Fundasaun Mahein (FM), 23 October 2014
Press Release
Challenges and Tentative Security at the Land Borders of Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste became the Republic Democratic of Timor-Leste (RDTL) after 24 years of Indonesian occupation. The state’s total area, measuring 15,007 m2, shares at least 228 kilometers of border territory with Indonesia.
Control of the boundary territory is an important aspect of state sovereignty. Therefore, the government of Timor-Leste must prepare quality policy and strategy to anticipate transnational threats, such as organized crime, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and other illegal activities poses threats to national security.
In order to address this aspect of national stability, the government of Timor-Leste has engaged in a cooperative border policy with Indonesia through the border securities, led by state agencies such as Unidade Polisia Fronteira (UPF), the Department of Migration, the Department of Taxes, the Department of Commerce, the Quarantine Unit, DNTT, and other relevant institutions.
Implementation of this cooperative policy continues to face obstacles, in terms of coordinating these institutions at the border. So far, institutions have proven unable to fully neutralize the transnational threats coming over the border line. Furthermore, the undeveloped commerce control systems at the borders could unintentionally allow illegal commerce to cross between the two countries.
This control system is still fragile, given the limitations of human resources, institutional capabilities, facilities, and equipment at border posts. Organized crime groups and private businesses will take advantage of this border control system by secretly transporting drugs, contraband, and military equipment, all of which threaten national security.
Another potential problem is the “Border Pass” Policy that the government has issued to districts that share the border with Indonesia, such as Covalima, Bobonaro and Oe-cusee. These ‘border passes’ aim to facilitate community activities, such as commerce, cultural events, and family visits at the border line. Monitoring has shown that this policy has given rise to many irregularities, and some people continue to violate the policy by using or passing “Dalan Tikus” at the border line.
Fundasaun Mahein’s monitoring determined that most people lack information about the difference between proper and improper uses of the “Border Pass.” Some people have misused the pass by carrying out family visits in Cova Lima than coming down to Dili for months at a time. Other Timorese citizens have used these passes to travel to other restricted provinces, such as Kupang and Bali.
FM has also witnessed the problems of the Unidade Polisia Fronteira (UPF), who have insufficient equipment and facilities. The UPF lacks access to necessary patrolling materials, such as lamps, binoculars, and GPS systems. Furthermore, it has been proven that UPF post in Wala-Lama does not have clear water, so members at this posting must travel long distances in order to bathe or cook.
Another threat to internal security is the poor functioning of integrated posts, some of which have not performed due diligence and inspection of movements across the border. A concrete example identified by FM is the integrated post in Mota-Masin, in Cova Lima District. FM’s monitoring showed that the Department of Taxes did not perform inspections of packages traveling across the border. Rather, these inspections were made by security members of GUARDAMOR, who simply asked the owners to explain the contents of their boxes. Furthermore, interviews have shown that people living near the border line in Oecusse feel insecure in regards to the border line, whose problems have yet to be resolved.
The aforementioned problems inhibit the ability of the UPF to carry out their duties effectively at the border line, and Timor-Leste must adopt a balanced reform policy that integrates advanced and dynamic deterrents to threats at the border.
Recommendations:
1. FM recommends that the government UPF posts at the border line, particularly in the areas using the ‘Free Pass’ Policy and those with identified illegal transaction histories. Furthermore, FM recommends the fortification of human resources, facilities, and equipments at the border, in order to effectively prevent the entrance of external threats.
2. FM recommends that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MKIA) accelerate its coordination with the government of Indonesia in establishing traditional market activity at the border, because the uncertainty of these markets has allowed for the continued activity of illegal commerce across the border line.
3. FM recommends that the government provide screening equipment for the integrated posts at the border line, in order to enable border officials to inspect vehicles and deliveries that cross the border.
4. Recommends that Committee B of the National Parliament continue monitoring the UPF’s conditions at the border line and then approve a state general budget that reflects these necessities. The UPF has faced many problems over the years but has received no substantial help.
5. FM recommends that the Ministry of Justice continue holding socialization events that explain the procedures of the “Border Pass” Policy. By educating communities on this policy, the socialization events will hopefully help decrease violent acts and border violations associated with these passes.
For more details on this issue, see the following:
Nélson Belo
Executive Director of FM
Website: www.fundasaunmahein.org
Email: direktor.mahein@gmail.com
Phone (+670) 7831 6075 or (+670) 7756 1184
