted various activities of “territorial development”. The purpose of the territorial development is to prepare the region and the supporting forces to defend the country against the external and internal threats which endangers the totality of state and the national security. The supporting force includes what the TNI called “Trained People” (Ratih) which consists of Hansip (Civilian Defense) and Wanra (Civilian Resistance). These are the civilian population who were trained and organized to assist

²⁵ “Fuel smuggling along East Timor border again rampant” by Indonesian Detikcom web site, 22 May 2005 (Asia Intelligence Wire, 23 May 2005, published in the website of East Timor Action Network (ETAN), www.etan.org).

with internal security and external defense.²⁶ The target of the “territorial development” is to create firstly “a formidable fighting space” the defense area which is ready as a battlefield or area of operations, then “a formidable fighting instrument” the TNI’s reserve and supporting components that are ready to be used to win the battle, “a formidable fighting condition” the responsible and self-sacrificing people, and finally “TNI-People total integration” which is the firm and strong ties as well as the unity between the TNI and the people.²⁷

“Territorial development” is the routine duty of every territorial command ranging from Kodam to Koramil anywhere in Indonesia. However, apparently Korem 161 gives West Timor special attention. This can be seen from the deployment of the “Territorial Task Unit”, which is implemented by Kodim 1604/Kupang, Kodim 1605/Belu, and Kodim 1608/Timor Tengah Utara in their respective areas of work along the border with Timor-Leste.²⁸

According to the Commander of Korem 161 Colonel I Dewa Ketut Siangan, the concrete efforts that has been implemented includes: giving orientation to the religious, customary and youth figures as well as the refugees; reforestation; scout courses for the *Babinsa* (Noncommissioned Law Enforcement Officer, a TNI officer with the rank of sergeant who is tasked to implement “territorial development” at village level) who will become the scout instructor in their respective regions, revitalization of KB (Family Planning) and social services, as well as the eradication of illiteracy.²⁹ From this explanation, it appears that “territorial development” by Korem 161 is more in the form of activities which are aimed at improving the welfare of the society. Such activities are probably to enhance the credibility or the image of the TNI in the eyes of the civilian population, which is very much needed to show the “TNI-People total integration”. This is important for the TNI in the post-New Order period (1966-98), given that during the New Order period the TNI image was sharply declining in the eyes of the people because the TNI territorial command often conducted operations for political purposes to maintain the authority of the New Order government under President H.M. Soeharto.

That the territorial activities in the border areas with Timor-Leste have been concentrating on the orientation to the religious, customary and refugees leaders, as well as the community welfare, is possibly related to the fact that, in this region, several times there has been objections and protests over the presence of the TNI as a result of perceived excesses, such as violence against the civilian population and the increase of TNI forces such as the establishment of a Brigif in West Timor and the plan to establish a Korem in Flores.³⁰ Such activity for community welfare is probably needed to enhance the image of the security forces so that the people can accept the presence of the TNI (in particular TNI AD) which has increased in this region.

²⁶ The Territorial Base of the TNI Army, “Territorial Development In the Perspective of the TNI and the Perspective of Other Components of the State,” paperwork, Indonesian National Armed Forces Infantry, <http://www.tniad.mil.id/1artikel.php?pil=1&dn=20080812125129>.

²⁷ TNI AD Territorial Base, *loc. cit.*

²⁸ Colonel I Dewa Ketut Siangan, hal 10.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pg. 13.

³⁰ “Priest in Kupang Beaten by Member of Pamtas Yonif 742,” *Tempo Interaktif*, 24 September 2010; “The Plan for Construction of Brigif Headquarter Is Challenged,” the website of NTT Online, http://www.nttonlinenews.com/ntt/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3662:rencana-pembangunan-headquarter-brigif-mendapat-tantangan&catid=52:lain-lain&Itemid=70

IV. The Excessive Security?

In the literature on security, the Indonesian border security is classified into what is called a “hard-border security regime” or strict border security arrangements. In this type of arrangement, the border is tightly guarded by armed troops, while the cross border port of entry is limited in number and guarded not only by immigration officers but also by police officers and armed soldiers. Countries that impose the “hard-border security regime” tend to restrict the entry and exit of people who cross the border for national security reasons.³¹ The border crossing posts between Timor-Leste-Indonesia amounted to only four, for the eastern border Mota Ain-Batugade and Mota Masin-Salele, while for the western border Wini-Sakato and Napan-Bobometo.

The opposite of the “hard-border regime” is called as a “soft-border security regime” (soft border security arrangements). Under these arrangements, the country is not really restricting the people who cross the border because it does not consider that this will bring about threats to national security. The border posts are not limited to a small number. The border security does not have to involve armed soldiers. This system is usually adopted by the countries that have developed principles of *peaceful co-existence*, the countries in a region which do not feel disturbed by the presence of their neighboring countries so there is no need to restrict population movement between countries. Two friendly countries usually adopt a “soft-border regime,” system because they both do not feel threatened by each other.³²

From the Timor-Leste side, the border guard has been made very different. The soldiers who are deployed to guard the border were not from the military (F-FDTL) but from the police, namely from the Unidade Patroalhamento Fronteira Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (UPF PNTL – Border Patrol Unit of the Timor-Leste National Police). The UPF force consists of 240 personnel, so it is not even half of the force of the Satgas Pamantas RDTL-RI. This small troop not only guarded the land border in the western part (Oecusse) and eastern (Covalima and Bobonaro) but also served in guarding Nicolau Lobato international airport in Dili.

The difference is also seen in the arrangements of the ports of entry and exit of the border of the two countries. On the Indonesian side, apart from the Immigration, Customs, and Quarantine posts, there are also TNI (Satgas Pamantas) and POLRI posts deployed in the border. The examination of people and goods crossing the border is not only done by the Immigration, Customs, and Quarantine officers, but also by the officers from the TNI and POLRI in their respective posts. In addition to checking the passport of each person crossing the border, each of the POLRI and TNI officers also registered their names. When we crossed the border from Indonesia into Timor-Leste, there is a marked difference in attitude between the Indonesian officers and the Timor-Leste’s officers. The Timorese border officers who are doing the examination seemed to be relaxed and friendly in treating the people who are going to enter or leave Timor-Leste territory³³. The difference in border arrangements is probably reflecting the difference in the perceptions of the Timorese leaders regarding the border. For example, in 2003 when responding to the suggestions on the border guard by the military, the Prime

³¹ Ganewati Wuryandari, “Border Security Management: Theoretical Analysis,” in Ganewati Wuryandari (editor), *the Security in the Border of in Indonesia-Timor Leste* (P2P LIPI & Pustaka Pelajar), pg. 42-43. 2010.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Fundasaun Mahein’s Source, Atambua, (17 December 2010)

Minister Mari Alkatiri said, "The border is a territory that should be free from military because it is our gateway to be in touch with our friendly countries, not the place for our enemies."³⁴

The strict border guard by the TNI is rather unusual. Usually the "hard-border security regime" is imposed by countries that are hostile to the neighboring countries. For example, the border guarding between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). It also imposed by the state that is afraid of the large migration flow. For example, the border guarding by the United States of America on its border with Mexico to prevent the flow of illegal migrants who are trying to enter the United States to find work.

Indonesia is clearly not at war or facing the possibility for war with Timor-Leste. Both countries are keen to build good relations. Various bilateral cooperation are underway, in the areas of economy, health,³⁵ education, and promotion and gender equality.³⁶ The commanders of the armed forces of the two countries visiting each other and in September 2009 discussing about the dispatch of the members of the F-FDTL to participate in military in Indonesia.³⁷ In the regional level, Indonesia has been the sponsor for Timor-Leste to become a member of the Associations of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).³⁸ In March 2011 the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste Xanana Gusmao attended the Jakarta International Defence Dialogue and discussed defence relations between Indonesia and Timor-Leste. According to the Associated Press Indonesia reportedly offered export credit to Timor-Leste to purchase patrol boats.³⁹ According to Timorese leading daily newspaper the Suara Timor Lorosae the Prime Minister discussed the matter of weapons purchases from Indonesia with Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.⁴⁰

Timor-Leste's military power is clearly not a threat to Indonesia. If compared to the TNI, the FALINTIL-Força de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) force is very small. Timor-Leste Armed Forces does not have air force, its infantry troop is only consists of two Infantry Battalions, and its naval force only has two patrol boats. While the TNI infantry force in West Timor itself consists of 6-10 infantry companies, and in Kupang there is Indonesian National Armed Forces Air Force (TNI AU) base and a large Indonesian National Armed Forces Navy (TNI AL) base. The TNI AU base in Kupang is equipped with radar and other surveillance equipments to monitor the air in the Indonesian border area with Timor-Leste and Australia. There is a routine border air patrol by the F-5E supersonic

³⁴ Indonesia, East Timor agree to demilitarize border (Jakarta Post. Pg. 1. 31 Oct.2001)

³⁵ In March 2010, Timor-Leste's Health Minister Nelson Martins signed a cooperation agreement with the Indonesian Health Minister for the reduction in maternal mortality, combating malaria, cholera, TBC and others ("Indonesia Established Cooperation with Timor-Leste in the Health Sector," *Republika*, 26 March 2010).

³⁶ In September 2010, the State Secretary for Promotion and Equality (Secretaria de Estado da Promoção da Igualdade) signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding cooperation in the area of promotion and gender equality ("SEPI Hala'o Kooperasaun ho Indonesia," *Ta'es* (quarterly bulletin Secretaria de Estado da Promoção da Igualdade), No. 24 (July-September 2010).

³⁷ "Indonesia-East Timor Increases Military Cooperation," *Republika Online*, 3 September 2009, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/internasional/09/09/03/73972-indonesiatimtim-tingkatkan-kerja-sama-militer>.

³⁸ "Experts, Indonesia agree: Let Timor Leste join ASEAN", Jakarta Post, 10 April, 2011 (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/07/experts-indonesia-agree-let-timor-leste-join-asean.html>)

³⁹ <http://timorhauniandoben.blogspot.com/2011/03/timor-leste-interested-in-buying.html>

⁴⁰ Sosa Kilat Husi Indonesia F-FDTL-PNTL Presija Ekipamentus Militar, Suara Timor Lorosae, 24 March 2011 <http://suara-timor-lorosae.com/berita-3508--sosa-kilat-husi-indonesia-ffdtlpntl-presija-ekipamentus-militar.html> and <http://timorhauniandoben.blogspot.com/2011/03/sosa-kilat-husi-indonesia-f-ftdl-pntl.html>

fighter aircrafts from this base.⁴¹ The total number of personnel from this base is 175 personnel, which covers Kopassus (Special Forces Command), namely a qualified Special Forces Command.⁴²

The TNI AL base in Kupang is the Main Navy Base (Lantamal) VII, which is not only as a warship base but it is also covers Navy Air Base (Lanudal) because there are TNI AL aircrafts which are based in here. Lantamal VII oversees five smaller bases called Navy Base (Lanal), namely in Mataram (Lombok), Maumere (Flores), Kupang, Tual, and Aru. The warships from Lantamal VII are exploring the Indonesian maritime territory in the region of Lombok strait in the western part to Aru and Arafuru Sea in the eastern part. Timor-Leste's northern and eastern maritime territory are surrounded by Indonesian maritime territory which are explored by the Lantamal warships, it is only the southern coast which is not being explored by the TNI AL warships because it is in the border with Australian territory.⁴³

Besides the superiority of the Indonesian military, Timor-Leste is also not a threat because the leaders of Republica Democratica De Timor-Leste (RDTL) do not consider Indonesia as an enemy and since the beginning of independence actually wanted to have a good relationship with their neighbour. As has been said many times by Taur Matan Ruak, even since he became the Commander of the FALINTIL-Forces Defeca de Timor Leste (F-FDTL), "We can choose friends, but we cannot choose neighbors." Which means that Timor-Leste should be in good relationships with the countries surrounding it. The same thing was also said by the F-FDTL Chief of Staff, Brigadier Lere Anan Timor (who was also a former FALINTIL commander): "Before we fought each other because Indonesia is occupying Timor-Leste and that Timor-Leste wants independence, but after Timor-Leste became an independent sovereign state through the referendum in 1999, we are brothers."⁴⁴

The strict safekeeping of the Indonesian border is not caused by a real threat to Indonesia, but it is more associated with the Indonesian perception about the threat against the state and nation of Indonesia. Since the time of the Orde Baru, the Indonesian policy-makers have a strong view that because the Indonesian geographical location is strategic, where it connects two continents (Asia and Australia) and two oceans (Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean), thus there are many countries "who are interested" in Indonesia, in the sense that they want to take over Indonesia.⁴⁵ Such a view has created a "siege mentality", such as the general assumption that Indonesia is a state that being surrounded by many different potentially hostile countries around it, as

⁴¹ "Foreign Military Aircraft Detected in the Soputh of Rote Island, NTT," *Media Indonesia*, 19 May 2009. The website of The Northrop F-5 Enthusiast Page said that there are four F-5E based in the El Tari base. ("Indonesian National Army– Air Force," The Nothrop F-5 Enthusiast Page, http://cocardes.monde.online.fr/v2html/en/cartes/carte_monde.html

⁴² "Air Force Personnel Stationed in Kupang," *The Jakarta Post*, 7 April 2005.

⁴³ Lantamal VII is part of the TNI AL Easter Fleets which is headquartered in Surabaya. TNI AL has two fleets, namely Eastern Fleet and Western Fleet (which is based in Jakarta).

⁴⁴ This statement was presented in the seminar on maritime security which was attended by the TNI AL Commander of the Eastern Fleet Combat Task Force and the Commander of the Australian Navy, organized by Ministry of Defence of Timor-Leste in Hotel Timor, Dili, June 2010.

⁴⁵ Such opinions up to now is delivered through various courses in the National Defense Institute which is attended not only by medium and high military officers but also by the state officials, leaders of the civil society organizations and the political parties. This view is also disseminated through schools, especially in the subjects of Pancasila Moral Education, Civic Education, Education about the History of the National Struggle, and also through refresher courses for Guidelines for Carrying Out the Principles of Pancasila (P4).

well as by the superpower countries who want to have control over it. This is revealed, for example when there were incidences of border violations by the Royal Malaysian Navy in last year. The community groups and the politicians called for Indonesia to crack down on Malaysia. Not a few groups of people who called for the establishment of the voluntary forces to invade Malaysia.⁴⁶ But actually the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia are very good, at both a bilateral and multilateral level, to the extent that Malaysia even supplied weapons when Indonesia invaded Timor-Leste in 1975.⁴⁷

Such a mentality has made the TNI commanders sensitive to what they consider as threats to the Indonesian border. For example, when there are border violations by the East Timorese who enter into the Indonesian territory to buy goods for their daily necessities, the commander of Pantas considers it as “infiltration.”⁴⁸ This view of intrusion is probably not derived from real observations about the threat, but rather derived from an abstract view of the threat as described in the official documents of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense. For example, Defense White Paper 2003 and 2008 which were prepared by the Ministry of Defense said that the threats faced by Indonesia are getting more complex and that the possibility for military invasion is very small, however other forms of threats are increasing.⁴⁹ This view on the threat is very influential on the TNI commanders when they talk in general about the security situation. For example, when commissioning the Commander of Brigif 21/Komodo, the Commander of Kodam IX Major General Hotmangaradja Pandjaitan said that the threat to the totality of the nation and the state can come from abroad such as infiltration.⁵⁰ Other example, when talking about the need to add more battalions in NTT, the Commander of Korem 161 said that it is required to keep safe regions that border with two other countries. It is as if the two countries in question, namely Timor-Leste and Australia, are not countries that are friendly to Indonesia and therefore could become a threat to Indonesia or could be used by other countries to threaten Indonesia. When explaining about the addition of posts in the border between Indonesia-Malaysia, the Head of the Public Information Office of the TNI Headquarter Colonel Ahmad Yani Basuki said that this is done to “prevent illegal activities ... such as illegal logging, human trafficking, smuggling of explosives, infiltration, sabotage, and foreign intelligence activities.”⁵¹

Such views about the threat from other country were raised when the TNI commanders/officers speak in abstract. When talking in concrete terms about the issues encountered in the border, the commanders clearly understood about what they faced and did not speak in doctrinal terms. For example, when talking about violations in the maritime region of NTT, the Commander of TNI Eastern Fleet Rear Admiral Bambang Sunarto said that the crime that had occurred was territorial violations, trafficking, illegal logging, illegal fishing, and smuggling.⁵²

⁴⁶ “Millions of the Retired Military’s Sons Were Ready to be Sent to Malaysian Border,” *Rakyat Merdeka*, 27 August 2010, <http://www.rakyatmerdeka.co.id/news.php?id=2394>.

⁴⁷ Ken Conboy, *Kopassus – Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces* (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2003), pg. 225 & 231. Informasi ini berasal dari interview with Jenderal Benny Moerdani.

⁴⁸ “Many East Timorese Infiltrating NTT Through the Border Market,” the website of the Ministry of Defense, http://www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&new_topic=1

⁴⁹ See Ministry of Defense, *Defending the Nation in Entering the 21 Century – Defense White Paper 2003*, pg. 45-52 and *Defense White Paper 2008*, pg. 6-8, 27-38.

⁵⁰ “A Son of NTT Leads the Brigif 21 Komodo,” *Pos Kupang*, 20 February 2010.

⁵¹ “TNI Strengthens RI-Malaysia Border,” *Fajar*, 28 June 2010, <http://www.fajar.co.id/read-52525-tni-perkuat-perbatasan-rimalaysia>

⁵² “TNI AL Wipe Out Crime in NTT Sea,” *Pos Kupang*, 22 January 2011.

In relation to the problems occurred in the border between Indonesia and Timor-Leste, the Commander of Korem 161 said that the types of violations are:

- Smuggling of timber into Timor-Leste through cross border posts or through the “tiny path”
- Illegal selling of subsidized staples into Timor-Leste (sold with higher price compared with the price in Indonesia)
- Smuggling of basic goods that are expensive in Timor-Leste compared with the price in Indonesia, such as sugar
- Illegal border crossing because of family ties between the populations of Timor-Leste and Indonesia
- The plantation of the population of both countries that pass through the border line
- The shifting of border markers either intentionally or unintentionally by the Timorese population for particular agricultural interest.⁵³

The descriptions by the Commander of Korem shows that observation in the field differs from the abstract analysis of the threat, an analysis which assumes that the border is an area vulnerable to threats from outside or inside that endanger the totality of the Unitary State Republic of Indonesia. The descriptions derived from the field observations indicates that the violations which occur in the border are common crime, namely smuggling, illegal border crossing, and violations of the territory for personal interests (not the expansion of territory by other country). The description also shows that some of the violations come from Indonesia, namely the smuggling of basic goods and timber into Timor-Leste.

V. The Issues on the Border

From the observations on the news in the media and direct observations in the field, the issues on the land border between Timor-Leste and Indonesia are as follows.

a. *The border line which has not been agreed upon*

The determination of the border line by Indonesia and Timor-Leste is still unfinished. In several point, the negotiation between the two countries has not yet reached agreement, it is namely in Noelbesi segment, Manusasi, and Malibaka. Besides that there is one point that has not been surveyed, it is Subina-Oben.

The Noelbesi segment have not yet been agreed because of the difference in views between Indonesia and Timor-Leste in reading the map. Both countries agreed that the basis for determining the border is the two agreements made by the Portuguese and Dutch colonials in the past, namely *Convention for the Demarcation of Portuguese and Dutch Dominion on the Island of Timor* or Treaty 1904 and *Permanent Arbitral Awards 1914*.⁵⁴ In the agreement between the Portuguese and Dutch it was mentioned that Noelbessi river is the border between the two regions. The difference between Timor-Leste and Indonesia occurs because in this segment the river branched into two. The Indonesian side assumes that the boundary between the two countries lies in the eastern branch of the river, while the Timor-Leste side assumes that the boundary lies in

⁵³ Colonel I Dewa Ktut Siangan, *loc. cit.*, pg. 5-6.

⁵⁴ Ganewati Wuryandari, “The Issues of Demarcation and the Security in the Border of Indonesia-Timor Leste,” in Ganewati Wuryandari (editor), *the Security in the Border of Indonesia-Timor Leste*, pg. 121-122.2010

the western branch of the river. These differences are causing problems in the field because in the middle of the two branches of the river lays a fertile land for agriculture. The ownership of the place called Naktuka is still disputed by both populations in Timor-Leste and Indonesian sides. The population in the Indonesian territory opposed the cultivation of the land done by the Timorese population.⁵⁵

The differences about Manusasi segment occurs because the Indonesian side assume that for this particular area, the provisions in the agreement between the Portuguese and Dutch is no longer applicable because according to the information from the local people in the Sub-district of Miomafo Barat , the District of Timor Tengah Utara, the territory that had once belonged to the Portuguese had been handed over to the residents in the Indonesian side through a traditional negotiation for the settlement of a murder case around 1966s. The Timor-Leste side does not agree with the Indonesian views.⁵⁶

Malibaka River in Memo occurs because the Indonesian side wants that the point to be used as the boundary between the two countries is the midpoint of the river. Timor-Leste disagrees because based on the agreement between the Portuguese-Dutch the border should be the *thalweg* (the deepest point) of the river, not the midpoint.

The undetermined border in Subina-Oben occurs not because there are differences of opinions between the government of Timor-Leste and Indonesia, but it is because the survey for delimitation was blocked by the Indonesian population in that area. Under the Treaty 1904, the area is a part of Timor-Leste's territory. However the Indonesian population claimed that they have, for generations, processed the land in that area and rejected the delimitation survey. They were concerned that the result of the survey would be contrary to their claim.⁵⁷

| b. Smuggling

Smuggling often occurs through the border from Indonesia into Timor-Leste. The smuggled goods are were mostly the staple goods such as cigarettes, soap, noodles, and spices, as well as subsidized goods such as kerosene, gasoline and staples. This smuggling occurs because the prices are higher in Timor-Leste. Smuggling also occurs from Timor-Leste into Indonesia, namely the goods that are cheaper in Timor-Leste such as the rice subsidized by the Timor-Leste's Ministry of Tourism, Commerce and Industry (MTCI).

The smuggling often involves the members of TNI and POLRI. For example in 2005, the officers from the NTT Regional Police (Polda) detained three persons using navy trucks to smuggle 21 drum containing fuel into Timor-Leste.⁵⁸ Based on the observations from the NGOs in West Timor, there are also smuggling that involves the cooperation between the officers of Satgas Pamtas RI-RDTL and UPF PNTL. The goods that are smuggled from Indonesia were transported by trucks with the escorts of the officers of

⁵⁵ "Timor-Leste Claims Naktuka in NTT," *Kompas*, 11 October 2009; "Indonesia Should be Strict Over the Occupation of Naktuka," *Berita Sore*, 14 October 2010, the website of Berita Sore, <http://beritasore.com/2010/10/14/indonesia-harus-tegas-atas-pendudukan-naktuka/>

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pg. 129-130.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pg. 134-135.

⁵⁸ "Indonesia detains three using navy truck to smuggle fuel into East Timor" [summary of the Media Indonesia news, 18 July 2005), published in the website of ETAN, <http://www.etan.org>.

Satgas Pamtas at night, while the buyers of the goods have been waiting in the border of Indonesia-Timor Leste, along with the UPF PNTL officers.⁵⁹

c. Illegal border crossing

This problem often occurred before the implementation of the Cross Border Pass (PLB). The population from Timor-Leste territory often enters into the Indonesian territory to buy daily necessities for their own consumption, or buying merchandise for resale in Timor-Leste, or for family interests such as visiting family members, attending wedding ceremonies, family funeral or other customary events. These illegal visits are often known by the Timor-Leste and Indonesian border officers. It was not rare that the Indonesian border officers collected some money for the illegal border crossing.⁶⁰

d. Unofficial levies

The unofficial levies are collected against the Indonesian citizens who crossed the border Timor-Leste. These charges were done by the officers of Satgas Pamtas RI-RDTL in the border post in Mota Ain. Everyone who crossed the border is required to give their passport to these officers to be registered. When the officers found a citizen of Indonesia, who was crossing the border into Timor-Leste for the first time, this officer will call him to enter the post and then ask him to hand over some money, with the amount ranging between Rp 50.000 and Rp. 300.000.⁶¹

Other unofficial levies are applicable on goods exported from Indonesia into Timor-Leste. Officially exported goods are subject to examination by the TNI, POLRI, Customs, and Quarantine posts. In order that the officers not cause difficulties for the truck drivers who transport the goods, the drivers will give some money to these officials. According to an NGO staff in West Timor who observed this issue, the truck drivers handed over an envelope containing cash with an amount of Rp 200.000 for every check points. The truck driver who transports the goods to enter Timor-Leste through Mota Ain, should give an envelope to each of the posts (TNI, POLRI, Customs, Quarantine and so on). The driver who entering Timor-Leste through Wini/Sacato (Oecusse), should give an envelope to each of the four post (because the Quarantine officer is often not paper, therefore there is only TNI, POLRI, and Customs), and is those who crosses through Mota Masin should give an envelope to each of the six posts.⁶²

e. The incidences of border violations

After the East Timor's independence was restored in 2002 marked with the handing over of sovereignty from the UN, there have been many border incidences which involving the border security officers from the two countries.

For example, the first incident was in Malibaka in 2005 in the form of shooting at a member of TNI from Satgas Pamtas RI-RDTL. According to the PNTL who guarded the border, the shooting took place because the armed TNI member entered and violated

⁵⁹ Interview with DR, Kupang, December 2011.

⁶⁰ Interview with DR, Kupang, December 2010 and VR, a resident of Memo Village, Maliana, who has illegally crossing the border of Indonesia in order to by the daily necessities, Dili, December 2010.

⁶¹ Fundasaun Mahein Researcher, Mota Ain, 22 December 2010.

⁶² Interview with DR, Kupang, December 2010.

the border and had rejected the warning to withdraw from the border. The Indonesian side argues that the TNI member was inside Indonesian territory. This time the shooting was done by the PNTL members against three Indonesian civilian citizens. According to the PNTL members, the three were pro-integration militiamen who were caught in Timor-Leste's territory. These people were resisting arrest, resulting in a struggle and were then shot. The Indonesian authorities believe that this shooting by the PNTL members took place inside Indonesian territory.

Another example is that in several cases in the last decade Oecusse has seen confrontations. Another case was in Naktuka in early 2010. A number of TNI members who served in Satgas Pamantas RI-RDTL entered the disputed territory because there is a construction activity in that area which was carried out by Timor-Leste's Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Social Solidarity. The buildings were destroyed by the officers from the Satgas Pamantas RI-RDTL. The same incident was repeated at the end of February 2011.⁶³ A number of TNI members entered the area of Naktuka whose status is still not solved in the negotiation between the two countries. The news in Timor-Leste media said that there are 17 of them and they made destroyed the warehouse owned by the Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries Timor-Leste.⁶⁴

e. Violence against the civilian population

The increase in the TNI military forces in West Timor has caused excesses in the form of increased violence by members of the military against the civilian population. The triggers of violence are varied, ranging from personal disputes to the suspicion that the civilian people were smuggling goods to Timor-Leste. In January 2006, a woman from Oecusse who had illegally entered Indonesian territory to buy the daily necessities was arrested by the members of the TNI who were deployed to guard the border. Subsequently she was raped by the TNI members.⁶⁵ The violence occurs more frequently against the Indonesian citizens. For example, in November 2008, the members of TNI beat a civilian named Emanuel Kolo. In September 2009 Jakobus Pausobe was beaten. On 28 November 2009 Goris Maneak and Siprianus Nesi the residents of Ponu Village, the District of Timor Tengah Utara were tortured. The perpetrators were members of Yonif 742 (headquartered in Lombok) who served in Satgas Pamantas. Other victims include churchmen, as happened in January where TNI member beats Father John Oki Pr, in September 2010. TNI member beat the Parish priest of Santa Maria Mater Dei (Oepoli), Father Beatus Nino (better known as Father Bento). According to the people of Oepoli, the members of TNI border security officers often made trouble in their neighborhood, including drunkenness and vandalism.⁶⁶

The last violent incident causes the victim to die. This incident began with a dispute between seven young men and a member of Yonif 744 on 5 March 2011. The following

⁶³ <http://temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com/2011/03/tni-invade-tan-naktuka-fasilidade.html>

⁶⁴ "TNI 'Invade' tan Naktuka, Fasilidade Estadu TL Lori Todan" ("TNI again 'Invades' Naktuka, TL's State Facilities Are Being the Subject"), *Tempo Semanal*, 2 March 2011.

⁶⁵ Lembaga Advokasi and Anti Kekerasan Masyarakat Sipil (Lakmas), an NGO based in Kefamenanu, was accused by the Commander of Korem 161/Wirasakti, Colonel Noch Bola as a "foreign agent in the border" for protesting the rape. Colonel Bola alleges that the woman from Oecusse was intentionally infiltrated to Indonesia in order to "provoke the reaction of the Indonesian military" ("Provoking the Reaction of the RI Military, Rape Victim is Infiltrated by the PNTL," the website of Kapanlagi.com, http://berita.kapanlagi.com/hukum-kriminal/pancing-reaksi-militer-ri-korban-perkosaan-disusupkan-pntl-qg3nz5d_print.html)

⁶⁶ "Infantry battalion 742/SWY Not To Hurt the People," *NTT Online*, 14 January 2010 and *Tempo Interaktif*, 27 September 2010.

day a member of Yonif 744 along with a number of his friends searched the youths in their homes. The youth were either then arrested by the members of Yonif 744 or surrendered themselves to the battalion's headquarters. They were detained in the battalion post and suffered torture in there until one of them (named Charles Mali) passed away on 13 March 2011. The others five were later treated in hospital for serious injuries. The next day, Modesta Datu, the mother of Charles Mali, died of a heart attack believed to be caused by the shock of her son's death.⁶⁷

In light of the problems that have occurred along the border, it appears that the border security as conducted by the Indonesian side does not seem to be in accordance with the existing problems. If the problem happens to be smuggling, then the necessary expertise to deal is under the authority of the police, not military. The incidence of vandalism by members of the TNI in Naktuka could have been avoided. In the event of breaches by Timor-Leste's side in the form of building construction in the disputed territory it is not supposed to damage the building, but by the means of communication. First, by asking the officers from Timor-Leste to stop and then reporting the building work to the commander of the Satgas Pamtas so that a report can be forwarded through the existing channels to the appropriate authorities at the national level, who will seek solutions through political/diplomatic means. It is probable that time is still needed for the policy-makers in Indonesia to process the information obtained from the field, information which will be used as the basis for changes in the way the Indonesian state maintain its land border with other countries.

VI. Conclusion

The East Timor's independence from Indonesian occupation has made the land border between Nusa Tenggara Timur and East Timor an international border. The Indonesian military increases its forces in the province of NTT, especially in West Timor. Two to three Infantry Battalions were deployed in West Timor, and will be added to the Cavalry battalion, Air Defense Artillery battalion, and Combat Engineer detachment. In addition, the capabilities for air and sea surveillance are increasing also, with the addition of radar installations and the navy base close to Timor Leste.

Such military increase is too much if we compare it with the military forces on the other side of the border. At present Timor-Leste's armed forces only consists of two Infantry Battalions (1,332 personnel). However, the Timor-Leste defence white paper known as Forca 2020 proposes a 3,000 4 battalion multi component force.⁶⁸ Timor-Leste has plans to increase to 4 battalions. In 2010 it expanded its naval component to 4 patrol boats, and there are strong indications 2 more will be procured from either Indonesia or South Korea. While Timor-Leste has no airforce the Secretary of State for Defence outlined plans for an air component in the December 2010 edition of the Jurnal Defeza Nasional (National Defence Journal).⁶⁹ However, Timor-Leste's capabilities remain tiny compared to the TNI. The TNI's force increase is clearly not caused by a real threat from Timor-Leste, but merely because of the Indonesian's perceptions regarding the border as a vulnerable area where there are threats against the totality of the Unitary State Republic of Indonesia.

⁶⁷ "The Chronology of the Death of Charles Mali Victim of the TNI Torture in Atambua-NTT to Death," compiled by Father Leo Mali, 14 March 2011. "The Victim Died As a Result of the TNI Torture in Atambua and Youths Who are Victims of the TNI Torture in Atambua," The Grasroot Community, Kupang, 14 March 2011.

⁶⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timor_Leste_Defence_Force

⁶⁹ Jurnal Defeza Nasional, Edisaun Dezembro 2010-Junhu 2011.

The safekeeping of the land border between Indonesia and Timor-Leste has been conducted in militaristic way by the deployment of one battalion of combat troops in the posts along the border. While the problems encountered in the border areas were not in the nature of military threats in the form of foreign invasion or infiltration, but ordinary crimes such as smuggling of goods and illegal border crossing, or land disputes due to some segments of the border has not been agreed by the two states, and the border violations by security officers as the result of the lack in such agreement. The handling of these problems requires police expertise and other non-military skills and should involve other parties with the appropriate authority and competence.

Recommendations

That the Government's of Timor-Leste and Indonesia seek to develop unique border management apparatus with the only security personnel on the border being police.

That the Government's of Timor-Leste and Indonesia pro-actively inform their citizens of the details of growing defence and military links between the two countries.

That the Government of Timor-Leste consider its response to border management in a soft border regime system only.

That authorities on both sides of the border conduct regular meetings at the Dili-Jakarta, Dili-Kupang, district to district levels.

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