Picture: Fb Cesar Trinito Freitas Gaio (17 Sept. 2025)
Fundasaun Mahein (FM) views the recent protests in Dili as the predictable outcome of deeper failures by political elites to promote equitable economic development and political inclusion. For many years, FM and others have warned that if political elites continued to disregard the concerns of ordinary citizens, enrich themselves with public resources, and neglect the question of generational leadership transition, the result would be rising discontent and violent socio-political conflict. The present situation illustrates these risks with stark clarity. The purpose of this article is to shed light on the root causes of the unrest and its wider implications, as well as to highlight the urgent need for reforms to prevent further escalation and future violence.
In recent weeks, anti-government protests have spread across multiple developing countries in Asia, from Indonesia to Nepal and ultimately Timor-Leste itself. These movements, though different in their triggers and scale, share a common foundation of frustration with entrenched elites, perceptions of corruption and neglect, and a lack of genuine opportunities for younger generations. In Indonesia, demonstrations have become some of the largest since the fall of dictatorship, while in Nepal anger over corruption and impunity has shaken political institutions and led to violent confrontations with heavy loss of life. In Dili, Timorese students and youth took to the streets for several days of protest, challenging policies seen as symbols of elite corruption and venality.
FM has long cautioned that without meaningful preparations for leadership transition, national stability and security are at risk. This warning resonates now more than ever as Timor-Leste faces worldwide trends of political impatience and volatile public sentiment. The stakes are magnified by ASEAN accession and rapid technological shifts such as social media and artificial intelligence, which will demand state capabilities and political responses that differ from those of the resistance era. Leaders who rely on past legitimacy while deferring political renewal are unlikely to build institutions resilient enough to withstand these emerging pressures.
President José Ramos-Horta recently convened a National Seminar on the Next Generation’s Role in National Development under the theme “Continuing the Legacy.” Alongside Prime Minister Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, he called on youth to pursue education, initiative and innovation. This framing placed the burden almost entirely on young people, without clarifying what those in power will do to dismantle barriers to participation or to institutionalise merit-based pathways into leadership positions.
As FM has written, political recruitment and advancement in Timor-Leste remain fundamentally rooted in loyalty to established leaders and parties rather than competence or integrity. Martial and ritual arts groups are among the few organisations consistently recruiting youth and engaging them in politics, which has been a cause of serious concern among many observers. Dependence on Xanana Gusmão as a singular national figure continues to dominate political life in this country; with no clear figure or group being groomed as successors, there is a risk that a major power vacuum will emerge in the near future. Some military figures have even voiced concern about political instability, although the F-FDTL shows no intent or capacity to intervene. These dynamics illustrate the fragility of Timor-Leste’s political system if current leaders continue to defer the issue of leadership transition.
FM has observed with concern the escalation of anti-government protests in Dili and the rapid sequence of events that unfolded. What began as anger over the planned purchase of new Toyota Prado vehicles for parliamentarians quickly evolved into a broader debate about corruption, nepotism, elite privilege and the role of youth in Timor-Leste’s democracy. On 12 September the government passed a resolution authorising a “Joint Operation” between the military (F-FDTL) and police (PNTL) to run until 6 January 2026. The stated aim was to maintain public order during major upcoming events, but its timing suggested pre-emptive concern about unrest and a desire to expand the powers of security institutions.
Protests soon escalated: cars were set on fire, stones thrown at police and security forces responded with beatings, tear gas and reportedly rubber bullets. Police were filmed entering the UNTL campus and committing violence against students. Some students and police suffered serious injuries, mainly as a result of stones thrown by protestors. Reports also circulated that agents provocateurs were operating within the crowds; while FM cannot confirm that these reports are accurate, the fact that many believe them to be true illustrates the degree of mistrust and confusion at play in this situation. The protests continued even after Parliament announced the cancellation of the car purchase, showing that the grievances extend far beyond a single policy.
By mid-September, opposition figures including Fretilin parliamentarians expressed support for demonstrators. On 17 September, parliamentary representatives from CNRT, Fretilin, PD, KHUNTO and PLP issued a joint declaration after meeting with student leaders. They pledged to abolish lifetime pensions for parliamentarians, revise the law on freedom of assembly and pushing the government to support economic development in state budget discussions. In response, the EUTL announced the suspension of demonstrations, but only on the condition that these promises are implemented within three months. If not, student leaders have vowed to resume protests. In the immediate aftermath, students celebrated what they saw as a victory by driving motorbikes through the streets, beeping horns, cheering and even dancing tebe-tebe with PNTL officers.
These events illustrate the intensity of public anger, and, potentially, the vulnerability of Timor-Leste’s political institutions to mobilisation from below. Many will argue that the fact that students were able, within days, to secure concessions on long-contested issues shows the strength of civic pressure when young people mobilise effectively. At the same time, the speed of concessions raises questions about whether they represent meaningful reform or elite appeasement designed to buy time while leaving the basic structures of power and decision making unchanged. This is especially concerning because the government’s Joint Operation resolution will remain in place until January 2026, raising serious implications for how future protests might be handled if Parliament fails to deliver on its three-month deadline.
It is also important to note that the issues which have dominated the protests — lifetime pensions and official vehicles — while powerful symbols of elite self-enrichment, are not the most serious governance challenges facing the country. Far more significant drivers of corruption and elite capture have remained largely unaddressed. These include systemic abuse of public contracts, embezzlement of state funds and ever-expanding veterans’ pensions, all of which consume far more resources than vehicles or parliamentary benefits.
FM views the final part of the parliamentary declaration — substantive inclusion of popular concerns in state budget debates — as the most critical. Prioritisation of productive sectors is essential not only for raising living standards and averting social unrest, but also for tackling what is arguably the most fundamental challenge facing the state: unsustainable dependency on finite petroleum reserves and the looming fiscal cliff. FM and many other analysts have long warned of this threat, and the Government itself recognises it as a major concern. If this commitment leads to genuine investment in productive sectors, it could mark a turning point in Timor-Leste’s history. However, if the promise is merely symbolic, it risks deepening public disillusionment and reinforcing the perception that elites only act under pressure, which could incentivise further unrest and instability.
FM repeats that the protests themselves are not the cause of Timor-Leste’s fragile and unstable situation. They are a symptom of deeper failures by leadership to address inequality, corruption and exclusion. Today’s students are continuing the legacy of resistance against oppression that runs through Timor-Leste’s modern history, from the anti-colonial struggle to the independence movement. By using digital tools to mobilise and document abuses, they are not threatening democracy but demanding its realisation. While FM remains concerned about the risk that violent protests pose to public safety and national stability, we believe that peaceful youth engagement in the political process should be celebrated.
Conclusion
FM welcomes the resolution that has brought an end to the immediate unrest, but we remain concerned that if elites treat these promises as tools to buy time and avoid accountability, protests are likely to return with greater intensity in the future. If, however, these commitments are fulfilled with seriousness and transparency, they could lay the groundwork for a new relationship between leaders and citizens.
Looking ahead, FM remains deeply concerned about the risk of future violent unrest and repression, particularly given that the Joint Operation remains in force, compounding the systemic risk of unaddressed corruption and rising public frustration. The future of Timor-Leste’s political development will be determined not by symbolic gestures but by whether political leaders deliver on the fundamentals: inclusive economic opportunities, functioning services, youth participation and an end to corruption and nepotism. The events of September 2025 demonstrate that the younger generation will no longer tolerate governance that fails to meet these standards. FM urges leaders to heed this warning and take responsibility for the renewal of Timor-Leste’s democracy and the fulfilment of the promise of independence.
