(Foto-internet)
Tempu kontinua la’o, oportunidade interesante ba Timor-Leste kontinua nia dezenvolvimentu iha aero. Lideransa sira servisu maka’as hodi avansa planu adeasaun Timor-Leste nia ba membru Associação das Nações do Sudeste Asiático (ASEAN), ne’ebé promete mellora relasaun no kooperasaun ekonómika ho nasaun sira seluk. Posibilidade admite ba progresu importante iha nível internasional, lideransa sira tenke vijelante no kontinua toma-medida hodi proteje seguransa ba nia sidadaun sira no mellora lakuna sira ne’ebé afeita negativamente ba nasaun seluk ne’ebé liga ho Aeroportu Internasional Prezidente Nicolau Lobato.
Husi perspetiva legislativu, governu hatu’ur ona regulamentu sira ba seguransa aeroportu iha 2006. Dekretu Lei 06/2006 “estabelese prinsipiu sira no regra ba asesu husi ema no veíkulu sira ba area sira ne’ebé proibidu no rezervadas iha aeroportu no kampu aero sira iha nasaun tomak.” Blog ka artigu ida ne’e husi Fundasaun Mahein tenta sukat atual seguransa aeroportuária nian iha Aeroportu Internasional Prezidente Nicolau Lobato tuir padraun legal ne’ebé kria ona husi governu rasik no to’o iha ne’ebé ona governu efetivamente proteje sidadaun sira Timor-Leste no país distinasaun sira husi perigu.
Artigu 4, Parte 1 buka delimita area sira “restritu” ba aeroportu (ba deit Aeroportu Dili) iha ne’ebé, tuir Artigu 2, “Asesu restritu ka limite no kontroladu ba razaun seguransa ho maneira kartaun asesu”. Maibe, inklui “Area Astasionamentu”, iha Artigu 4, Parte 1-5, no “area hotu-hotu no instalasaun sira iha aeroportu laran”, iha Artigu 4, Parte 1-6 ho parte sira iha zona restrita ka limite nian. Ida ne’e ita haree ladun lójika, no la tuir ho rotulos atual nian ba zona sira restritu ka limite nian iha Aeroportu Prezidente Nicolau Lobato. Iha “parte aero” ne’ebé deklara totalmente hanesan zona restritu ka limite, inklui “area hotu-hotu aeroportu nian, inklui mos para fatin sira, dalan ba taxi sira, rute sirkulasaun sira, no edifisiu sira ne’ebé asesu iha ne’eba”. Maibe, tuir definisaun ida ne’e, edifisiu terminal hotu-hotu no edifisiu VIP hanesan area restritu ka limite.
Enkuantu zona restritu ka limite dadauk ne’e “rotuladas” ka tau marka ona iha aeroportu hanesan (pasa revista ka check-in, fatin sai, fatin to’o, zona naha ka bagajen nian no area administrativa) konsistente ho norma internasional sira, FM rekomenda katak governu halo revizaun ba lejislasun iha Artigu 2 no 4 hodi defini klaru liu tan zona restritu sira no revizaun definisaun ba zona “fatin aero” no “rai nian” iha aeroportu laran. Ida ne’e tenke halo espesifikamente ba Aeroportu Internasional Prezidente Nicolau Lobato no diferente ho aeroportu seluk iha nasaun tomak. Sekarik ”fatin aero” no “rai nian” ba aeroportu la klaru ba ema hotu atu kompriende, no labele aplika perfeitamente husi autoridade sira seguransa aeroportu nian, ida ne’e posibilidade ba ema ruma ho sekretamente lori sasan hanesan droga no kilat hodi hakat liu dalan ne’e, no bele fo ba pasajeiru ida hodi lori tama aviaun laran. Ida ne’e kritiku tebes katak “fatin aero” kontinua hetan patrulla ka seguru no reforsa, nune’e autor perigu sira labele iha oportunidade lori subar buat ruma tama ba area ida ne’e no aviaun laran.
Governu mos tenke foti medida hodi garante katak zona hirak ne’e hotu seguru durante oras folga nian. FM nia monitorizasaun rejista ona insidenti balun iha Aeroportu Internasional Prezidente Nicolau Lobato la iha patrulla husi pesoal ruma durante oras folga nian. Durante periodu ne’e, kuaze parte hotu-hotu iha aeroportu inklui dalan-sira, zona pasa revista nian ka check-in no zona prosesamentu ba sasan sira ne’ebé loke no fasil atu asesu. Iha pontu seluk, FM nia monitorizasaun rejista katak presenza husi guarda seguransa iha instalasaun sira ne’e, maibe sira la patrulla ativamente iha barreira aeroportu nian, ne’ebé ho fasil monta iha fatin sira ne’ebé taka husi nakukun.
Enkuantu, sistema ba kartaun asesu kobre ona iha Artigu 6 – 18 garante efetivamente katak pesoal ne’ebé la autoriza la viola bareira sira seguransa, sistema ida ne’e seidauk aplika ho forma koerente no universalmente. Diretor Fundasaun Mahein rasik, ne’ebé la iha elejibilidade ba kualker asesu espesial ba aeroportu, konforme define ona iha Artigu 11, dalaruma autoriza hakat liu postu revista seguransa nian no tama iha area restritu “fatin aero” ne’ebé limite la ho identifikasaun ruma, limitasaun ba asesu ka sosa billete aviaun nian.
Infelizmente, kombinasaun husi fronteira terrestre ne’ebé sei kuak, lina kosta ne’ebe la monitoriza no rejime aduaneiru ka alfândega ida ne’ebé fraku halo Timor-Leste hanesan teritoriu ida ne’ebé organizasaun terorista sira ka organizasaun kriminozu sira seluk bele esplora ka aproveita hodi halo operasaun lojistika ho fasil. Karik governu bele hadi’a ka mellora ho substansial bele minimiza risku hirak ne’e iha aeroportu.
Hanoin fila fali ba observasaun ne’e, FM fiar katak sidadaun sira sei espresa sira nia preokupasaun ba públiku kona-bá nesesidade reforma urjente ba operasaun seguransa iha Aeroportu Internasional Prezidente Nicolau Lobato. Sekarik atake terorista ruma iha fatin distinasaun ruma ne’ebé utiliza aviaun husi Dili, sei lakon ema barak husi Timor-Leste no posibilidade mos ba sidadaun sira husi nasaun seluk. Nasaun sira hanesan Australia no Singapura provalmente sei suspende aviaun semo direta ba Timor-Leste, signifikativamente aumenta kustu viajen ba imigrante sira, turista no investidor sira mai no husi Dili. Aleinde ne’e, Timor-Leste nia reputasaun sei monu ka ladiak ho signifikante iha momentu krusial nia prosesu adeasaun ba ASEAN.
Liña primeiru ba defeza nian maka ho formasaun pesoal. Pesoal seguransa tenke treinadu hodi entende kona-bá seguransa ne’ebé aplika ba ema ne’ebé tama iha area sensetivu sira. Kazu kontrariu, la iha kontrolu ne’ebé lolos saida maka bele tama no sai ba rai liur. Sira tenke kompriende katak la iha exsesaun ba regra, no pesoal ne’ebé la ho kartaun asesu ka kartaun embarke hodi tama iha area ka zona seguru sei infrenta konsekuensia sériu. Pista ka fatin semo ne’ebé sai hanesan pontu final antes ema sa’e aviaun, tenke sai fatin ne’ebé seguru. Sekarik ema bele liu postu verifikasaun bagajen no asesu espasu ida ne’e iha kualker momentu, seguransa iha aeroportu signifikativamente komprometida.
FM rekomenda:
1. Kontratu espesialista seguransa aeroportu nian hodi halo avaliasaun iha fatin aeroportu nian no esplika oinsa terorista ida bele aproveita pontu fraku sira ne’ebé oras ne’e iha sistema seguransa atu halo atake ruma. Aleinde ne’e, grupu ida ne’e bele fornese enkuadramentu ida ba reforma legal kona-bá Dekretu Lei Nú. 6/2006, no rekomendasaun sira hodi mellora ekipamentu nesesariu sira.
2. Hasai fila-fali kuadru lejislasaun foun ida kona-bá regulamentu seguransa ba aeroportu (Dekretu Lei Nú. 6/2006/) klarifika definisaun ba zona restrita sira, zona rezervada sira, lokalizasaun aero nian, no lokalizasaun rai nian. Aleinde ne’e halo klaru iha dekretu lei ne’e nia laran kona-bá sidadaun sivil sira (pasajeiru no la’os pasajeiru sira) ne’ebé bele tama iha area sira ne’e tuir tempu ne’ebé determina ona.
3. Treinu fila-fali pesoal seguransa sira ne’ebé eziste ona tuir norma internasional kona-bá protokulu seguransa aeroportu nian, atualiza dekretu lei relasiona ho seguransa aeroportu, no konsekuensia sira karik sira la halo tuir prosedimentu sira seguransa nian.
4. Garante katak unidade patrullamentu aeroportu 24/7 espesifikamente treinadu ba seguransa aeroportu nian, no kompriende nesesidade monitorizasaun.
Atu hetan informasaun kle’an liu kona-bá asuntu ne’e bele kontaktu:
Nélson Belo
Diretor Ezekutivu
Email: direktor.mahein@gmail.com ka almeidamahein@gmail.com
Telemovel: (+670) 78316075 no 77561184
Website: www.fundasaunmahein.org
Alarming Gaps in Airport Security
As time continues, exciting prospects for Timor-Leste’s continued development hang in the air. Leaders are working diligently to advance Timor-Leste’s accession plan into the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which promises to enhance relationships and economic cooperation with other countries. Amidst the prospect of significant gains internationally, leaders must remain vigilant in taking continued steps to protect the security of their citizens, and to improve security gaps which may negatively affect other nations linked to Nicolau Lobato International Airport.
From a legislative standpoint, the government set out regulations for airport security in 2006. Decree law 06/2006 “establishes the principles and rules of access of people and vehicles to restricted and reserved areas in airports and air fields nationwide.” This blog from Fundasaun Mahein seeks to measure the current state of airport security at Nicolau Lobato International Airport against the legal standard created by the government themselves, and the extent to which the government is effectively protecting citizens of Timor-Leste and destination countries from harm.
Article 4, Part 1 seeks to delineate the “Restricted,” areas of the airport (presumably only DIL airport) where, according to Article 2, “access is restricted and controlled for security reasons by way of access cards.” However, the language includes the “Parking Area,” in Article 4, Part 1-5, and “all areas and facilities within the airport perimeter,” in Article 4, Part 1-6 as pieces of the restricted zone. This does not seem to be logical, and does not match with the current labels for restricted zones at Nicolau Lobato Airport. The “Air side,” which is declared as a fully restricted zone, includes “entire area of the airport including the runways, the taxiways, the circulation routes and all buildings with access to those areas.” However, according to this definition, the entire terminal building and VIP building would be restricted areas.
While the restricted zones currently labeled at the airport (check-in, departures lounge, arrivals lounge, cargo zone, administrative zone) are consistent with international standards, FM recommends that the government update their legislation in Articles 2 and 4 to more clearly delineate restricted zones, and to revise the definitions of “Air side,” and “Land side,” zones within the airport. This should be done for Nicolau Lobato International Airport specifically, and separately for other airports across the nation. If the “Air side” and “Land side” of the airport are not clearly defined for everyone to understand, and not perfectly enforced by airport security authorities, it becomes possible for a person to secretly bring things like drugs or weapons on to the runway, and to give it to a passenger to take on to the plane. It is critical that “Air side” spaces be continuously patrolled and enforced, so that dangerous actors do not have any opportunity to sneak something into this area and on to an aircraft.
The government must also take steps to ensure that these zones are equally secure during off-hours. FM’s monitoring has recorded incidents in which Nicolau Lobato International Airport was not being patrolled by any personnel during off-hours. During these times, almost every part of the airport, including the runway, check-in zones, and luggage processing zone, were unlocked and easily accessed. At other points, FM’s monitoring recorded the presence of security guards on the premises, but they were not actively patrolling the perimeter fence of the airport, which could be easily mounted under the cover of darkness.
While the access card system covered in Articles 6-18 would effectively ensure that non-authorized personnel do not breach security barriers, this system is not being implemented consistently and universally. FM’s very own director, who does not have eligibility for any special airport access as defined by Article 11, is frequently allowed to bypass security checkpoints and enter the restricted “Air side,” departure lounge without any display of identification, restricted access badge, or purchased airline ticket.
Unfortunately, the combination of a porous land border, unmonitored coastlines, and a weak customs regime render Timor-Leste a territory that terrorist organizations or other criminal organizations could exploit for logistical operations with relative ease. However, if addressed, the government can make substantial improvements to minimize these risks at the airport.
In light of these observations, FM hopes that citizens will express their concern to public officials regarding the need for urgent reform to Nicolau Lobato International Airport’s security operations. If a terrorist attack on one of those destination cities were to occur using an aircraft from Dili, there would be immense human costs for Timor-Leste, and likely for citizens of many other nations as well. Nations such as Australia and Singapore would be likely to suspend direct flights to Timor-Leste, significantly increasing the cost of travel for immigrants, tourists, and investors to and from Dili. Further, Timor-Leste would face significant reputational damage at a crucial point in their ASEAN accession process.
The first line of defense is with personnel training. Security personnel must be trained to understand that security only works if it is applied to every single person entering into a sensitive area. Otherwise, there is no actual control over what can enter or exit the country. They must understand that there can be no exceptions to the rule, and that personnel who allow people without access cards or boarding passes to enter into secure areas will face serious consequences. The runway, which is the last point before people board on to planes, must be the most secure. If people are able to bypass luggage checkpoints and access this space at any time, the security of the airport is significantly compromised.
FM Recommends:
1. Hire airport security experts to conduct an onsite evaluation of the airport and to explain how a terrorist could take advantage of current weak points in the security system to carry out an attack. In addition, this group may provide a framework for legal reform of Law Decree 2006/6, and recommendations for necessary equipment upgrades.
2. Re-issue a new legislative framework for airport security regulation (Decree Law 2006/6) that clarifies the definitions of restricted zones, reserved zones, air side locations, and land side locations. In addition, clarify language within the decree regarding which civilians (passenger and non-passenger) can enter which areas at a given time.
3. Re-train all existing security staff in international standards of airport security protocol, the updated law decree pertaining to airport security, and the consequences if their security procedures are not followed closely.
4. Ensure that 24/7 airport patrol units are specifically trained in airport security, and understand the need for constant perimeter monitoring.
For more details on this issue, please contact:
Nélson Belo
Executive Director of FM
Phone: +670 78316075 or 7756 1184
Email: direktor.mahein@gmail.com
Website: www.fundasaunmahein.org
