Picture: RDTL
Fundasaun Mahein (FM) presents the following article to contribute to the ongoing national debate on constitutional reform and the future direction of Timor-Leste’s political system. This discussion follows a seminar organised by the National Parliament in December 2025, which initiated formal debate on revising the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The debate comes at a critical moment in the country’s democratic evolution, shaped by recurring political deadlocks, weak institutional coordination and growing public frustration with elite-centred politics.
Increasingly, constitutional reform is being framed through a more specific and contentious question: should Timor-Leste retain its semi-presidential system or move toward a full presidential system? Supporters of this shift argue that the current system has produced persistent political impasse and poor coordination, undermining urgent development priorities. Others warn that concentrating executive power carries serious risks in a context where governance institutions remain fragile.
For FM, this debate cannot be reduced to a binary choice between political systems. What is fundamentally at stake is whether Timor-Leste’s constitutional framework reflects the country’s political reality, social structure, governance capacity and developmental needs. FM strongly believes that significant constitutional reform is necessary, not for ideological reasons, but because the existing constitution no longer adequately serves these realities. This article therefore outlines FM’s analysis of the relationship between the RDTL Constitution, governance performance and development, and identifies principles that should guide a credible and inclusive reform process.
Best Practice, Best Fit and a Changing Global Context
The constitutional debate in Timor-Leste reflects a broader and often under-examined tension between “best practice” and “best fit” approaches to state-building, policymaking and international development. Best practice approaches prioritise alignment with international standards and formal democratic norms, typically promoted by international organisations, donors and external advisors, and rooted in the institutional experience of advanced western democracies. In Timor-Leste’s case, this is most clearly reflected in the copy-paste adoption of laws and institutions from other countries, alongside a heavy reliance on foreign advisors.
While this approach helped secure international legitimacy and donor confidence in the early years of independence, it has also produced legal and institutional frameworks that exceed local administrative capacity and remain weakly implemented in practice. Paradoxically, this has reinforced dependence on external expertise rather than building sustainable domestic capacity.
By contrast, a best fit approach emphasises contextual adaptation, historical legacies, traditional social structures and the realistic limits of implementation. Such approaches do not sit easily with top-down interventions and instead tend to emerge through domestic political negotiation, social contestation and incremental institutional adjustment over time. FM leans toward this best fit perspective, not as a rejection of international standards, but as a recognition that institutions function effectively only when they are socially legitimate and practically enforceable.
These debates increasingly intersect with wider global discussions about multipolarity and civilizational diversity. As the post-Cold War assumption of a single western-led governance model erodes, there is growing recognition that states follow different political and developmental paths shaped by history, culture and social structure. This shift does not imply a rejection of democracy or human rights. Rather, it challenges the assumption that externally designed institutional templates represent the only or optimal route to stability, legitimacy and development.
For FM, democratic principles and human rights remain essential. Emphasising best fit is therefore not an argument for relativism or authoritarianism. The question is how principles are institutionalised and realised in practice. When governance systems are poorly aligned with social realities and state capacity, democratic rules risk becoming symbolic rather than effective, weakening rather than strengthening public trust.
Constitution-Building in Timor-Leste: Formal Systems and Informal Realities
Timor-Leste’s state institutions were largely established during the UN administration and early independence period through a best practice lens. Many laws and institutional designs were adopted from external models with limited adaptation to local political culture, administrative capacity or socio-economic conditions. Over time, this has created a widening gap between formal institutions and informal political realities.
Many laws are weakly enforced or selectively applied. The Constitution itself mandates institutions that have never been established, such as military courts. In practice, political decision-making is shaped less by formal rules than by personal relationships, historical loyalties and patronage networks. As FM has argued in previous analyses, this disconnect undermines institutional legitimacy and erodes public confidence in the state.
For FM, political instability in Timor-Leste should not be understood as a series of isolated crises caused by individual actors alone. While elite political behaviour matters, recurring instability reflects deeper structural problems embedded in the constitutional design itself, including ambiguous divisions of authority, unrealistic assumptions about institutional capacity and weak alignment with how power actually operates. These issues cannot be resolved solely through leadership change or appeals to political maturity; in FM’s view, they require substantive constitutional revision.
Semi-Presidential or Presidential: What Is at Stake?
Against this background, the debate over semi-presidential versus presidential systems has intensified. Under Timor-Leste’s current system, executive authority is divided between a directly elected president and a government accountable to parliament. In theory, this arrangement promotes balance and accountability. In practice, ambiguous constitutional provisions regarding mandates, veto powers, government formation and parliamentary dissolution have contributed to government instability and inconsistent policy implementation.
Proponents of a presidential system argue that overlapping authority and fragmented multiparty competition have produced a costly and inefficient system ill-suited to Timor-Leste’s development needs. From this perspective, the country suffers from an “excess of democracy”, where intense inter-party rivalry obstructs coherent decision-making. A unified executive is seen as a way to improve coordination, reduce disputes and provide clearer leadership, particularly as Timor-Leste seeks to diversify its economy, invest in infrastructure and meet the demands of regional integration through ASEAN.
However, these arguments risk underestimating the dangers of executive power concentration in a context marked by weak rule of law, entrenched clientelism and limited accountability. Comparative experience shows that in fragile or developing states, presidential systems often magnify existing governance weaknesses, leading to personalised rule, erosion of checks and balances and reduced civil society space.
In Timor-Leste, where politics is already highly personalised and patriarchal norms remain strong, a powerful presidency could further concentrate wealth and authority within a narrow elite, marginalise women and youth and intensify political polarisation. At the same time, defenders of the current system argue that its failures stem less from institutional design than from limited capacity and underdeveloped political culture, suggesting that reform should focus on clarifying and strengthening the existing framework rather than replacing it entirely.
For FM, this debate reinforces the need to move beyond institutional labels and address the deeper mismatch between constitutional design and political reality.
Timorese Characteristics and the Form of the State
In previous work, FM advanced the concept of social democracy with Timorese characteristics, arguing that meaningful reform requires clarity about what those characteristics are. Timor-Leste is neither a western liberal country nor an East Asian developmental state. It occupies a hybrid position shaped by a history of resistance to colonialism and occupation, strong communal and familial ties, Catholic social values and democratic aspirations.
Timor-Leste is a small, closely interconnected society with limited class stratification, despite growing inequality. Political relationships remain personal and popular; citizens know their leaders and expect proximity rather than distance. In such a context, the state should not be distant, opaque or excessively bureaucratic. Yet over time, state institutions have become increasingly centralised and disconnected from everyday social life, contributing to perceptions of elitism, weak responsiveness and declining trust.
Constitutional reform must therefore consider how the form of the state can better reflect Timorese social realities. This includes reassessing the balance between centralisation and participation, rethinking how authority is exercised and ensuring that institutions facilitate rather than obstruct meaningful engagement between citizens and the state. Practical examples include strengthening the decision-making role of municipalities and suco-level institutions, simplifying access to public services and improving complaint and accountability mechanisms.
Defining Timorese characteristics must not be left to political elites alone. Past constitution-building processes were dominated by elite factions, contributing to exclusion and instability. Broad public involvement is essential to ensure that reform reflects collective aspirations and the needs of diverse constituencies rather than narrow interests.
Public Inclusion and the Reform Process
Any constitutional revision process that excludes the public risks elite capture or the imposition of an elitist vision of the state. A credible process therefore requires meaningful public consultation, civic education and clear legal procedures to guide revision and prevent politicisation.
FM recommends that Parliament adopt a dedicated legal framework governing the reform process, aimed at ensuring transparency, inclusivity and consensus. Moving beyond divisive historical narratives and elite competition will be essential to articulating a shared, future-oriented vision of the state.
Conclusion
For FM, the rationale for constitutional reform is clear: to better align Timor-Leste’s governance system with the country’s political realities, social structure and developmental needs. Whether Timor-Leste retains a semi-presidential system or adopts a presidential one, reform must address deeper problems of political polarisation, clientelism, weak rule of law, limited meritocracy and poor responsiveness to citizens’ needs.
FM does not advocate a predetermined institutional model. Instead, we call for a pragmatic, inclusive and contextualised reform process grounded in a best fit approach. Reducing the gap between formal rules and informal practices, strengthening accountability and restoring public trust should be the primary objectives. If pursued carefully and inclusively, constitutional reform can provide a foundation for sustained political stability, improved governance and a democratic culture that genuinely reflects Timorese society and fulfils the promise of independence.
