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Policy and Realization of the V Constitutional Government in the Timorese Security Sector, 2012-2015 “Between Challenges and Success”

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Photo: Zania Ferreira, 2014.

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Executive Summary

This report focuses on the realization of the development of the Timorese security sector under the fifth (V) constitutional government, as according to the vision of the 2011-2030 National Development Strategic Plan (PEDN). There are four phases to achieving this 2030 vision.

The fifth (V) constitutional government is currently in its first phase of the PEDN: long-term consolidation of its security institutions, from 2011 to 2015. The efforts are concentrated on important services in reconstruction and reformation of the security institutions, specifically: human resources; reinforcing institutional legal framework; and issues of crime prevention, investigation, public safety, and border control.

During the first phase from 2011 to 2015, the defense institution (F-FDTL) will be developed into a professional force with a rigorous legal framework in place in order to control the behavior of military members. A division of work-labor must be clearly defined in coordination between the PNTL and F-FDTL. Gender issues must be addressed, the F-FDTL must be professionalized in various areas, including in its role as a peace-keeping force, and finally, information and technology must be integrated in a working system under the command's control.

Currently, some aspects of this consolidation phase have been realized, while others have not yet been completed. It is Fundasaun Mahein's (FM) view that the following further efforts must be taken under this new government mandate to consolidate the security sector, specifically with regard to infrastructure, human resources, legislation, and other issues that contribute to the security sector's development.

1. Recommends that the VI Constitutional Government develop its infrastructure for the PNTL and F-FDTL; the following are assessments of suitable needs and procurement processes to ensure transparency and good governance.
2. Recommends the VI Constitutional Government fortify its human resources through formation and training of police members and military according to what is necessary for the professionalization of police and military members now and in the future.
3. Recommends the government strengthen its bilateral cooperation with foreign countries by creating long-term agreements and partnerships to support and develop Timor-Leste's security sector.
4. Recommends the government establish a National Maritime Authority (NMA), and, more importantly, define a National Security Policy (NSP) in order to better implement security policy in line with the PEDN.



Introduction

Policies for the stabilization of the security sector are necessary and important conditions of the development process in post-conflict states. Timor-Leste needs to acknowledge and address its history of conflict by designing a long-term strategy plan for the security sector that will professionalize military and police institutions, so as to ensure the state's sovereignty as according to its constitution.

Timor-Leste's security sector policy is defined clearly in the 2011-2030 PEDN. The PEDN details the development process step-by-step: in the short-term, from 2011 to 2015; in its middle phase, from 2016 to 2020; and in the long-term, from 2020 to 2030.¹

Noted specifically in the fifth (V) constitutional government program is that the 2011-2015 phase is dedicated to consolidation of the security and defense institutions,² with the intent that by 2030 the security sector will be totally reformed—in particular, the military and police, who will be professionalized to serve the people and country.³

After the fourth (IV) government was formed, the Interim Minister (IM) and Defense Ministry (MD) were unified into the Ministry of Defense and Security (MDS). This unification continues in the fifth (V) government, with the purpose of easily controlling and avoiding bureaucracy in the military and police institutions, a very positive point in this phase of the development of Timor's security sector.

Therefore, this report will discuss in depth the realization of the fifth constitutional government of some important points on sub-sectorial policies for security sector development as defined by the PEDN, particularly regarding the implementation goal the government wishes to reach in its short-term (2011-2015) phase.

Methodology

The methods of analysis used are: a discussion held by the Fundasaun Mahein (FM) team, called *Security Sector Discussion (SSD)*⁴; collected data from media publications on government policy issues in security sector development; official documents such as the PEDN, the IV and V governments' constitutional policies; the paper of the state general budget (SGB) from 2011 to 2015; publications of previous reports from *National and International Non-Government Organizations* (NGOs); and interviews with important sources retaining knowledge of this report.

¹ National Development Strategic Plan (PEDN) 2011 - 2030.

² Policy of the V Constitutional Government.

³ National Development Strategic Plan (PEDN) 2011 - 2030.

⁴ SSD is a model used by the FM team in order to hold routine discussions on defense and security issues. Discussions are organized by the FM team and, in addition to FM staff, involve academics and domestic and international security/defense experts.



Vision of the PEDN 2030: First Phase (2011 – 2015) for the Security Sector

PEDN's plan for 2011-2015 clearly formulates how to develop the security sector, and particularly the MDS, during the consolidation phase. However, this report also incorporates the PEDN plan for 2016-2020, as its facets are pertinent and ultimately integrated with the first (2011-2015) phase as follows.

- 1) *2011-2015 is the designated time period in which the security institution is focused on reconstruction and reformation, specifically targeting human resources, the strengthening the institutional framework, and the issues of crime prevention, investigation, public safety, and border control.*
- 2) *2016-2020 is the time period during which the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) will be wholly reformed into a professional service, qualified to assume responsibility for assistance with modern infrastructure and equipment, and rigorous in efficient application of rules as part of its responsibility for good governance. It will further strengthen human resources, infrastructure, and equipment in order to ensure the institution's service of civil protection and crime prevention.*
3. *During the phase from 2011 to 2015, the defense institution (F-FDTL) will be developed into a professionalized force with a rigorous legal framework in place in order to control the behavior of military members. A division of work must be clearly defined in coordination between the PNTL and F-FDTL. Gender issues must be addressed and the F-FDTL must be professionalized in various areas, including in its capacity as a peace-keeping force, and information and technology must be integrated in a working system under the command's control.*
4. *The 2016-2020 phases must ensure that the F-FDTL is a credible force with sufficient equipment and capability to assume, as a responsible force, the mission of contributing to state security and development. It must also respect human rights as required by law.*

Realization of the Security Sector in the Fifth (V) Government from 2012 – 2015

Generally, the fifth (V) constitutional government still employs the security sector unification structure of the fourth government, with the goal to simplify the levels of command and to avoid bureaucratic policies for the military and police institutions. The unification policy has been led by Xanana Gusmão as the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defense and Security (MDS).

Through a unified structure, the policies of the MDS, for the process of developing the security sector, are executed by the *Secretary State of Defense (SSD)* and the *Secretary State of Security (SSS)*. All efforts have been made by the fifth government to develop the security sector as according to the following sub-sectorial policies of the PEDN.



1. Legislation

a. Institution of PNTL

Legislation is an important part of the development process of the security institution, as a proper legal framework and rule of law ensure the successful performance of the institution. These policies are defined in the PEDN's 2012-2017 program for the fifth constitutional government and the 2014-2018 PNTL strategic plan with the intent to improve police members' capacity to implement rule and law, as according to *Norms Organization and Procedure (NOP)*.⁵

As detailed in the PEDN, during the consolidation process the government will focus on legislation issues for the security sector, especially diplomacy and organic law in the security sector, including legislation for civil protection and migration services, and will continue developing internal norms and rules for the PNTL related to police procedures, discipline, transparency, and accountability.⁶

The PNTL's role as a security institution is to ensure internal security in Timor-Leste; important legislation has been passed regarding its development has been passed under the fifth (V) government mandate, as displayed in the following table.

⁵ PNTL Strategic Plan 2014 – 2018. Bulletin PNTL. P9-10

⁶ RDTL. (2011). Juridical Regime; Document of PEDN. P176.



List of Legislations Produced for the Security Institution

| Year | Important Legislations for the Security Institution, 2007 – 2010 | Year | Important Legislations for the Security Institution, 2011 – 2015 |
|------|--|------|---|
| 2007 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree of Special Operations for Crime Prevention | 2011 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree of Juridical Regime of Using Forces • Alteration Salaries Regime of National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) |
| 2008 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organic Law for Ministry of Defense and Security (MDS) | 2012 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree No. 22/2012, Extraordinary Period for Promoting the PNTL |
| 2009 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree No. 09/2009: The Organic Law of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) • Law Decree No. 10/2009: Regime Salaries for the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) • Law Decree No. 28/2009: Alteration Salaries Regime of National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) • Decree of Promotion Regime of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL). • Law Decree of National Intelligence Service. • Organic Law of Migration Service • Estatutos do Pessoal do Serviço de Migração. | 2013 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree No. 10/2013 Extraordinary Period for the PNTL Command |
| 2010 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree No. 13/2010: Alteration Salaries Regime of National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) • Law No. 02/2010: Law of National Security | 2014 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree No. 15/2014: Alteration of the Organic Law for the Scientific of the Criminal Investigation Police |


Source: Jornal da República, 2015.

The above table shows that in the three years since its formation, the fifth constitutional government has focused its attention on legislative issues, resulting in important legislative progress for the PNTL and showing that the government has made positive progress in its development of the PNTL institution.⁷

However, the government needs to review its existing laws and produce important legislation such as laws for the National Maritime Authority (NMA) and other authorities in order to respond to the dynamic development of the internal security sector. Though the government has produced substantial legislation, the implementation of said legislation remains an obstacle in the professionalism and performance of the police institution.⁸

There are at least 924 cases from 2009 to 2014 of PLNTL members committing disciplinary infractions—841 by males, and 83 by females (see following graphic).⁹

Graphic: Disciplinary Infractions Committed by Members of the PNTL



Source: National Department Justice of PNTL, 2014

As shown in the graphic above, cases of disciplinary infractions were much higher before the PEDN was implemented compared to the 3 subsequent years of consolidating the security sector. Lower numbers of disciplinary infractions committed by members of the police indicate solid progress in the development of the Timorese security institution.

A lack of knowledge of the law and regulations is a major factor in the disciplinary infractions by the police. All legislation is written in Portuguese, which the members of the police find difficult

⁷ The government easy and quick produces the law, but hard in implementing. Some produced laws need to review because do not necessary with the institution's situation.

⁸ Fundasaun Mahein. (19 August 2014). Dismissal members of F-FDTL-PNTL: As a Discipline Reform? Mahein's Voice No. 83. P7. Can Access here; http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/MNL_Nu.-83_1902014_Demisaun-F-FDTL.pdf

⁹ Report of Fundasaun Mahein, 2014.



to understand, and there is insufficient training of the police on the meaning and applicability of these laws and regulations.¹⁰

The PNTL command has come to an agreement with the National University of Timor-Lorosa'e (UNTL) that Portuguese courses will be provided for members of the police, and particularly for new cadets at the police training center.¹¹ They will continue to provide training and scholarship for members of the police according to the annual action plan through the proposed state general budget, which aims to strengthen the bilateral cooperation in Timor's defense and security sectors.¹²

b. Institution of the F-FDTL

Legislation for the F-FDTL has also been defined in the PEDN as a key step in the development and professionalization of the defense institution. This was undertaken by the fourth and fifth governments by unifying the MD and IM to create the MDS.¹³

After the F-FDTL was formally made into the defense force for Timor-Leste, it began developing regulations for military service of the state and its people. Much legislation was produced before the inception of the fifth (V) government. The following are pieces of legislation produced before the formation of the PEDN.

¹⁰ This concern was also voiced by the PNTL General Command, commissary Julio Horna, during a meeting with the FM team on 10 April 2015

¹¹ This policy is begun since the first government up to present still ongoing through the bilateral cooperation, including the annual action plan annually at the ministry of defense and security.

¹² This policy began under the first government continues to exist through the current administration through bilateral cooperation, including the creation of annual action plans for the Ministry of Defense and Security.

¹³ Fundasaun Mahein. (06 August 2012). Policy of Defense and Security Ministries, Period 2007 – 2012. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/MNH_02-06082012.pdf

List of Legislations for Defense Sector

| Year | Important Legislation for Defense Institution, 2007 – 2010 ¹⁴ | Year | Important Legislation for Defense Institution 2011 - 2015 ¹⁵ |
|------|--|------|---|
| 2007 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law No./2007 Law of Military Service | 2011 | None |
| 2008 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree No. 16/2008: First Alteration Law of the Military Service • Law Decree No. 31/2018: Organic Law Ministry of Defense and Security | 2012 | None |
| 2009 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remunerators Regime of the F-FDTL • Law Decree No. 17/2009 Regulation for Military Service • Law Decree No 26/2009: The Statute Organic of the Military Police • Law Decree No. 32/2009: Regime of Promotion for General Official with Post Ass military. • Law Decree No. 11/2009: Remunerators Regime of the F-FDTL. | 2013 | None |
| 2010 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Law Decree No. 4/2010: Alters Promotion Regime for High Level of Military Post. • Law Decree No. 12/2010: Organic of National Defense Institute – DNI | 2014 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estatutos dos Militares das F-FDTL¹⁶ |

Source: Jornal da Repúblika, 2015.

¹⁴ Legislation in this table is that which has been produced by the government up to the present, and which has been published in Jornal da Republika.

¹⁵ According to Fundasaun Mahein's monitoring, the government did not produce any laws in this timeframe, and if it did so they did not publish any officially through Jornal da Repúblika.

¹⁶ This has been noted in the Jornal da Repúblika 2014, but an explanation of the contents of such laws has not been published yet.



As shown in the above table, the majority of legislation was produced during the fourth government mandate. In three years of the fifth administration's mandate, there was no legislation produced and published in *Jornal de Rebulika*.¹⁷ This lack of legislation has occurred despite the PEDN's stated focus on the issue of sufficient legislation and regulation for the security sector's consolidation process.¹⁸

In addition, there have been obstacles in the implementation of published legislation, including the aforementioned difficulties with legislation written in Portuguese. This problem arises, in particular, from the fact that the majority of the military has been educated in the Indonesian school system. The F-FDTL has provided training in Portuguese, but only for the higher ranks.¹⁹

Issues with lack of lingual skills and knowledge of the law continue to allow soldiers to commit disciplinary infractions. The most concrete justification of this issue arose in March, when the supreme commander of the F-FDTL held two dismissals for 19 soldiers because of their crimes and infractions.²⁰ This is becoming a concern for the F-FDTL and the President as the supreme commander of the army's forces.²¹

Another issue is that the government must not only produce laws, but also revise all produced legislation in accordance with the policies of the PEDN that have designed short-term goals and purposes—in particular, dealing with issues of legislation that contribute to the development of the military institution.²²

2. Human Resources

a. *Institution of the PNTL*

Human resources are an important aspect of development of the PNTL and so are a fundamental part of the fifth government's annual action plan.²³ The fifth (V) government program is outlined by the PEDN, calling for the government to establish a better system for

¹⁷ A law decree on military programs was approved in 2012 but has not been published officially via government portals and publications.

¹⁸ Much legislation is now incompatible with current military standards and needs, and there has been no review and revision of said legislation for nearly five years.

¹⁹ The government continues to provide Portuguese courses to soldiers inside the country and abroad, but the government needs to officially translate those laws to Tetum to make them fully intelligible to Timorese forces.

²⁰ May. (30 May 2014). Command of the F-FDTL Dismissed 19 Members. Media Diariu Nasional. Available at: <http://www.jndiario.com/2014/05/30/komando-f-fdtl-demite-membru-19>

²¹ Problems with language have become an obstacle for the F-FDTL supreme in selecting eligible members to participate in such training abroad. The second general commander of the F-FDTL, brigadier Filomeno Paixão, recognized the issue when meeting with the FM team in 2014 at the F-FDTL general headquarters in Fatuhada, Dili.

²² Recruitment systems are based on region.

²³ RDTL. (2011). National Development Strategic Plan (PEDN). Chapter 5. P197.



human resources, including the professionalization of the security sector through training, recruiting, proper formation, and meeting the institution's needs.²⁴

The government has included in its annual action plan a proposal to recruit new members of the PNTL through the state's general budget,²⁵ given that during the fifth government mandate the PNTL has only twice recruited new members. In 2012 the PNTL recruited 260 new soldiers,²⁶ and in 2014 recruited around 520,²⁷ raising the current membership of the PNTL to 3,584.²⁸

The government continues to facilitate training for PNTL members in various important areas corresponding to the mission of the police: formation of law and human rights; community policing; administration and finance; investigation; operations; pilot and navigation; traffic services; intelligence; and more.²⁹

These formative policies have led to qualified human resources in the PNTL ensuring professionalism and the performance of the institution. However, there are still issues of professionalism around human rights violations, lack of discipline, and paramilitary operations that is the police's responsibility to address.³⁰

Meanwhile, inactivity in the capacity work of the administration and in investigations has become a challenge for human resources development for the PNTL. Because criminal cases against police members require extensive legal justification, the government has failed in its effort to reform its human resources through investigations. The PNTL currently possesses 206 qualified investigators.³¹

Another concern in human resource management for the PNTL is that the placement and positions for police officers within divisions are not based on their backgrounds, which becomes a factor in their individual prejudice in their work. For example, the police's merit members are

²⁴ Program of the Council Minister. (26 August 2012). PROGRAM OF THE V CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION 2012-2017. P72.

²⁵ Fundasaun Mahein. (06 August 2012). Policy of defense and Security Ministry Period 2007 – 2012. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/MNH_02-06082012.pdf

²⁶ TDW. (09 September 2012). Recruitment for new police Members will be held this month. Media The Dili Weekly. <http://www.thediliweekly.com/tl/news/security-defencejustice/1718-pntl-recruits-anew-this-month>

²⁷ Ferreira, Sonia. (24 March 2014). This year PNTL Recruits 520 of New Police Members. Media STL. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/tinan-nee-pntl-rekruta-polisia-foun-nain-520/>

²⁸ RDTL. (2015). Profile of PNTL. Document of OJE 2015. P155

²⁹ Fundasaun Mahein. (06 August 2012). Policy of defense and Security Ministry Period 2007 – 2012. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/MNH_02-06082012.pdf

³⁰ Disobedience of these polices continue today. In response to such acts, the PNTL command dismissed some members in early 2014.

³¹ Lopes, Izac. (21 November 2014). 101 of the PNTL officials received certificate over the criminal investigation. Available at: <http://www.pntl.tl/wp-content/uploads/kalins-pdf/singles/ofiasiasi-pntl-101-simu-sertifikadu-kona-ba-investigasaun-kriminal.pdf>



investigators, but they sometimes work for community police because of the private interest in the area.³²

b. Institution of the F-FDTL

Human resource development policy for the F-FDTL is crucial to the fifth government's agenda to ensure operational military services. The government plan, focusing on recruitment policy and reformation, has been called "Forsa 2020" and in conjunction with PEDN policy aims to improve human resources formation and recruitment for the F-FDTL.³³

In enacting this "Forsa 2020" plan, the government aims to recruit at least 3,000 new members by 2020.³⁴ In 2011 the government recruited 600 new members³⁵ and recruited another 600 in 2014.³⁶

The government has also invested in military human resources through basic and advanced military training internally and abroad, specifically through technical and joint training; weapons management; logistics; administration and finance; piloting; natural disaster training; IT; navigation; and through education in military theory at domestic and international universities.³⁷

Investment in these areas has led to the hope that by 2015 the F-FDTL would serve as a conventional professional defense force in terms of human infrastructure and resources. However, the F-FDTL currently in 2015 continues to face issues of human resources development—including the issue that no qualified members of the F-FDTL or government are in attendance of Defense Ministerial Meetings (DMM).³⁸

Furthermore, the F-FDTL does not have sufficient human resources to fill its posts for military attachés in countries such as Indonesia, Portugal, and Australia. Timor-Leste's plan to join ASEAN also requires qualified members of the F-FDTL to represent Timor-Leste in participation in international defense meetings and forums.³⁹

3. Infrastructure

³² These problems have been determined by the monitoring and interviewing police investigators who are currently active in the community policing program because of their abilities in needed areas.

³³ RDTL. (2011). Development for the F-FDTL. Document of PEDN. P203

³⁴ Fundasaun Mahein. (18 April 2011). Dreams and Reality for the Development and Professionalism of the FALINTIL-FDTL. Mahein's Voice No.18. P9

³⁵ RDTL. (17 May 2011). 600 candidates are selected to be incorporated into the F-FDTL. Available at: <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=5034&lang=tp>

³⁶ Claudio. (04 February 2013). F-FDTL will recruit 600 members. Media Timoroman. Available at: <http://timoroman.com/f-fdtl-sei-rekruta-membru-600/>

³⁷ Fundasaun Mahein. (27 September 2013). Progress and Challenge of defense cooperation of Timor-Leste. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/MNL_Nu.59_27092013_Kooperasaun-Defezapdf1.pdf

³⁸ Freitas, Jeronimo. (19 March 2015). CD International Policy and defense Cooperation – SED. Private Interview.

³⁹ Gusmão, Martinho. (18 April 2015). Director of PEPI – SED. Private Interview.



a. *Institution of the PNTL*

Infrastructure is a crucial factor in the performance of any institution, and since the PEDN has been established the government has invested heavily in infrastructure development, equipment, and facilities. The PNTL remains poor in infrastructure, and such conditions are a challenge to the effectiveness of the police service. Therefore, the government has defined a policy of infrastructure development as part of the long-term phase of its strategic plan.⁴⁰

The fourth (IV) government has rehabilitated the offices of some municipality commanders, including the ones in Viqueque, Dili, Manatuto, and Ermera in 2011,⁴¹ and has also provided logistical assistance to the PNTL through providing vehicles, constructing a training center for police and a facility for PNTL administration, addressed communications issues at the headquarters, and more. In 2013 the government invested heavily through the Secretary of State of Security (SES) in infrastructure in the PNTL.⁴²

Through its annual action plan the fifth (V) government has continued to prioritize reconstruction of PNTL infrastructure in municipalities including Aileu, Ermera, Manufahi, Liquica, an Oecusse, as well as new infrastructure for border police units (UPF) in border territories such as Bobonaro, Covalima, and Oecusse. The government will also focus on construction of stations for administrative posts and on setting up radio communication for the commanders of the relevant municipalities.⁴³

However, investments in infrastructure have not yet reached the standards and goals outlined in the long-term phase of the strategic plan, and the majority of PNTL commanders from the 13 municipalities are concerned⁴⁴ with this progress, including the current PNTL commissary, Julio Hornai.⁴⁵

Concerns have also been raised from national police leaders,⁴⁶ who have pointed out that though the government has invested in PNTL infrastructure, it has stopped short of providing sufficient funds for necessary projects including the establishment of sleeping quarters in

⁴⁰ Ferreira, Sonia. (17 December 2013). The government keeps improving infrastructure to PNTL. Media STL. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/govenu-kontinua-hadia-infra-estruturaba-pntl/>

⁴¹ Fundasaun Mahein (06 August 2012). Policy of defense and security ministry of 2007 – 2012. Mahein's Thought No. 02.

⁴² SAPO. (02 October 2012). OJE 2013, the government will strongly invest in the PNTL. Available at: <http://noticias.sapo.tl/tetum/info/artigo/1273141.html>

⁴³ RDTL (2011) PNTL annual action plan. Document of OJE 2011.

⁴⁴ Fundasaun Mahein. (09 June 2013). Basic Development of Infrastructure: The Long-term Characteristics of the National Police. Mahein's voice No. 54. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/MNL_Nu.-57_19062013_Baze-Dezenvolvimentu-Infrastruturapdf.pdf

⁴⁵ During a workshop on re-designing the program for New Zealand's support for the community policing, a 50/50 investment split was suggested with the NZ government to improve infrastructure for the structure of the official police village (OPS) in Timor-Leste.

⁴⁶ FM interviewed the former assistant commander of the PNTL, Afonso de Jesus, on 17 March 2015 at the PNTL general headquarters in Kaikoli, Dili.



Oecusse and Same barracks and the creation of proper general quarters for the PNTL general commander and for the UPF.⁴⁷

The government's failures to provide proper investment also stem from a poor procurement system for funding for the PNTL. A number of cases have shown that a majority of infrastructure projects are not based on usual public concerns and lack proper oversight, resulting in a prejudiced development process. In 2013 there was noted malpractice in project implementation, and Deloitte's assessment report of the Ministry of Defense and Security (MDS) in 2012 also observed that the procurement system in place is flawed.⁴⁸

b. Institution of F-FDTL

Since its establishment as the Timorese institution of defense in 2001, the F-FDTL has employed a minimalist system of infrastructure, equipment, and facilities. At the time, the F-FDTL was 80% dependent on donors' assistance through bilateral cooperation for its maintenance and development of internal infrastructure. Following the formation of the fifth (V) government, attention has been focused on the development of F-FDTL infrastructure through the allocation of funds from the state general budget (OJE).⁴⁹

Through allocation of state general budget (OJE) funds to the development of military infrastructure, the government has succeeded in updating the F-FDTL's basic capabilities through providing the provisions of ammunition, police military quarters, a man quarters for the F-FDTL, a port for the military's naval arm, houses for soldier, and more. Since the publishing of the PEDN in 2011, the government has invested approximately 21 million USD per year in military infrastructure.⁵⁰

In 2013, the government provided ammunition, barracks in Hera, a newly constructed office for the assistant service commander, and new military posts in Atauro, Oecusse, Tunubibi, and Tilomar.⁵¹ In 2014, the government provided further equipment and facilities, including communication materials and tools, established and information system for administrative assistance, and purchased further military equipment for the F-FDTL.⁵²

The efforts of the government to develop its military infrastructure through its annual action plan are part of an integrated policy of the national strategic plan, and have through 2015 successfully provided the military with sufficient infrastructure and modern technology and

⁴⁷ De Jesus Afonso. (17 March 2015). Former assistant commander of the PNTL. Private interview.

⁴⁸ Deloitte reports critiqued that the MDS does not make public agreements while purchasing equipment for the defense and security institutions. There was only one investment source for those high-budget projects.

⁴⁹ Fundasaun Mahein. (06 August 2012). Policy of defense and security ministry of 2007 – 2012. http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/MNH_02-06082012.pdf

⁵⁰ Ferreira, Sonia. (22 January 2014). OJE 2014, SED prioritized for infrastructure of the F-FDTL. Media STL. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/oje-2014-sed-tau-periodade-ba-infra-estrutura-f-ftdl/>

⁵¹ RDTL. (2013). The F-FDTL annual plan of 2013. Document of OJE 2013. P143

⁵² RDTL. (2014). The F-FDTL annual plan of 2014. Document of OJE 2014. P148



integration.⁵³ While recognizing this success, the government must reform its procurement system process in order to ensure the sustainability of these projects.⁵⁴

A 2012 Delloite report included a red flag regarding the procurement system of the MDS, noting that the SSD in international discourse processes does not adhere to procurement standards or requirements, instead using single sources for the purchasing equipment for the F-FDTL, including the purchase of patrol ships from China and the construction of a naval port in Hera.⁵⁵

4. International cooperation

a. Strategic Cooperation

As part of the PEDN, from 2011 to 2030 th government has planned to strengthen its defense and security institutions of Timor-Leste through strategic international cooperation with foreign nations such as the United State of America (USA), Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Indonesia.⁵⁶

International cooperation has led to positive progress in the development of both PNTL and F-FDTL institutions. Cooperation with Indonesia has provided facilitated training in and comparative analysis of community policing tactics, as well as police training on combating drugs and human trafficking.⁵⁷ F-FDTL members have undergone basic and advanced military training courses in Lemhanas (Jakarta) and a Timor-Leste military attaché has been established in Indonesia to strengthen military cooperation.

Strategic cooperation with the US has led to support of communication facilities and transport for the PNTL,⁵⁸ and has included military training of F-FDTL military members through joint exercises including COBRA, LAFAEK, CARAT, and more.⁵⁹

New Zealand and Australia have also contributed development support for the F-FDTL and PNTL. New Zealand's efforts through the Asia Foundation's program HAKOHAK⁶⁰ and TLCPP⁶¹

⁵³ RDTL. (2011). Development purpose of the F-FDTL 2015. Document of PEDN. P206.

⁵⁴ The 2012 Delloite report indicated that Defense and Security Ministries faced major flaws in their procurement systems.

⁵⁵ Claudio. (04 December 2012). Ministry of Defense and Security Against Law and Procurement Rules of the RTDL. Media Timoroman. Available at:

<http://timoroman.com/ministeriu-defesa-no-seguransa-kontra-lei-no-regulamento-aprovisionamentu-rtdl/>

⁵⁶ Fundasaun Mahein. (27 September 2013). Progress and Challenges of Timor-Leste's Defense Cooperation. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/MNL_Nu.59_27092013_Kooperasaun-Defezapdf1.pdf

⁵⁷ SAPO. (23 November 2011). PNTL Command Welcomes POLRI Delegation. Available at: <http://noticias.sapo.tl/tetum/info/artigo/1202895.html>

⁵⁸ PNTL. (03 February 2015). [Embaxadora EUA ba TL entrega motorizadas 15 ba PNTL](http://www.pntl.tl/2015/02/03/embaxadora-eua-ba-tl-entrega-motorizadas-15-ba-pntl/). Media PNTL. Available at: <http://www.pntl.tl/2015/02/03/embaxadora-eua-ba-tl-entrega-motorizadas-15-ba-pntl/>

⁵⁹ Tomas Pinto, Julio. (11 April 2013). Joint Exercise FALINTIL-FDTL and U.S. Marines. Available at: <http://juliotomaspinto.com/publication/117-joint-exercise-falintil-fdtl-and-us-marine.htm>

⁶⁰ HAMETIN KOPERASAUN ENTRE POLISIA HO KOMUNIDADE - HAKOHAK



have lent support to infrastructure and human resources development for community policing efforts, and have provided facilities and equipment for PNTL operational services.⁶² Australian cooperation has resulted in human resources capacity-building initiatives including military techniques training, medics, English courses, administration and finance assistance, and scholarships through the *Defense Cooperation Program* (DCP).⁶³

China, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines have also contributed to human resources and infrastructure development for the PNTL and F-FDTL. China has contributed support through the building of general quarters for the F-FDTL, the office of the defense ministry, the office of the President and Supreme Commander of the Army, and has also contributed through training courses for the F-FDTL.⁶⁴

Japan has facilitated the training of four (4) members of the F-FDTL at the National Academy of Defense in Yokosuka. Japan has also pledged continued support for improvements to infrastructure and facilities of Timor-Leste's military forces.⁶⁵ In addition, Japan provides funding and support for capacity-building of the PNTL, focusing on community policing, IT training, and other areas.⁶⁶

South Korea and the Philippines have also contributed support to development of both institutions. The Philippines have provided training for the PNTL in piloting, crime prevention and human resources management,⁶⁷ and South Korea has provided three ships for navigation training for army forces.⁶⁸

Bilateral cooperation between Timor-Leste and its foreign partners have resulted in positive outcomes for development of security and defense institutions. However, the government must sign a MoU legal agreement for military and police cooperation in order to ensure sustainability of these development initiatives.

⁶¹ Timor-Leste Community Policing Program - TLCPP

⁶² PNTL. (07 September 2014). [TLPDP entrega karreta 10 no motor 3 ba PNTL](http://www.pntl.tl/2014/09/17/tlpdp-entrega-karreta-10-no-motor-3-ba-pntl/). Media PNTL. Available at: <http://www.pntl.tl/2014/09/17/tlpdp-entrega-karreta-10-no-motor-3-ba-pntl/>

⁶³ Institute for Security and Sustainability. (2013). Defense Cooperation Program (DCP) Timor-Leste. Available at: <http://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/easttimor/defence-cooperation-program-dcp-timor-leste/#axzz2NqfXTPL3>

⁶⁴ RDTL. (25 October 2011) Timor-Leste and China Strengthen Defense Cooperation. Media Governu. Available at: <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=2912&lang=tp&n=1>

⁶⁵ RDTL. (12 March 2012). Japan will continue supporting for Timor-Leste. Available at: <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=6632&lang=tp>

⁶⁶ Cooperation with Japan continues through the present, and in early 2015 Japan facilitated the PNTL command's comparative study of policing in Indonesia.

⁶⁷ Fundasaun Mahein. (21 July 2011). Development of the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL). Mahein's voice No. 21. Available at: https://fundasaunmahein.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/fm-nia-lian-21_21jullu-20111.pdf

⁶⁸ Fundasaun Mahein. (27 September 2013). Progress and Challenges of Timor-Leste's Defense Cooperation. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/MNL_Nu.59_27092013_Kooperasaun-Defezapdf1.pdf



There is not yet any formal cooperation, or *Memorandum of Understanding* (MoU), between Timor-Leste's military and police institutions and their foreign counterparts. Five of Timor-Leste's partners in international defense cooperation have entered into MoU's with Timor-Leste, but others still remain without. Among those without is the Philippines, which has provided development support to both the PNTL and F-FDTL yet has not entered into an MoU agreement.⁶⁹

Such efforts must be undertaken by the sixth (VI) government in its annual action plans, and particular focus must be given to the progress of strategic international cooperation in order to facilitate development of the defense and security institutions as according to the long-term timeline for the PEDN.

b. Historical cooperation

In terms of the historical cooperation, Timor-Leste has strengthened the cooperation with the bloc countries called *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa* – CPLP (Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, São Tome e Príncipe, Cabo-Verde, and Guine-Bissau) to develop police and military institutions. The cooperation ties with these block countries (CPLP) is going well and have given positive point in developing these two institutions internal and internationally through military and police trainings.⁷⁰

Furthermore, Portugal provides strong capacity-building support to the PNTL, having provided training instructors for Especial Police Units (UPE) members, anti-terrorism training, and more.⁷¹ Cabo Verde provided “Ezersisiu Felino” military training for the defense sector.⁷²

In addition, Portugal supports F-FDTL development through offering patrol ships and naval training for the F-FDTL's naval arm, and military soldiers for general posts, including air force training.⁷³ Portugal has pledged continued support for institutional development.⁷⁴

Cooperation with the Federal Police of Brazil (FPB) has fortified human resources within the PNTL.⁷⁵ Brazil's support has also fortified human resources within the PNTL's investigation and

⁶⁹ Freitas, Jeronimo. (19 March 2015). CD of International Policy and Defense Cooperation. Private Interview.

⁷⁰ Carceres. (18-19 August 2012). Joint Training between Forces of CPLP countries in Angola, called “EXERCICIO FELINO”. *Bulletim das F-FDTL*. Vol. 286. P20-21

⁷¹ Ferreira, Sonia. (03 February 2014). UEP-PNTL possessed Professional instructors. *Media STL*. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/uep-pntl-ih-a-ona-instrutores-profesional/>

⁷² Basic Training offered by Portugal is important for the development of defense and security institution, yet the government also spends a significant amount of funds to pay military advisers from the CPLP bloc.

⁷³ TS. (25 November 2014). Portugal has supported Timorese naval forces development, and will continue supporting the air force of the F-FDTL. *Media Tempo Semanal*. Available at: <http://www.temposemanal.com/seguransa-defesa/portugal-apoiu-ona-forca-naval-no-sei-apoiu-harii-forca-aero-f-ftl>

⁷⁴ Tap. (27 November 2014). Portugal provides capacity building to the F-FDTL in military academies. *Media Diariu Nasional*. Available at: <http://www.indiario.com/2014/11/27/portugal-kapasita-f-ftl-ba-akademia-militar/>

intelligence units, as well as in the Unidade Polisia Fronteira (UPF).⁷⁶ In addition, Brazil plans to continue to support the F-FDTL through military technique training, military police, and instructors for military training, cultural events, and military sport in the future.⁷⁷

Cooperation with the bloc of CPLP promises international development advantages for both the PNTL and F-FDTL in the future. Recently of note, the Timor-Leste flag was raised as a part of a peacekeeping force in Lebanon through the CPLP,⁷⁸ and Timor-Leste PNTL members have also been involved in international peacekeeping operations in Guinea-Bissau.⁷⁹

However, Timor-Leste has not yet entered into formal engagements with the CPLP bloc and countries, instead employing ad hoc cooperation through the state and military and police institutions. FM recommends that the government revise its cooperative defense agreements with CPLP by legalizing the MoU and seeking approval through the National Parliament to aligning its goals with the PEDN.

5. Community Police and Prevention Conflict

Community policing is another focus of the PEDN. Structurally, the community policing department is overseen by the national operational commander (KON), under Law Decree No. 9/2009 on the organic law of PNTL.⁸⁰ As a juridical foundation and important aspect of security sector development, community policing continues to be strengthened by the government to better serve the people and nation.⁸¹

To undertake such development of the nation's community policing efforts, the government has clearly included in its annual action plans allocations of the state budget for funding for PNTL institutional development. In 2015, the PNTL received \$27.963 million in funding from the state general budget (OJE).⁸² \$1.258 million is accordingly directed to KON, though it is unclear what portion of the budget is being allocated specifically for community policing efforts.⁸³ The

⁷⁵ Brazil supported development heavily during the fourth administration, but has not yet continued to do so in 2015.

⁷⁶ SAPO. (04 March 2011). Federal Police will support training for agents in Timor-Leste. Available at: <http://noticias.sapo.tl/tetum/info/artigo/1134208.html>

⁷⁷ RDTL. (30 November 2010). Timor-Leste and Brazil Cooperation in Areas of Defense. Government portal. Available at: <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=4370&lang=tp&n=1>

⁷⁸ Sena, Leandro. (16 July 2011). 12 Members of the F-FDTL participate in peace keeping force in Lebanon. Radio Liberdade. Available at: <http://www.radioliberaldadedili.com/notisia/107-memburu-f-fdtl-12-partisipa-forsa-manutensaun-paz-iha-libanon>

⁷⁹ Ferreira, Sonia. (22 July 2013). 3 of the PNTL members work under UN Mission in Guinea Bissau. Media STL. Available at: <http://suara-timor-lorosae.com/memburu-pntl-nain-3-ba-misaun-onu-iha-guinea-bissau/>

⁸⁰ RDTL. (2009). PNTL organic law. Article 16) line 1 Versicle b). P8.

⁸¹ RDTL. (2011). Infrastructure and Logistics. Document of PEDN. P198.

⁸² RDTL. (2015). Budget. Document of OJE 2015. P155

⁸³ Fundasaun Mahein. (30 September 2014). Proposal of the state general budget (OJE) 2015 for the community policing. Mahein's voice No. 89. P5. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/MNL_Nu.89_30102014_OJE-2015.pdf



allocation of funds and the related budget plan have been questioned in a TAF follow-up report.⁸⁴

The PNTL's 2015 annual action plan aims to improve the operational services and visibility of community policing services in order to consolidate security efforts and secure communities. The primary mode of expansion of community policing has come through the establishment of 'official police villages' (OPS) in rural areas and the acquisition of equipment and transport for OPS officers.⁸⁵ As of August 2015, the PNTL has set up 230 OPS of its target of 442 total villages across Timor.⁸⁶

The government has thus far provided sufficient allocation of funds for positive development of community policing efforts in line with the national strategic plan. Moving forward, it must continue to provide discrete funding for community policing in order to properly improve human resources, infrastructure, equipment and facilities for the OPS.⁸⁷

TAF's recent report detailed a lack of transport facilities and communication equipment that prove problematic for members of the OPS. The sixth government must address these concerns; as it stands now, members of the OPS often operate in two or three villages each without proper transport or communication.⁸⁸

In a similar vein, conflict prevention methodologies and goals have been well covered in the PEDN. As a nation still fragile in its nascent post-conflict development, Timor-Leste must have effective policies in place to prevent and resolve conflict across the country. Low socio-economic standing can easily trigger conflict in the future among Timorese.⁸⁹

To address the need for comprehensive conflict prevention, the government established in 2008 the National Directorate of Community Conflict Prevention (DNPCK) through Law Decree number 31/2008, 13 August, of the organic law of the security and defense ministries. The objective of the DNPCK is to research, assess, and develop strategy for conflict prevention in Timor-Leste, and to provide supervision and training in such methods of conflict prevention.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ This report is written by Jennu Asman on cost calculations of official police village (OPS) initiatives, held on February 2015.

⁸⁵ RDTL. (2015). Annual plan of National Police of Timor-Leste – PNTL for 2015. Document of OJE 2015. P160.

⁸⁶ Monteiro, Longuinhos. (2015) Interior Ministry. Exclusive debate program of Ita Nia Governu TVTL.

⁸⁷ These issues were discussed in a 2015 workshop between PNTL and donors at the general headquarters over the re-design of New Zealand's assistance program for community policing in Timor-Leste.

⁸⁸ OPS placements in 2014 faced issues such as transport, communication and allocation.

⁸⁹ Inequality situations in Timor-Leste have the potential to arouse national conflict.

⁹⁰ Fundasaun Mahein. (26 April 2013). Different institutions work for the same cause, such as efforts between DNPCK, DHPKS and Department of Community Policing. Mahein's Voice No. 50. Available at: <http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/2013/04/26/instituisaun-diferente-serbisu-ba-asuntu-hanesan-entre-dnpkk-dhpks-no-departementu-polisiamentu-komunitaria/>



The 2015 annual action plan of the Secretary of State for Security (SES) follows on the heels of the 2014 plan in prioritizing human resources development and administrative management of the DNPKK to better develop strategies for conflict prevention. Such efforts have displayed the government's commitment to policy implementation in conflict prevention in line with the national strategic plan, and has thus far resulted in the installation of conflict prevention networks in all 13 districts.⁹¹

Despite these efforts, the DNPKK's action plan for conflict prevention remains poor. Domestic and international reports show that Timor-Leste still faces high levels of conflict and tension over land disputes, martial arts groups, and more. These issues remain a serious threat to the security of Timor-Leste. The DNPKK still faces human resources shortages, affecting the viability of the conflict prevention network.⁹²

The government must assess and refine the current status of the DNPKK and fortify its community policing programs. As the majority of community police are networked through the DNPKK, the government should take steps to further integrate the two services and increase collaboration.⁹³ These goals should be met during the strategic plan timeframe of 2014-2018 in which the PNTL plans to establish 442 OPS in all villages across Timor-Leste.⁹⁴

6. Border Management and Migration Service

Border control policy and immigration services have become key facets of the PEDN. The government will provide immigration services (SM) training and maritime police units (UPM) in order to better respond to trans-national threats from Timor-Leste's western border and from the sea.⁹⁵ Currently, the government has established integrated posts along the border comprised of SM, Quarantine officers, UPM, and representatives of the National Directorate of Transport and Land (DNLT).⁹⁶ Timor-Leste's maritime border is controlled by maritime police and the KN-F-FDTL.⁹⁷

⁹¹ Gusmão Martinha. (27 October 2014). POLKOM works with local authorities to eliminate conflict. Media The Dili Weekly. Available at: <http://www.thediliweekly.com/tl/news/security-defencejustice/12800-polkom-works-with-local-authorities-to-eliminate-conflict>

⁹² RDTL. (24 March 2015). DNPKK REACTIVE SERVICE OF NATIONAL NETWORK FOR CONFLICT PREVENTIVE. Document of Interior ministry. P2. Available at: <http://www.minterior.gov.tl/dnpkk-reactiva-servisu-rede-nasional-ba-prevensaun-konfliktu/?print=pdf>

⁹³ The government needs integrated institutions that can coordinate efforts and offer a clear, united front of service and security to citizens.

⁹⁴ These OPS posts will cooperate with village councils and referral networks to work for conflict prevention and resolution in local areas.

⁹⁵ RDTL. (2011). Human Resource of Border Management and Immigration. Document of PEDN. P198

⁹⁶ Fundasaun Mahein. (23 October 2014). Challenge and Tentative of the at the Border territory of Timor-Leste. Mahein 's voice No 88. P11. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/MNL-Nu.88_231012014_Siguransa-Fronteira_Versaun-Tetum.pdf

⁹⁷ Thus far the maritime security of Timor-Leste at the naval component and maritime police's control. So far the maritime security of Timor-Leste has remained in the control of the maritime police an F-FDTL naval component.



Despite government allocation of funds to address these issues, the services in collaboration at integrated border stations face shortages in human resources, equipment, and proper facilities. Border customs operations have also become a concern of the national parliament.⁹⁸

Because of the imbalance in human resources in the UPF (Unidade Polisia Fronteira), large areas of the border are unmanned, with great distances between border posts.⁹⁹ In addition, lack of facilities and equipment, including screening machines, provide a great obstacle to the effectiveness of control of the border territories.¹⁰⁰ Investigations have shown that illegal trafficking of contraband, drugs, and military equipment continues with little trouble over the border, causing distinct threats to Timorese national security.¹⁰¹

Border control remains a crucial issue in Timorese state sovereignty, and the state must have effective policy and management of its border control in order to ensure internal security. Likewise, immigration services must act effectively and efficiently to mediate the crossing of Timorese borders.¹⁰²

On the other hand, though, the government has invested heavily in infrastructure and human resources for the UPM and KN-F-FDTL to improve border control efficacy. The fifth government has employed its bilateral cooperation with international partners to support the UPM and the naval component of the F-FDTL. In 2014, for example, the United States provided funding support for the UPM to rehabilitate ports and purchase maritime service equipment such as radio communications equipment, lifejackets, binoculars, and lamps.¹⁰³

The naval component of the F-FDTL owns and has access to sufficient infrastructure, equipment and facilities, due to strategic defense cooperation in security development between Timor-Leste and its regional and global partners. However, some conditions remain that limit the effectiveness of naval patrols—e.g., the naval service's inability to patrol *Tasi-mane* to deter illegal fishing off Timor's coast.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ Alm. (25 June 2014). PN Concerns with Border Customs Operations. Media Diariu Nasional. Available at: <http://www.indiario.com/2014/06/25/pn-kecionista-servisu-alfandega-fronteira/>

⁹⁹ Concerns of UPF members at the border line (Suai, Batugade and Oe-Cusse) voiced to Fundasaun Mahein during monitoring in October, 2014.

¹⁰⁰ Fundasaun Mahein. (23 October 2014). Challenges and Tentative Security on the Borders of Timor-Leste. Mahein's Voice No 88. P11. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/MNL-Nu.88_231012014_Siguransa-Fronteira_Versaun-Tetum.pdf

¹⁰¹ Tempo Semanal. (03 December 2010). Former militias and TNI import drugs to TL. Available at: <http://temposemanaltimor.blogspot.com/2010/12/eis-milisia-ho-eis-tni-hatama-droga-mai.html>

¹⁰² RDTL. (15 October 2003). Immigration and Asylum Law of 2003 (LIA). Available at: http://migracao.gov.tl/?page_id=112.

¹⁰³ Sequera, Jacinta. (12 June 2014). USA embassy supports funds and equipment for UPM. Media STL. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/embaixada-amerika-apoia-osan-no-ekipamentu-ba-upm/>

¹⁰⁴ Fundasaun Mahein. (13 February 2014). Illegal Fishing: Threats and Obstacles for the Security Institution. Mahein's Voice No. 69. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/MNL_Nu.69_13022014_Peska1.pdf



The government's efforts thus far have succeeded in the implementation of PEDN standards for the security and defense institutions, particularly for immigration services, the UPF, and the naval services. Further steps should be taken to enhance these standards of security services, and steps should also be taken to further define Timorese land and maritime borders so as to discourage the possibility of ongoing land and border disputes.

FM supports the efforts of the government in its current cooperation with Indonesia to resolve land and border disputes,¹⁰⁵ and encourages the UPM and naval arm of the F-FDTL to focus their efforts on finalizing a navigational map that clearly defines Timor-Leste's domestic waters and maritime borders. At the present time, Timor-Leste still lacks proper definitions of the range of its territory and of its borders.¹⁰⁶

7. Stability and Public safety

As a state that's only recently emerged from heavy conflict, the government's plans for stability and security in the country is of paramount importance. The state has clearly mapped out in its long-term goals of the PEDN the need for long-term investment and development of the security sector.

In its annual action plan, the government prioritizes stability and public safety through the improvement in areas including human resources, security legislation, infrastructure, facilities and equipment, management and administration, and strengthening the quality of police service.¹⁰⁷

Challenges still exist, however, in the government's development of the internal security and public safety in Timor-Leste. Though occurrences are scaling down, youth conflicts still arise periodically, and martial arts groups still pose a minor concern.¹⁰⁸ Most notably, in 2014 a confrontation between youths took place in Pantai Kelapa, resulting in two wounded, and conflicts in Hera have broken out, including the martial group conflicts in Bacau in 2014 and 2015, resulting in fatalities.¹⁰⁹ Also a murdered case in Hera that caused a man died¹¹⁰ including

¹⁰⁵ FJR. (18 April 2015). Indonesia and Timor-Leste agreed to resolve land dispute issues. Media MetroTV. Available at: <http://internasional.metrotvnews.com/read/2015/04/18/387780/indonesia-dan-timor-leste-sepakat-rampungkan-isu-perbatasan>

¹⁰⁶ Nasimento, Miro. (05 November 2014). TL needs a proper navigation map to protect its sea. Media STL. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/tl-presija-mapa-navigasaun-propriu-hodi-protese-tasi-laran/>

¹⁰⁷ Son. (16 August 2013). The government will prioritize better conditions for UEP. Media STL. Available at: <http://jornal.suara-timor-lorosae.com/governu-sei-tau-kondisaun-diak-ba-polisia-uep/>

¹⁰⁸ On 2 June 2015 there was a confirmed conflict between youths in Comoro (hudi-laran), resulting in a head wound for a young man. This conflict suspiciously involved PNTL members. Available at: <https://www.facebook.com/fundasaunmahein/posts/985094498176142>

¹⁰⁹ Media Tempo Semanal (07 January 2015). PSHT and Kera Sakti killed each other, TMR sad. Available at: <http://www.temposemanal.com/desportu/tag/PSHT%20%20Kera%20Sakti%20Oho%20malu%20Baucau>

¹¹⁰ May. (30 July 2014). Youths group assaulting each other, A man died. Media Diari Nasional. Available at: <http://opinitimor.blogspot.com/2014/07/oho-malu-grupo-joven-asalta-malu-ema.html>

a murdered case between martial arts groups in Baucau district within 2014 and 2015.¹¹¹ And another situation that become concern up to present for the entire society.

8. Integrated Policy of Defense and Security

Timor-Leste has adopted a concept of integrated security policy, in line with the PEDN, to cohesively prevent internal and external threats. The implementation of this integrated policy has gone smoothly in terms of opening up communication channels and collaboration between the security and defense institutions—namely, through joint operations and humanitarian assistance initiatives. This integration policy has proven to be a strong development in the maintenance of state security.¹¹²

Practice of defense and security integrated policies was going better thus far in term of coordination between both sectors; through the joint operation and humanitarian service that has responded to the security and defense institutions. Such acts become positive points of the national strategic process to improve better the state's institutions presence in term of security to people and the country.¹¹³

A challenge in the institutionalizing of security is the lack, to date, of an official National Security Policy (PSN) to properly define the integrated services of defense and security in Timor-Leste. Though the promulgation of the PSN has been discussed in the past, it still has yet to be written in a single, official policy.¹¹⁴

Another pressing issue is that the government has not yet established a National Maritime Authority (AMN) to coordinate security services in the Timor Sea. Without a proper AMN, Timor-Leste is ill-equipped to provide security within its own maritime borders, nor to collaborate in disaster relief, rescue, and international efforts.¹¹⁵ The government must prioritize the establishment of the AMN and of the PSN moving forward.

9. Security Policy and Maritime Geostrategy

Geographically, Timor-Leste is located between the two regions of Pacific Asia and South Asia. As a new country with a large maritime territory containing crucial natural resources, Timor-

¹¹¹ Media Tempo Semanal (07 January 2015). PSHT ho Kera Sakti kill each other, TMR sad. Available at: <http://www.temposemanal.com/desportu/tag/PSHT%20%20Kera%20Sakti%20Oho%20malu%20Baucau>

¹¹² Monitoring by FM has shown that there is solid progress in integrated coordination between police and military institutions.

¹¹³ Monitoring by FM has shown that there is a progress of integrated coordination between military and police institutions so far

¹¹⁴ Fundasaun Mahein has had meetings with multiple entities and will produce a report on PNTL from a civil society perspective, as part of providing an opportunity for organizing a public discussion in Timor-Leste.

¹¹⁵ Indonesia (Badan SAR Nasional / Search And Rescue/SAR) led or focuses on disaster in maritime area.

Leste must define its maritime geo-strategies. Timor-Leste's fledgling maritime security institution does not yet have the capacity to stand alone in defense and oversight of Timorese maritime borders and territory.¹¹⁶

By seeing from geo-policy and geo-strategy Timor-Leste is a new country unable to stand along to respond for the global threats in the maritime area. From these global treats will remind all countries in the world to strengthen the bilateral ties in some important sectors; as a new country Timor-Leste continues strengthen relationship with ASEAN and pacific regions to prevent threats in the maritime area of Timor-Leste.¹¹⁷

With the aim of securing its maritime borders, the government of Timor-Leste has strengthened its relations and defense cooperation with state partners operating in South Asia and the Pacific Region, including the US, China, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, New Zealand, and others. Trilateral cooperation is in operation between Timor-Leste, Indonesia, and Australia to secure the surrounding maritime territories.¹¹⁸

Though the government should pursue further definition of maritime security policy, specifically in regards to Timor-Leste's trilateral cooperation with Indonesia and Australia,¹¹⁹ Timor-Leste's geostrategy of cooperative defense of its maritime territories is a bright spot in the development of internal security and defense.

Recommendations

The PEDN has defined policies for security sector development from 2011 until 2030. Though the government has adhered to the strategic plan through 2015, focusing on development and consolidation of the F-FTL, PNTL, and other relevant institutions, the vision of the PEDN has not yet been achieved in terms of infrastructure, human resources, legislation, and more. The following recommendations focus on these aspects of the PEDN:

1. Recommends the VI Constitutional Government continue to develop and consolidate the PNTL and F-FDTL to ensure transparency and proper governance.

¹¹⁶ Fundasaun Mahein. (27 September 2013). Progress and Challenge of Timor-Leste's Defense Cooperation. Mahein's Voice No.59. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/MNL_Nu.59_27092013_Kooperasaun-Defezapdf1.pdf

¹¹⁷ Fundasaun Mahein. (27 September 2013). Progress and challenge of defense cooperation of Timor-Leste. Mahein's voice no. 59. Available at: http://www.fundasaunmahein.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/MNL_Nu.59_27092013_Kooperasaun-Defezapdf1.pdf

¹¹⁸ Trilateral agreement between Australia, Indonesia and Timor-Leste had been legally approved under a signed agreement by the Majority Parliamentary Alliance Government (AMP), and cooperative efforts have conducted patrols along the territory borders.

¹¹⁹ Tempo Semanal. (16 April 2015 16). RI Minta TL Memulai Perundingan Batas Laut. Available at: <http://www.temposemanal.com/lautem/tag/Perbatasan%20Laut%20Australia%20dan%20TimorLeste>.



2. Recommends the government fortify human resources through further training for military and police members to establish professionalized and modern security institutions.

3. Recommends the government strengthen its bilateral cooperation targeting development support of the Timorese security sector.

4. Recommends the government establish a National Maritime Authority and promulgate a national security policy so as to better integrate security under the auspices of the PEDN.



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