
(Foto: Google)
Ho Timor-Leste nia formasaun ba VII Governu Konstitusional ne’ebe atu forma dadauk ne’e, Fundasaun Mahein (FM) fo hanoin ba goveru liu-liu Ministru Defeza ne’ebe servisu hamutuk ho FALINTIL Forsa Defeza (F-FDTL) hodi dezenvolve no atualiza politika defeza ne’ebe relevante, no bele realiza. Enkuantu foka liu mos ba dezenvolvimentu politika Polisia Nasional Timor-Leste (PNTL) ho nia implementasaun, parte defeza seidauk hetan atensaun nesesariu ba F-FDTL hodi bele kontribui ba defeza nasional Timor-Leste nian no mos seguransa. Politika defeza ne’ebe establese hanesan Forsa 2020 ne’ebe hari’i iha 2007 seidauk implementa, ambisaun liu no seidauk to’o no mos la efetivu liu hodi orienta F-FDTL ba defeza nasional no mos kooperasaun seguransa internasional.
Politika foun ida ne’e tenki identifika ameasa, dezafiu no oportuidade sira ne’ebe Timor-Leste hasoru, papel no responsabel saida mak F-FDTL iha hodi dezenvolve F-FDTL sai hanesan instituisaun ne’ebe bele defende defeza nasional no kooperasaun seguransa internasional. Politika foun ida ne’e tenki inkluzivu husi planu investimetu integradu ida ne’ebe detaila ba investimentu finanseru ne’ebe persiza hodi fahe no sustenta F-FDTL, inkluzivu konaba infrastrutura, ekipamentu no rekursu umanu sira. Rekonese ba ida ne’e, ameasa, dezafiu no oportunidade sira saida mak Timor-Leste hasoru?
Depois ho brutal okupa durante tinan 24 husi Indonesia, no antes koloniza husi Portugal, Timor oan sira iha memoria no deskonfiansa ne’ebe naruk ba forsa militar husi rai liur ba Timor-Leste, dezeju ba soberania nasional, integridade territorial hanesan parte nasionalizmu ida ne’ebe labele halakon. Tamba ne’e mezmu invazaun forsa ida husi rai liur aas ne’ebe ladun bele ba iha trismestri ne’ebe besik ka dook, kapasidade atu oferese disuazivu ne’ebe kredibel ba forma forsa agresaun militar ida esterna ne’ebe tenki fo hanoin prioridade primeru ba F-FDTL nian. Segundu, konfiansa ba seguransa maritima Timor-Leste hanesan priorida fundamentu ba F-FDTL, Timor-Leste dadauk ne’e iha ona kapasidade hodi haforsa ninia seguransa maritima ne’ebe bele fo oportunidade ba krimi organizadu hodi halo krimi transnasional hanesan trafiku humanu, droga no kilat. Peska ilegal hanesan mos ameasa ba rekursu naturais, seguransa alimentar no soberania Timor-Leste. Ikus liu, operasaun military duke funu (MOOTW) tenki konsidera. MOOTW ne’e involve operasaun hanesan pasifikasaun no suporta ba autoridade sivil. Timor-Leste iha oportunidade hodi kontribui ba iha komunidade ida global ne’ebe diak ba iha misaun Nasoens Unidas (ONU), ne’ebe hala’o husi nasaun sira seluk durante periodu pos-konflitu Timor-Leste. Partisipasaun iha misaun mos sei fo benefisiu hodi bele prepara F-FDTL ho esperensia operasaun ne’ebe barak nomos benefisiu ba dezenvolvimentu Timor-Leste. Aleinde ne mos dezafiu sira fo hanoin hela ba papel F-FDTL hodi fo suporta ba forsa sivil. Dadauk ne’e, F-FDTL so bele desloka karik iha situasaun urjenti ka ho desizaun hamutuk husi governu no Presidenti da Republika, tantu ba operasaun seguransa internu ka asistensia ba dezastre. Maibe F-FDTL hala’o ona operasaun ba seguransa interna la ho deklarasaun, no ida ne’e hanesan presendente ne’ebe perigu hodi uza F-FDTL ne’ebe la tuir konstituisaun. Uza F-FDTL ba iha servisu paz hanesan asistensia ba dezeastre, no mos asistensia infrastrutura no Saudi mos persiza tau konsiderasaun ne’ebe aas.
Kona ba kapasitasaun F-FDTL nian hodi fo disuazivu ne’ebe kredibel hasoru agresaun eksternu, estrutura forsa hetan sujere husi Forsa 2020 ne’ebe la realistiku ho objetivu fo orientasaun 3000 forsa hodi iha forsa ba funu konvesional, ekuantu faila hodi refleta katak karik hanesan kapasidade ne’ebe hato’o F-FDTL sei hasoru teknolijia no numeru ne’ebe aat liu husi nasaun vizinu sira. Se karik la iha invasaun husi rai liur, ida ne’e hanesan ekipamentu militar ne’ebe karun sei la halakon iha semana primeru husi invasaun ida husi agresor ida ne’ebe bele simu lalais superioridade aero no naval konaba F-FDTL. Ida ne’e foka ba iha Forsa 2020 ne’ebe planu husu kareta armadura, helikoptru funu nian, artilaria nato’on ba aviaun kiik sira no mos forsa naval ne’ebe kompletu ho artila rudal nian. Ekipamentu hanesan ne’e karun hodi bele hetan no defende nomos sei la iha intervensaun ne’ebe signifikadu ba nasaun sira ho kapasidade funu ne’ebe diak liu. Ita haree deit difikuldade forsa naval Indonesia (TNI-AL) ne’ebe iha ona no defende ro funu ne’ebe diak liu tamba ho rekursu humanu ne’ebe boot iha Indonesia nomos kapasidade tekniku no nia industria.
Forsa 2020 mos halo eru ho advokasia konaba sistema kilat espesifiku iha kazu balun duke kapasidade espesifiku. Izemplu sistema kilat ne’ebe uza hanesan M16 Amerika, Milan Missil guiado antitanque (ATGM) no M113 Transportadores pessoal blindado (APC), ikus mak funu Vietnam ne’ebe manas liu no la tuir funu konvensional modernu no sei lokaliza membru F-FDTL sira ho risku bot sekarik hasoru iha tempu ohin mai. Hanoi hostoria funu iha period 21 hatudu ona katak kombatente sira ne’ebe involve iha funu ne’e la konvensional bele hamosu impaktu perigu hasoru teknolojia no numeru ne’ebe diak ho rekursu ne’ebe mak diak liu.Tamba ne’e, F-FDTL defende postura defeza ne’ebe kredibel hasoru invasaun rai liu, sei diak liu hodi duni akizasaun kilat infantaria nivel aas ne’ebe bele perigu ba forsa konvensional ne’ebe ladun familiarizmu liu husi funu ne’ebe lakonvensional katak kilat bot hanesan Metralhadoras pesadas-HMG, haraun Granada otomatiku AGL), morteru no granada aero ka mortars and man-portable Missil de superficie para ar (SAM) nomos ATGM. Kilat sira hanesan ne’e laos tahu forsa inimigu sira ba risku maibe mos kareta lapis baja, helikoptru, no aviaun funu hodi nune’e obriga ema ba potensiu funu. Aleindene’e, kapasidade hanesan ne’e prepara luan ona iha industria kilat global ne’ebe kompetetivu liu no bele hetan hodi halo investasaun fiskal ne’ebe naton duke kapasidade ne’ebe hato’o ba Forsa 2020, hodi nune’e fo dezafiu ne’ebe bele atinji, iha kontinuasaun no bele jere osan ba invazaun Timor-Leste.
Konaba seguransa maritima, Timor-Leste hasoru ameasa ba ninia soberania seguransa tamba hahalok krimi transnasional no mos kaptura peska ilegal sira, ne’ebe aproveita kapasidade kontrolu husi seguransa maritima husi nasaun refere. Tantu F-FDTL no PNTL hasoru difikuldades bot hodi halo hala’o no defende ro patrola 5 ho kilat nato’on no ro 3 husi Korea do Sul inklui Xina ba halo operasaun tuir lei, kobre iha tasi no mos halo operasaun ba dezastre ruma, defende F-FDTL ne’e defisil hodi halo servisu seguransa maritima ne’ebe fundamentu liu. Mezmu ida ne’e espresa absurdeza F-FDTL ne’ebe dezenvolve forsa naval naton ne’ebe kompletu ho ro funu nomos rudal. Tamba ne’edezenvolvimentu kapasitsaun hala’o hodi halo operasaun seguransa maritime tenki sai prioridade duke planu hodi dezenvolve forsa naval natoon ne’ebe sei halo invazaun finanseru ne’ebe signifikante no liu kapasidade tekniku no industria Timor-Leste ne’ebe bele defende.
Intersante, governu Australia oferese ona atu ajuda Timor-Leste ro patroliu foun rua ne’ebe halo husi Austal iha Australia Oeste, parte ida husi program segundu ro patroli ba paz inklui treinamentu ba membru no asistensia manutensaun ba vida moris. Programa ne’e prepara ona nasaun 12 ho kapasidade atu halo vijilansia maritime no proteze peskador sira tuir lei nomos asistensia dezastre naturais no humanu ho objetivu atu prevene peska ilegal sira no krimi transnasional inklui ajuda ba autoridade sivil ba tempu ohin mai. Dezastre naturais ne’e opsaun ida ne’ebe bele maneja fundus no kontinuasaun ba F-FDTL hodi dezenvolve kapasidade seguransa maritima ne’ebe kredibel, liuliu wainhira konsidera F-FDTL no PNTL nia rekordasaun servisu hodi bele hetan no defende ro patrol segundu husi Portugal, Xina no Korea do Sul.
Kona ba dezenvolvimentu F-FDTL ba operasaun militar aleinde funu (MOOTW) fator balun mos tenki konsidera. (PKO) ida ne’e obriga F-FDTL iha forsa maizumenus membru 120 ne’ebe preparadu nomos presiza kursu lingua ne’ebe importante. Treinamentu kultura no potensia ba komunidade ne’ebe iha transporte (motor) ne’ebe bele salva (PMV’s) hanesan Busmaster halo husi Australia hodi salva sira iha zona konflitu. Ida ne’e mos presiza siklu dezenvolvimentu ne’ebe preparadu no kompania 1 atu iha posibilidade ba kompania 1 infantaria ne’ebe kontinua iha APKO’s. ba asistensia hasoru forsa sivil, komponenti tekniku no mediku ne’ebe luan husi F-FDTL mos tenki tetu tantu liu husi asistensia naturais no husi kontribuisaun ba periodu paz ba dezenvolvimentu infrastrutura rural no asistensia mediku.
Rekomendasaun
1. Estratejia defeza nasional tenki realistiku no bele selu, rekuinese finanseiru no rekursu humanu ne’ebe preparadu ba F-FDTL no kapasidade funu konvensional husi nia vizinus sira.
2. F-FDTL tenki foka ba dezenvolvimentu kapasidade seguransa maritima ne’ebe iha kontinuasaun hodi kontra krimi transnasional no peska ilegal sira, no fo asistensia humanu hodi salva ema nia vida.
3. F-FDTL tenki dezenvolve siklu preparasaun no formasaun ba komponente rai hodi bele fo kontribuisaun kompania ba forsa manutensaun paz ONU nian.
4. Habelar komponente enjinaria no mediku F-FDTL hodi suporta ba forsa sivil durante stadu de emerjensia, no servisu dezenvolvimentu ba periodu paz nian.
Time for a New Defense Policy in Timor-Leste
With Timor-Leste’s VII Constitutional Government soon to be formed, Fundasaun Mahein (FM) calls on the new Government, in particular the Ministry of Defense working in cooperation with the FALINITIL Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL) to develop an updated, relevant and achievable Defense Policy. Whilst significant focus has been placed on developing policy for the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL) and supporting its implementation, defense has not received the necessary attention required for the F-FDTL to appropriately contribute to Timor-Leste’s national defense and security. The standing Defense Policy, Force 2020, published in 2007, has yet to be implemented, is overly ambitious, unaffordable and ineffective in orientating the F-FDTL for national defense and international security cooperation.
This new policy should identify the threats, challenges and opportunities facing Timor-Leste, what roles and responsibilities the F-FDTL has in addressing these issues, and formulate a course of action to develop the F-FDTL into an institution capable of national defense and international security cooperation. This policy should be inclusive of an integrated investment plan that that details the financial investment required to deliver and sustain the F-FDTL, inclusive of infrastructure, equipment and human resources. Recognizing this, what are the threats, challenges and opportunities Timor-Leste faces?
Having been brutally occupied for 24 years by Indonesia, and before that colonized by Portugal, the Timorese people have a long memory of and distrust towards foreign military powers operating in Timor-Leste, and the desire for national sovereignty and territorial integrity is an indelible part of the national psyche. Therefore, although invasion by an external military power is highly unlikely in both the near and far term, the capacity to offer a credible deterrent to military aggression from a foreign power must remain the F-FDTL’s first priority. Secondly, ensuring Timor-Leste’s maritime security should be the F-FDTL’s next priority, as Timor-Leste currently lacks the capacity to enforce its maritime security, which offers organized crime groups (OC) opportunities to engage in transnational crime such as human trafficking, narcotic and arms smuggling. Illegal fishing is also a threat to Timor-Leste’s natural resources, food security and prosperity. Finally, Military operations other than war (MOOTW) must be considered. MOOTW involves operations such as peacekeeping and support to civil authorities. Timor-Leste has the opportunity to contribute as a good global citizen to United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping (PKO) missions, much as other states did during Timor-Leste’s post-conflict period. Participating in UN missions would also have the added benefit of providing F-FDTL personnel with much needed operational experience and an additional stream of revenue for Timor-Leste’s development. Additionally, challenges remain around the F-FDTL’s role in providing support to the civil power. Currently, the F-FDTL can only be deployed during a State of Siege or a State of Emergency after a joint decision by the Government and the President of the Republic, be this respectively for internal security operations or disaster relief. However, the F-FDTL has been deployed for internal security operations without said Declarations, and this sets a dangerous precedent for the unconstitutional use of the F-FDTL. The utility of deploying the F-FDTL for peacetime tasks such as disaster relief, as well as for infrastructure and medical support should also be given greater consideration.
Regarding the F-FDTL’s capacity to provide a credible deterrent to external aggression, the force structure suggested by Force 2020 is fiscally unrealistic, aiming to orientate a 3000-strong force towards having high-end conventional war fighting capabilities, whilst failing to recognize that even if such capabilities where acquired, the F-FDTL would still face severe technological and numerical overmatch from its neighbors. In the unlikely event of a foreign invasion, these highly expensive military hardware acquisitions would likely be decimated in the first few weeks of an invasion by an aggressor that would quickly achieve air and naval superiority over the F-FDTL. This is in reference to Force 2020 plans to acquire Armored Vehicles, Attack Helicopters, light Artillery, light Anti-aircraft Artillery, and a light naval force of Corvettes and Frigates armed with guide missiles. Such hardware is expensive to acquire and sustain, nor would it present a significant deterrent to states with vastly superior conventional war fighting capabilities. One only has to look at the difficulty the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) has had in acquiring and sustaining its more sophisticated surface warships, despite Indonesia’s greater human resources, and its technical and industrial capacity.
Force 2020 also makes the mistake of advocating for specific weapons systems in some cases, rather than specific capabilities. Examples of this include outdated weapon systems such as American M16 rifles, French Milan anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM’s) and M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC’s), the latter of which are of Vietnam War era vintage and totally unsuited for modern conventional warfare, and would place their F-FDTL crews at high risk if facing a contemporary opponent. Considering the history of warfare in the 21st century alone, it has been demonstrated that combatants engaging in unconventional warfare can inflict severe causalities on technological and numerically superior opponents with far fewer resources. Therefore, for the F-FDTL to maintain a credible defense posture to external invasion, it would be better off pursuing the acquisitions of advanced infantry weapons that would put at risk hostile conventional forces through unconventional warfare, namely heavy weapons such as Heavy Machine Guns (HMG), Automatic Grenade Launchers (AGL), mortars and man-portable Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) and ATGM’s. Such weaponry would not only place enemy troops at risk, but also their Armored Vehicles, Attack Helicopters and Combat Aircraft, hence imposing both human and hardware costs on any potential invader. Additionally, such capabilities are widely available within a competitive global arms industry and could be acquired for a much lower fiscal investment than the capabilities advocated for in Force 2020, and therefore provide a much more achievable, sustainable and cost-effective deterrent to an invasion of Timor-Leste.
Regarding maritime security, Timor-Leste faces threats to its sovereignty and security due to the actions of actors engaged in transnational crime and illegal fishing, who take advantage of the State’s maritime security capacity shortfalls. That both the F-DFTL and PNTL have to date had great difficulty in deploying and sustaining their 5 unsophisticated and lightly armed patrol boats (3 South Korean and 2 Chinese) for basic law enforcement operations, fisheries protection and search and rescue tasks, reinforces that the F-FDTL is hard-pressed to conduct even the most basic maritime security tasks. This also reveals the absurdity of the F-FDTL developing a light naval force equipped with guide-missile armed warships. Therefore, the development of a sustainable capacity to conduct maritime security operations should take precedence over plans to develop a light naval force which would require significant financial investment and exceed Timor-Leste’s technical and industrial capacity to sustain.
Interestingly, the Australian Government has offered to donate to Timor-Leste two new Pacific Patrol Boats built by Austal in Western Australia, as part of the second generation of the Pacific Patrol Boat Program, inclusive of crew training and through-life maintenance support. This Program has already provided 12 Pacific nations with the capacity to conduct maritime surveillance, fisheries protection, law enforcement operations, search and rescue and humanitarian relief, which has served to deter illegal fishing and transnational crime, as well enabled support to civil authorities in times of natural disaster. This offer provides the most cost-effective and sustainable option for the F-FDTL to develop a credible maritime security capability, especially when considering the F-FDTL and PNTL’s track record in acquiring and sustaining second patrol boats from Portugal, China and South Korea.
Regarding the deployment of the F-FDTL for Military operations other than war (MOOTW) several factors must be considered. Whilst there would be financial incentives and operational experience to be gained through participation in UN Peacekeeping operations (PKO), this would require the F-FDTL to have up to a company sized force (approximately 120 soldiers) available for deployment, and require specialized language, cultural and civil affairs training, and potentially require the acquisition of Protected Mobility Vehicles (PMV’s) such as the Australian-made Bushmaster, for their safety in conflict zones. This would also require the development of a readiness cycle within the F-FDTL’s regular Infantry Battalion, with 1 Infantry Company readying, 1 Company ready and 1 Company in reset, to allow for the continuous deployment of 1 Infantry Company on UN PKO’s. For support to the civil power, expansion of the F-FDTL Engineering and Medical components should also be considered, both for disaster relief assistance, and for peacetime contributions to rural infrastructure development and medical support.
Recommendations
1. National Defense strategy should be realistic and affordable, recognizing the financial and human resource available to the F-FDTL and the conventional war fighting capabilities of its neighbors.
2. The F-FDTL should focus on the development of a sustainable maritime security capability for countering transnational crime and illegal fishing, and providing for humanitarian relief and search and rescue capability.
3. The F-FDTL should develop a readiness and training cycle for the Land Component to contribute Company sized contributions to UN PKO’s.
4. Expansion of F-FDTL Engineering and Medical components for support to the civil power during a State of Emergency, and for peacetime development tasks